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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In their seminal paper, Miller und Modigliani (1961) show that payout policy does not 
affect firm value. Following their reasoning, firm value is solely determined by investment 
policy, whereas the payout to shareholders corresponds to the difference between 
investments and earnings. Even though Miller und Modigliani (1961) only discuss 
dividends as payout method, their argument can readily be applied to stock repurchases as 
well. When firm value is solely determined by investment policy, not only the amount of 
payout, but also the composition of the payout into dividends and stock repurchases is 
irrelevant from the perspective of shareholders. However, the dividend irrelevance 
proposition by Miller and Modigliani (1961) rests on the assumption of perfect capital 
markets. This dissertation examines implications of deviations from the assumption of 
perfect capital markets for payout policy and board structure empirically. 
 Perfect capital markets do not allow for tax differentials between different payout methods 
and do not imply a different market reaction to changes in the payout of dividends and 
stock repurchases. Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyzes the determinants of the amount 
and the composition of payout in the presence of market frictions. Another potential reason 
for the relevance of payout policy from the perspective of shareholders is based on agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) show that managers do not always act in the best interests of shareholders. These 
conflicts of interests manifest in cases, where firms generate large amount of free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986). Payout policy can play an important role in this context as an increase in the 
amount of payout reduces the amount of cash which is left to the discretion of the 
management. Even though payout policy can serve as a disciplining device for the 
management, Allen and Michaely (2003) refer to the role of the board as one shortcoming 
 2 
of this explanation. They question why boards that are aware of the overinvestment of 
management are not able to better monitor the management in the first place. Following 
this reasoning, Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation deal with the role of the (supervisory) 
board within the German corporate governance system.  
The work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) inspired much of the subsequent research in the field of corporate finance 
and corporate governance. Relaxing the assumptions of perfect capital markets, many 
studies in the field of corporate finance are concerned with the question of how the 
financing structure and payout policy should be determined in order to increase 
shareholders’ welfare. Similarly, studies in the field of corporate governance often 
investigate how corporate governance structures should be chosen in order to limit agency 
costs and increase shareholders’ welfare. In this context, Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation analyze the monitoring of the management by the supervisory board as one 
important aspect of the corporate governance structure.  The research in corporate finance 
and corporate governance is also concerned with the factors that determine the financing 
structure/payout policy and corporate governance structures of a firm. Chapters 2 and 4 of 
this dissertation investigate the determinants of executive compensation, director 
compensation and payout policy.  
Due to their closely related research topics, empirical studies in the field of corporate 
finance and corporate governance apply similar empirical methodologies. One of the most 
important issues confronting these studies is the problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity 
refers to the correlation between explanatory variables and the error term in a regression 
and can stem from three different sources: simultaneity, measurement errors, and omitted 
variables (Roberts and Whited, 2013). Simultaneity occurs if the causality between two 
variables could go either way, e.g. does a corporate governance characteristic drive 
corporate performance or does corporate performance lead to the implementation of a 
certain corporate governance characteristic? Measurement errors are caused by variables of 
interests that are measured incorrectly. This dissertation puts a special emphasis on the 
omitted variables problem. Endogeneity due to omitted variables arises if a factor that 
influences the dependent variable is not included in the regression and thereby appear in the 
error term. One way to deal with the omitted variables problem is the use of panel data. The 
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use of panel data allows controlling for the impact of past realizations of the dependent 
variable on their current realization. This is particularly relevant for path-dependent 
variables like capital structure or dividend payouts. However, the estimates of the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable are biased when the OLS or within-group 
estimator (WG) are used. Consistent estimates can be obtained by the GMM-in-systems 
(GMM (SYS)) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which is used in Chapter 4. Factors 
that are unobservable and thus difficult to quantify are another reason for an omitted 
variables problem. Important sources of unobserved heterogeneities are manager 
characteristics such as their skills, abilities and knowledge. These characteristics potentially 
influence firm performance but are difficult to quantify and observe. Standard panel data 
methods are usually sufficient to cope with unobserved heterogeneity of managers over a 
short-time horizon. In contrast, empirical studies over a longer time horizon (where the 
turnover of managers is more relevant) or empirical studies that are explicitly interested in 
measuring these unobserved heterogeneities call for advanced panel data methods that are 
used in Chapter 3.   
The predominant part of the research in the field of corporate finance and corporate 
governance is based on the US market. The US market is characterized, among other 
things, by a dispersed ownership structure and by a one-tier board system, where the tasks 
of advising and monitoring the management are combined in the board of directors. The 
corporate governance system of German firms exhibits fundamental differences to the US. 
Focusing on German firms allows investigating, whether the empirical evidence based on 
the institutional environment of US firms can be supported for firms operating in a different 
corporate governance system. In addition, new research questions derive from the 
peculiarities of the German corporate governance system. 
In three self-contained essays, this dissertation deals with the impact of board structure on 
firm performance and with determinants of executive compensation, director compensation, 
and payout policy. Each of the three chapters is based on panel data sets of German firms. 
Distinguishing features of the institutional environment of German firms lead to new and 
interesting insights compared to the evidence for the US market.  
The institutional environment of German and US firms in terms of their payout policy 
differs substantially. It was not before 1998, when a law came into force that allowed firms 
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to repurchase up to 10% of their shares. Prior to the adoption of this law stock repurchases 
were essentially prohibited in Germany. Furthermore, the relative tax treatment of 
dividends and stock repurchases changed considerably following a major tax reform in 
2001. Therefore, the institutional environment of German firms allows us
1
 to analyze how 
the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 and a major tax reform in 2001 affected the 
payout policy of German firms. Using different Lintner-type partial adjustment models we 
test competing theories regarding the choice of dividends and stock repurchases as payout 
methods in Chapter 4. The two-tiered board system is another important aspect that 
distinguishes the German system from the US system of corporate governance. German 
firms are required to set up an executive board which is responsible for running the firm 
and a supervisory board which is responsible for monitoring the members of the executive 
board. In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, chief executive officers 
(CEOs) often become a member or the chairman of the supervisory board of the same 
company upon retirement. We refer to this practice as CEO transitions. Chapter 2 explores 
the impact of former CEOs on the supervisory board on firm value, operating performance 
and executive as well as director compensation. The strict institutional separation of 
managers with leadership/advisory and managers with monitoring tasks within the two-
tiered board system also enables the investigation of their absolute and relative importance 
in explaining firm performance in Chapter 3. The three chapters are summarized in the 
following. 
Chapter 2.
2
 Chapter 2 is based on CEO transitions as a distinguishing feature of the 
German two-tiered board system. This practice has been discussed controversially because 
of potential conflicts of interest. On the one hand, the former CEO should monitor a 
management team that he just left. Close personal relations with his former colleagues 
could result into too cozy relations. These potential conflicts of interests might be 
detrimental to firm performance. On the other hand the former CEO might also be able to 
fulfill his monitoring task more effectively than other supervisory board members as he has 
arguably accumulated firm and industry expertise during his tenure. A former CEO on the 
                                                 
 
1
Chapters 2 and 4 of this dissertation are based on joint work with coauthors, whereas Chapter 3 is based 
on sole-authored work. This is indicated by the use of the corresponding personal pronouns throughout the 
introduction and the following chapters of this dissertation.   
 
2
This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Andres and Erik Theissen (Andres et al., 2013c). 
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supervisory board could also affect executive compensation as the personal connections 
between the former CEO in his task as a supervisor and his former colleagues can lead to a 
leniency bias which potentially causes higher executive compensation. As a former CEO on 
the supervisory board is also involved in setting the pay of the supervisory board members 
he may also use his impact to his own benefit and lobby for an increase in the 
compensation of the supervisory board. The consequences of former CEOs as members of 
the supervisory board have also been analyzed by some recent papers for the German 
market. In general these papers find no conclusive evidence regarding the effects of former 
CEOs on firm performance. A different paper by Fiss (2006) finds lower executive 
compensation in firms with a former CEO as chairman of the supervisory board and high 
ownership concentration. However, all these papers analyze individual aspects of CEO 
transitions.  
In contrast to this, our paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the economic 
consequences of CEO transitions. Our paper contributes to the literature in several other 
ways: We go beyond the usual dummy variable approach to capture former CEOs on the 
supervisory board by analyzing whether the amount of time the former CEO and the current 
executives spent together on the executive board also affects executive compensation. In 
addition to that, the impact of CEO transitions on director compensation has not been 
investigated before. We also go beyond the existing literature with regard to performance 
implications of CEO transitions. This is the first paper that explores the impact of former 
CEOs on the supervisory board on long-run performance. To this end, we construct 
portfolios of firms with a former CEO on the supervisory board and investigates the effect 
of CEO transitions by the Fama-French 3-factor, the Carhart 4-factor model and by 
calculating buy-and-hold-returns based on the market model. We use a panel data set 
covering 150 German listed firms over a 10-year period and find the following results: 
Consistent with the existence of a leniency bias, we show that executive compensation 
increases significantly with the joint tenure of the former CEO and the current executives 
on the executive board. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we also find that 
per-capita executive compensation increases significantly after a CEO transition. We 
further find weak evidence that the compensation of the members of the supervisory board 
is also higher. Short-run event study results indicate that the announcement of the transition 
of a retiring CEO to the supervisory board is considered as good news. Thus, despite the 
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increases in executive compensation, we can conclude that CEO transitions are not a cause 
of concern for shareholders. 
Chapter 3.
3
 Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on former CEOs as a specific type of monitors, 
this chapter explores the importance of managers with monitoring tasks on a more general 
level. Monitoring of executives is one way of constraining managerial abuse and protecting 
the interests of shareholders. Even though the board of directors has a dual role as advisor 
and monitor of executives (Adams and Ferreira, 2007), empirical studies for the one-tier 
board system of the US focus primarily on the monitoring function of the board of directors 
(Adams et al., 2010). Most studies follow an empirical setting that is similar to Chapter 2 as 
the monitoring function is assumed to be related to observable board characteristics like the 
size of the board or the proportion of outside directors on the board. However, unobserved 
heterogeneity of managers with monitoring tasks could also affect the effectiveness of the 
monitoring function, but received little attention by prior research. In contrast to this, a 
growing strand of the literature has shown an impact of individual managers with 
leadership tasks on firm policies and firm performance. The vast majority of these studies 
focus on the impact of executives and especially CEOs on firm performance. There are also 
some studies that focus on the impact of individual managers who are presumed to have 
monitoring functions, i.e. outside directors. However, all these studies focus on the impact 
of individual managers with the same tasks; i.e. they only analyze the impact of managers 
with leadership or monitoring tasks, but do not analyze their relative importance. 
Furthermore, the assignment of monitoring and advisory tasks to individual managers 
would be difficult for the one-tier board system. As already mentioned the German 
corporate governance system is characterized by a two-tiered board system with an 
executive and a supervisory board that can also be found in several European countries. 
The two-tiered board system allows the cleanest separation (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) of 
the leadership/advisory and monitoring task on the level of individual managers as the 
advisory function is assigned to the individual members of the executive and the 
monitoring function to the individual members of the supervisory board.  
The study in this chapter analyzes the impact of unobserved heterogeneity of managers 
with monitoring and leadership/advisory tasks and compares their relative importance in 
                                                 
 
3
This chapter is based on sole-authored work (Fernau, 2013).  
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explaining firm performance of German firms. The empirical methodology used in this 
study is based on Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (AKM method) (1999) and builds upon 
the recent progress in the adequate estimation of manager fixed effects. This method allows 
a more precise estimation of unobserved heterogeneity on the level of individual managers 
and the investigation of a larger number of managers. This study adds to the literature in the 
following important aspects: To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that 
investigates the absolute and relative impact of managers with fundamentally different 
tasks. This allows an evaluation of the importance of managers with monitoring tasks in 
absolute terms and relative to managers with leadership/advisory tasks in explaining firm 
performance. Second, the inclusion of the fixed effects of managers with monitoring tasks 
allows the reexamination of the link between the board structure and firm performance. 
This allows me to test the robustness of the size and the significance of some board 
characteristics in the presence of manager fixed effects. Third, the empirical setting allows 
a different investigation of the controversial issue discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. When manager fixed effects are interpreted as proxy for skills the empirical 
setting of this study allows the reinvestigation of the changes of former executives to the 
supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement on the level of individual managers. 
Using a comprehensive panel data set of 889 German listed firms for the period 1993-2011 
and controlling for a wide array of observable board, manager and firm characteristics, my 
results can be summarized as follows: The results suggest that fixed effects of managers 
with leadership/advisory and monitoring tasks are almost equally important in explaining 
firm performance. Moreover, a considerable smaller part of the variance in firm 
performance is explained by observable board characteristics than by the unobserved 
heterogeneity of individual managers with monitoring tasks (e.g. skills, motivation or 
reputation). The results indicate omitted variable bias problems in regression models 
without manager fixed effects as the size and the significance of some board characteristics 
changes in regressions accounting for manager fixed effects. Corroborating the findings of 
earlier studies and the findings in Chapter 2, CEO transitions are not a cause of concern for 
shareholders. The interpretation of manager fixed effects as skills yields another interesting 
insight into the working of the two-tiered system. The results suggest that firm performance 
only depends on the aggregate skills in both boards, but not on the skill distribution 
between or within the executive and supervisory board. 
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Chapter 4.
4
 Whereas Chapter 2 and 3 are based on the two-tiered board structure of 
German firms, Chapter 4 builds upon the institutional setting for the payout policy of 
German firms.  The changes in the institutional setting of German allow us to analyze how 
the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 and a major tax reform in 2001 affected the 
payout policy of German firms and thereby to test competing theories regarding the choice 
between dividends and stock repurchases as payout methods. Two central questions that 
attracted the attention of financial economists for a long time with regard to payout policy 
are the following: How do firms decide on the amount of cash to be paid out to 
shareholders and which payout method should they use? As early as in 1956 Lintner 
developed a partial adjustment model for dividend payouts that is still the workhorse of 
many empirical investigations in this field. At the time when Lintner developed his model 
dividends were by far the more important payout method than stock repurchases. However, 
the volume of stock repurchases increased significantly since then and even surpassed the 
volume of dividend payouts in recent years (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). This gives raise 
to the question if and how stock repurchases can be integrated in a Lintner-type partial 
adjustment of total payout. How stock repurchases should be integrated in a Lintner-type 
partial adjustment model hinges on the economic reasons that drive the choice between 
dividends and stock repurchases as payout methods. The Lintner model should be better in 
explaining total payouts rather than dividends if the assumptions of Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) apply and both payout methods are good substitutes for each other. In contrast to 
this the model specification could change with the tax regime if tax differentials drive the 
choice between dividends and stock repurchases. When one follows the financial flexibility 
hypothesis brought forward by Jagannathan et al. (2000), a Lintner-type partial adjustment 
model have to consider different kinds of earnings, i.e. permanent earnings, that determine 
the payout of dividends and transitory earnings that drive stock repurchases.  
In this chapter we test these competing theories for the choice between dividends and stock 
repurchases by using Lintner-type partial adjustment models. The paper adds to the 
literature in the following ways: This is the first paper that analyzes the implications of the 
introduction of stock repurchases for the magnitude and determinants of dividend payouts 
within the framework of partial adjustment models. Moreover, we evaluate whether 
                                                 
 
4
This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Andres, Markus Doumet and Erik Theissen (Andres et 
al., 2013b). 
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Lintner-type partial adjustment models are better in explaining dividend payouts or total 
payouts and do not restrict our sample to firms with a particular history of payout decisions 
as in Skinner (2008). Using the decomposition of earnings into a permanent and a transitory 
part, this is to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that tests the flexibility hypothesis 
(brought forward by Jagannathan et al., 2000) within a Lintner-type partial adjustment 
model. We also account for the role of special dividends as a potential substitute for the 
payout of transitory earnings prior to the introduction of stock repurchases. Using GMM-
in-systems estimations and a large panel of German firms covering the period 1988-2008, 
our results can be summarized as follows: Our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that dividends and stock repurchases are close substitutes. They are also inconsistent with 
the prediction that tax considerations are a major driver of payout decisions. Rather, our 
results support the flexibility hypothesis which predicts that dividends are used to disburse 
permanent earnings while stock repurchases are used to disburse transitory earnings.
 10 
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Chapter 2 
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
Former CEOs as Monitors 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One distinguishing feature of the German corporate governance system is the two-tiered 
board structure with an executive board and a supervisory board. The executive board runs 
the firm while the main task of the supervisory board is to monitor the executive board. The 
members of the supervisory board are elected by shareholders and employees (according to 
German co-determination laws). The supervisory board, in turn, nominates the members of 
the executive board and sets their pay.  
A person cannot be a member of both boards simultaneously. What can and often does 
happen, though, is that the CEO,
1
 after retiring, becomes a member of the supervisory 
board. We refer to this practice as CEO transitions. In the majority of the cases (about 60% 
in our sample) a former CEO who becomes a member of the supervisory board is then 
elected chairman of the board. This is potentially important because the chairman of the 
supervisory board almost always also chairs the compensation committee.  
                                                 
 
1
The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) stipulates that the board members manage the firm 
jointly and decide by majority vote. The law explicitly prohibits that one member (or a group of members) 
can decide against the majority of the members of the executive board. The executive board is not required to 
have a chairman. If a chairman is appointed (as is the case in most corporations), his powers are less broad 
than those of a CEO in a UK or US corporation. It may therefore be incorrect to translate "chairman of the 
executive board" as "CEO". However, for expositional efficiency, we stick to the term CEO.  
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The transition of a former CEO to the supervisory board has been discussed controversially. 
On the one hand the former CEO has accumulated firm and industry expertise, which 
should allow him to fulfill his monitoring task effectively. On the other hand he becomes 
the supervisor of the management team that he just left. This entails the danger of too cozy 
relations. The personal connection likely leads to a leniency bias, which may result in 
higher executive compensation. In addition, the former CEO may be reluctant to criticize or 
revoke decisions he took during his tenure as CEO. He may even exert pressure on his 
successor not to challenge the strategy or organizational structure he implemented during 
his tenure. In consequence, a former CEO who becomes chair of the supervisory board may 
impede necessary changes.  
These potential conflicts of interest have sparked regulatory change. In 2005 a provision 
dealing with the issue was added to the German Corporate Governance Code.
2
 It 
recommended that “it shall not be the rule” for the former CEO or a former executive board 
member to become chairman of the supervisory board. This provision had little practical 
effect. Therefore a new law was enacted and came into force in 2009. It introduced a 
“cooling-off period” for former executives who wish to become supervisory board 
members. A person who was a member of an exchange-listed firm’s executive board within 
the past two years cannot become a member of the same firm’s supervisory board.3 This 
provision is not limited to the position of chairman (as was the case under the code’s 
recommendation).  
It is a priori unclear whether the advantages or the disadvantages of having a former CEO 
on the supervisory board dominate (and, consequently, whether or not the new law can be 
justified on economic grounds). We therefore address this issue empirically. We construct a 
panel data set covering 150 German listed firms over a 10-year period. We use this data set 
to analyze three questions. First, we ask whether the promotion of a former CEO to the 
supervisory board affects firm value. To answer this question we perform both short-term 
and long-term event studies. Second, we analyze whether the presence of a former CEO on 
the supervisory board affects the operating performance of the firm. Third, we investigate 
                                                 
2
The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. 
Compliance is not mandatory. Rather, firms have to publish an annual declaration of conformity that states 
their degree of compliance. See Section 2.2 and Andres and Theissen (2008) for more details.  
 
3
There is an exception that is tailored to family firms. See Section 2.2 below for details.  
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whether the level of executive compensation or the level of director compensation
4
 is 
different in firms in which a former CEO serves on the supervisory board. To this end we 
estimate panel regressions and perform a difference-in-differences analysis.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The short-run event study results indicate that 
firm value increases when a former CEO becomes a member of the supervisory board. The 
result of the long-run event study and of the analysis of operating performance point in the 
same direction but are mostly insignificant. Executive compensation increases in the 
amount of time the former CEO and the current executives were jointly sitting on the 
executive board. This joint tenure time is a proxy for the strength of the personal relation 
between the former CEO and the current executives. In a difference-in-differences analysis 
we find that per-capita executive compensation increases after a CEO transition. This effect 
is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. The annual per capita 
compensation of the members of the executive board is found (after controlling for other 
variables such as firm size) to increase by about € 123,000 when the departing CEO 
becomes an ordinary member of the supervisory board and by about € 276,000 when the 
departing CEO becomes the chairman of the supervisory board. Results with respect to 
director compensation are less clear but, if anything, point towards higher director 
compensation in firms with a former CEO on the supervisory board. When considered in 
isolation, the results on executive and director compensation appear to support the critics of 
CEO transitions. However, because the analysis of share price and operating performance 
indicates a positive performance effect of CEO transitions, our findings do not support the 
conclusion that CEO transitions are disadvantageous to shareholders.  
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, and most importantly, it is 
related to some recent papers that have also analyzed the transition of former CEOs to the 
supervisory board of German listed corporations. Both Bermig and Frick (2010) and 
Grigoleit et al. (2011) analyze whether firms with a former CEO at the helm of the 
supervisory board have higher firm values or deliver better operating performance. While 
Bermig and Frick (2010) find some evidence of a negative effect, Grigoleit et al. (2011) 
conclude that there is "no significant relation between supervisory board membership of 
former executive board members and firm performance" (p. 608). Grigoleit (2011) uses 
                                                 
 
4
We use the term "executives" for the members of the executive board and the term "directors" for the 
members of the supervisory board.  
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short-run event study methodology and concludes that the announcement of a CEO 
transition has no significant impact on share prices. Bresser and Valle Thiele (2008) find 
that the current CEO of a firm is more likely to be replaced in response to poor 
performance when a former CEO chairs the supervisory board. Fiss (2006) reports that 
executive compensation is lower in firms that have a former CEO at the helm of the 
supervisory board and that have high ownership concentration. All papers alluded to above 
focus on individual aspects of CEO transitions. Ours is the first paper that provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of CEO transitions. It is also the 
first paper that use a difference-in-differences approach to study the effects on executive 
compensation of CEO transitions, and it is the first paper that analyzes director 
compensation in addition to executive compensation.  
On a more general level our paper is related to the literature on the magnitude and 
determinants of executive compensation (see the surveys by Murphy, 1999; Aggarwal, 
2008; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; for evidence from Germany, see Schmid, 1997; Elston 
and Goldberg, 2003; Kaserer and Wagner, 2004; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006). We draw on 
this literature to determine the set of control variables to be included in our analysis of 
executive compensation.  
Our paper is further related to several papers that analyze the relation between executive 
compensation and board structure. Hallock (1997) and Core et al. (1999) report that 
executive compensation in US firms with reciprocally interlocking boards
5
 is higher than in 
other firms. Agrawal and Nasser (2012), also using US data, find that the presence of an 
independent director who is also a blockholder reduces executive pay. Lawrence and 
Stapledon (1999), on the other hand, find no evidence that the proportion of independent 
directors on the boards of Australian firms affects executive compensation. Fahlenbrach et 
al. (2010) find that the appointment of the CEO of another firm as outside director does not 
affect CEO compensation. Boyle and Roberts (2010) analyze a sample of New Zealand 
firms in some of which the CEO is a member of the compensation committee. They 
document higher pay increases (but not higher pay levels) and lower pay–performance 
sensitivity in these firms. Evans et al. (2010) discuss whether a departing CEO should be 
                                                 
 
5
Hallock (1997) defines an interlocking board as follows. “[T]he current CEO of firm A serves as a 
director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A” (p. 331).  
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retained on the board of US firms. They do not, however, analyze whether this decision has 
implications for executive compensation. 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the duality of the CEO and chairman of the 
board roles in UK and US corporations. While this literature addresses the question whether 
one person should hold these two titles at the same time, we ask whether one person should 
hold these titles serially. Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993) and others argue that 
management and control should be separated. Brickley et al. (1997) challenge this view. 
They provide a thorough discussion of potential costs and benefits of separate titles. The 
results of their empirical analysis lead them to tentatively conclude that "the widespread 
practice of combining the titles of CEO and chairman is indeed efficient" (p. 218) and "that 
legislative reforms forcing separate titles are misguided" (pp. 218-219). Such a reform 
obviously implements a "one size fits all" approach. This has been criticized by Dey et al. 
(2011). These authors find that firms that split the CEO and chairman titles in response to 
environmental pressure "have significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent 
performance" (p. 1595). This supports the view that one size may not fit all. A similar 
argument may apply to the new German law (mentioned above and discussed in more detail 
in the next section) that came into force in 2009.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of important ways. As noted above, it is 
the first paper that provides a comprehensive analysis of the implications of CEO 
transitions for firm value, operating performance, and executive compensation. We are also 
the first to analyze whether the amount of time the former CEO and current executives 
spent together on the executive board affects executive pay. Finally, ours is the first paper 
that considers the impact of CEO transitions on director compensation. As a side product of 
our analysis, we deliver an up-to-date analysis of the determinants of executive and director 
compensation in Germany. We also go beyond the existing literature by analyzing long-run 
performance. Specifically, we build portfolios of firms with a former CEO on the 
supervisory board and test for abnormal long-run performance using the Fama-French 3-
factor and the Carhart 4-factor model. In addition, we calculate buy-and-hold-returns based 
on the market model.  
Our results are important in several respects. First, they contribute to the regulatory debate 
about the desirability of having a former CEO on the supervisory board. Against the 
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background of our evidence, the new law which came into force in 2009 and which 
impedes, or at least delays, the transition of a former CEO to the supervisory board is 
questionable. Second, our finding that a former CEO serving on the supervisory board 
exerts his influence to increase executive compensation supports the existence of a leniency 
bias. The result that executive compensation is increasing in the amount of time the former 
CEO and the current executives spent together on the executive board supports the view 
that stronger personal relations and common experiences increase the leniency bias. Our 
finding (albeit weak) that director compensation tends to be higher when a former CEO is 
at the helm of the supervisory board is consistent with the view that former CEOs exert 
their influence not only to the benefit of their successors and former colleagues, but also to 
their own benefit. Finally, on a more general level our results deliver insights into the 
working of a two-tiered board structure. This is particularly relevant because the 
introduction of the statute of the Societas Europaea (SE) allows SEs in all European Union 
countries, including those that formerly allowed only one-tier boards, to adopt a two-tiered 
board structure. The German experience with two-tiered boards may provide some 
guidance on the optimal organizational form.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institutional 
setting. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents the data set and some 
descriptive statistics. The design and results of our performance analysis are discussed in 
Section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains the results of our analysis of executive and director 
compensation, and Section 2.7 presents our conclusions. 
2.2 Institutional setting 
This section briefly reviews the institutional background and corporate governance 
regulations in Germany. The German equity market is characterized by concentrated 
ownership structures and an inactive market for corporate control (Franks and Mayer, 
2001). Consequently, monitoring by blockholders is an important corporate governance 
mechanism. Among these blockholders, founding families, domestic financials (banks and 
insurance companies), and other domestic corporations have traditionally been the most 
important ones. In recent years, however, bank equity ownership in non-financial firms has 
diminished (Dittmann et al., 2010) and foreign investors have gained importance. 
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To make the German corporate governance system more transparent, particularly for 
foreign investors, Germany introduced the Corporate Governance Code in 2002. The 
German Corporate Governance Code (hereafter "the code") contains recommendations and 
suggestions deemed to constitute “good governance.” The code is updated regularly and 
contains sections on shareholders and the general meeting, the executive board, the 
supervisory board, cooperation between these two boards, transparency, and the reporting 
and auditing of annual financial statements. 
Firms are not obliged to follow the recommendations of the code. However, the Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG) requires that listed firms publish an annual 
declaration of conformity. It must contain the information that the recommendations of the 
code “have been and are being complied with or which of the code’s recommendations are 
not being applied.”6,7 This is referred to as the “comply-or-explain principle” and is a 
building block of corporate governance regulations in a large number of European and non-
European countries. 
The German Stock Corporation Act stipulates a two-tiered board structure with an 
executive board and a supervisory board. The executive board (Vorstand) is responsible for 
running the firm. The supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which is composed of shareholder 
and employee representatives,
8
 monitors the executive board, appoints and dismisses 
executives, and sets their remuneration. The final decision about executive compensation is 
made by the whole supervisory board. The decision may be prepared by a compensation 
committee. Usually, the chairman of the supervisory board also chairs the compensation 
committee.
9
 
                                                 
 
6
This is a translation of Article 161 of the Aktiengesetz adopted from http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/entsprechenserklaerung/index.html, the official homepage of the Corporate Governance 
Commission. Besides recommendations the code also contains suggestions. No declaration of conformity 
must be made with respect to suggestions.  
 
7
Even though all exchange-listed corporations are obliged to publish a declaration of conformity, 
companies have been very reluctant to comply with some recommendations of the code. For example, only a 
small minority of firms complied with the recommendation to publish executive remuneration on an 
individual basis (Andres and Theissen, 2008). 
 
8
According to several codetermination laws, German corporations must allow employee representatives on 
the supervisory board. Simply put, one-third (one-half) of supervisory board seats are filled with employee 
representatives in companies with more than 500 (2,000) employees. 
 
9
The German Corporate Governance Code recommends that, in case a compensation committee exists, the 
chairman of the supervisory board shall also chair that committee. During 2003–2007, compliance rates with 
this recommendation were between 86% and 100% for firms included in the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX indices 
and exceeded 95% in most years (von Werder and Talaulicar, 2007).  
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It is not uncommon for CEOs of German corporations to become either a member or the 
chairman of the supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement. This “tradition” has 
been criticized by shareholder rights groups since it is likely that conflicts of interest arise 
(see Section 2.3 for a discussion). In 2005 a provision dealing with the issue was added to 
the code. It recommended that “it shall not be the rule” for the former CEO or a former 
executive board member to become chairman of the supervisory board. As stated above, 
firms do not have to follow the recommendations of the code. In addition, this particular 
recommendation cannot be interpreted as a general ban, since it only stated that the transfer 
from the executive to the supervisory board “shall not be the rule.” Consequently, the 
provision had little practical effect. 
In 2009 a new law on the “appropriateness of management board compensation” (VorstAG) 
came into force. Among other things, the law introduced a “cooling-off period” for former 
executives who wish to become supervisory board members: According to § 100 (2) of the 
AktG, a person who was a member of an exchange-listed firm’s executive board within the 
past two years cannot become a member of the same firm’s supervisory board.10 This 
provision is not limited to the position of chairman (as was the case under the 
recommendation of the code). Potential conflicts of interest were stated as the main reason 
for the new rule. Our data covers the period 1998–2007 and is thus not affected by the new 
law. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
This paper’s main objective is to analyze whether the transition to the supervisory board of 
a retiring CEO has implications for firm value, the operating performance, or the 
compensation of executives or directors. As already stated in the introduction there are 
arguments in favor of both positive and negative effects.  
During his tenure a CEO accumulates firm and industry expertise and builds relations to 
suppliers, customers, large owners and creditors. Upon transition to the supervisory board 
                                                 
 
10
The law also contains an exception from the ban: If the suggestion to elect the former executive to the 
supervisory board is due to shareholders (with a quorum of 25% of votes), a former executive can directly 
become member of the supervisory board without taking the two-year waiting period into account. The 
exception was explicitly tailored to the interests of family firms, where founders or other family members 
should be able to monitor executives after their retirement. 
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after retirement he thus should be in a position to fulfill his monitoring task effectively and 
to provide valuable advice to the executive board. According to the stewardship theory of 
management, managers will use their expertise and their connections in the best interest of 
the firm. As a consequence, the appointment of a retiring CEO to the supervisory board 
should be regarded as good news by investors. We therefore have 
H2.1a (Share price performance - "stewardship theory"): Share prices react 
positively to the announcement that a retiring CEO will become a member of the 
supervisory board.  
If the stewardship theory holds, the appointment should also improve the operating 
performance of the firm. We thus have 
H2.2a (Operating performance - "stewardship theory"): Firms with a former CEO on 
the supervisory board have better operating performance. 
The stewardship theory essentially assumes that there are no conflicts of interest between 
the former CEO and the firm. This does not have to be the case. In his new role as 
supervisor the former CEO may be reluctant to criticize or revoke decisions he took during 
his tenure as CEO. He may even exert pressure on his successor (the new CEO) not to 
challenge the strategy or organizational structure he implemented during his tenure. In 
consequence, a former CEO who becomes chair of the supervisory board may impede 
necessary changes. The German legislator adopted such a more skeptical view. In the 
proposed resolution for the decision on the law on the “appropriateness of management 
board compensation” in parliament, it was argued that it is “alarming” that former 
executives are given the opportunity to constrain actions of the current executive board to 
correct strategic mistakes or to resolve irregularities that lead back to their time as CEO 
(Bundestag, 2009).  
This more pessimistic view on the role of the former CEO results in the "agency theory" 
counterparts of hypotheses 2.1a and 2.2a above.  
H2.1b (Share price performance - "agency theory"): Share prices react negatively to 
the announcement that a retiring CEO will become a member of the supervisory 
board.  
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H2.2b (Operating performance - "agency theory"): Firms with a former CEO on the 
supervisory board have worse operating performance.  
As noted earlier, a former CEO who becomes a member of the supervisory board also 
becomes involved in setting executive pay. This is particularly true in cases in which the 
former CEO is elected chairman of the supervisory board, because the chair of the 
supervisory board almost always also chairs the compensation committee.  
There are several arguments that suggest that executive compensation will be higher when 
a former CEO is on the supervisory board. The former CEO will typically have close 
personal relations with his former colleagues on the executive board. Out of a feeling of 
(excessive) loyalty to his former colleagues he may feel inclined to give in to their requests 
for higher compensation. In many cases, the evaluation of the performance of an executive 
(particularly with respect to long-term objectives) includes a subjective assessment besides 
objective performance measures. This is referred to as “subjective performance evaluation” 
(Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Prendergast (1999) points out that the principal’s 
discretionary authority often leads to a positive bias, the so-called leniency bias.
11
 Giebe 
and Gürtler (2012) present a model in which supervisor leniency is consistent with optimal 
contracts under informational asymmetries in a three-tiered hierarchy – principal, 
supervisor, and agent, which is precisely the environment we observe in public firms in 
which the supervisor (i.e. the supervisory board) is not the ultimate principal (i.e. 
shareholders). In our context, personal connections between the former CEO (who is now 
the supervisor) and his fellow executives can lead to favoritism (Prendergast and Topel, 
1996) and will most likely exacerbate the leniency bias. As a result, executives may receive 
higher remuneration packages in firms in which one of their former peers serves as member 
of the supervisory board.  
Previous research (e.g. Fiss, 2006; Westphal and Zajac, 1995) has found that greater 
similarity between the CEO and the board results in higher pay. Fiss (2006, p. 1017) argues 
that "it seems appropriate to expand similarity between executives and the board to also 
include similar experiences." Obviously, a retiring CEO who becomes a member of the 
                                                 
 
11
The most obvious reason for a positive leniency bias lies in the fact that it is simply unpleasant for a 
supervisor to offer negative ratings to an agent, which is why the supervisor refrains from doing so 
(Prendergast, 1999). Subrahmanyam (2008) offers an alternative explanation based on the concept of social 
networks.  
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supervisory board shares many experiences with the management team. The level of similar 
experiences is increasing in the amount of time the retiring CEO and the current executives 
have been sitting on the executive board together. Therefore we do not only analyze 
whether the presence of a former CEO on the supervisory board per se affects executive 
compensation, but also whether executive compensation is increasing in the average joint 
board tenure of the former CEO and the current executives. 
We have argued above that a former CEO may want to prevent his successor (the new 
CEO) from changing the strategy or organizational structure the retiring CEO implemented 
during his tenure. Granting higher remuneration may be a component of an implicit 
contract towards this objective.  
The aforementioned arguments lead to our third and fourth hypothesis. 
H2.3 (executive compensation - role dummy): The compensation of the members of 
the executive board is higher when a former CEO is a member (or the chairperson) of 
the supervisory board. 
H2.4 (executive compensation - joint tenure): The compensation of the members of 
the executive board is increasing in the time the retiring CEO and the current 
executives have been sitting on the executive board together.  
If a former CEO exerts influence to increase the compensation of the members of the 
executive board after retiring from the board, he will not directly benefit from this activity. 
He thus may also use his influence on the compensation process to lobby for an increase in 
the remuneration of the members of the supervisory board. Further, the former CEO may be 
thankful for having been elected into the supervisory board
12
 and may, therefore, lobby for 
higher director compensation out of a feeling of reciprocity towards the other members (as 
also argued by Bebchuk and Friend, 2005 in a related context).  
However, changes in the remuneration of the supervisory board require the shareholders’ 
consent. Consequently, any proposal aimed at increasing the compensation of supervisory 
board members must be made public prior to the shareholders’ meeting and may thus 
attract the attention of shareholders and the general public. It is an empirical question 
                                                 
 
12
Formally the former CEO will be elected by the shareholders' meeting. However, the supervisory board 
is very influential in proposing candidates for the board.  
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whether or not a newly appointed supervisory board chairman will take this risk. To answer 
it, we test an additional hypothesis. 
H2.5 (director compensation): The compensation of the members of the supervisory 
board is higher when a former CEO is a member (or the chairman) of the supervisory 
board. 
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our analysis of the transfer of CEOs to the supervisory board is based on the 150 firms 
included in the DAX (30 firms), MDAX (70 firms
13
), or SDAX (50 firms) indices as of 
December 31, 2002 for the sample period 1998-2007. The focus of our study is twofold: 
First, we analyze whether the promotion of a former CEO to the supervisory board affects 
firm value and operating performance. Second, we investigate the influence that a former 
CEO who joined the supervisory board upon retirement may have on the level of executive 
and director compensation.  
To address the first issue, we focus on CEO turnover events. During our sample period, we 
identify a total of 167 CEO turnover events. When analyzing the performance implications 
of the promotion of a former CEO to the supervisory board, we need to take into account 
that the decision to offer a former CEO a seat on the supervisory board is most likely not 
random. A CEO who is fired will certainly not be invited to become a member of the 
supervisory board. Therefore, when constructing a control group of firms in which the 
CEOs are not transferred to the supervisory board, we exclude all cases in which a CEO 
was fired (58 observations) and examine only cases in which a CEO stepped down 
voluntarily, usually because he reached retirement age. To identify cases of forced and 
unforced turnover we analyze press releases as well as additional news coverage of the 
turnover. Our sample consists of 107 unforced CEO turnover events (we lose two 
observations because of missing share price data). In 59 cases (55%), the departing CEO 
becomes a member of the supervisory board while in the remaining 48 cases (45%) the 
CEO steps down and leaves the firm. 
                                                 
 
13
In 2003 the number of firms in the MDAX was reduced to 50.  
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Panel A in Figure 2.1 shows the frequency of these two constellations for each year of our 
sample period. For the group of CEO transitions to the supervisory board, Figure 2.1 
further distinguishes between cases where the former CEO becomes the chairman of the 
supervisory board or an ordinary board member. The frequency of CEO transitions 
increases more or less steadily until 2003 (14 CEO transitions) and then decreases in the 
subsequent period 2004-2007. 
In order to investigate differences in the level of executive or director compensation in 
firms with and without a former CEO on the supervisory board, we construct a panel data 
set with additional control variables covering these 150 firms over the sample period 1998-
2007. Missing data items reduce the size of our initial panel data set to 1,405 firm-year 
observations. We gather data on the composition of executive and supervisory boards for 
all sample firms over the period 1998-2007 from the Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. In 
addition, we collect information on the composition of executive boards for the years 1982, 
1985, and 1987-1997.  
Based on these data, we determine for each firm-year whether the chairman or any member 
of the supervisory board had previously been the CEO of the firm. We define three dummy 
variables. The first is set to one for all firm-years in which the chair or any member of the 
supervisory board is a former CEO of the firm, and zero otherwise. The second (third) is set 
to one for all firm-years in which the former CEO is the chairman (an ordinary member) of 
the supervisory board, and zero otherwise.
14
 During our sample period the number of 
former CEOs on supervisory boards increased from 30 in 1998 (25.21% of observations in 
that year) to 42 in 2007 (31.58%) with a high of 46 in 2005 (31.94%). Over the whole 
sample period, 62 firms (41.33% of the firms in our sample) had a former CEO on the 
supervisory board of the same firm for at least one year. It is noteworthy that there is not 
only cross-sectional variation in the data, but also a high degree of longitudinal variation. 
Out of 62 firms that have a former CEO on the supervisory board at some point in time, 
only 14 firms have a former CEO in this position over the entire sample period. Panel B in 
Figure 2.1 depicts the frequency of the three different constellations for each year of the 
sample period.  
                                                 
 
14
Our sample contains 29 firm-year observations where the former CEOs were members of the 
supervisory board. One was the chair of the board while the other one was an ordinary board member. In 
these cases we set the dummy for “Former CEO is chairman of the supervisory board” to one and the dummy 
for “Former CEO is an ordinary board member” to zero. 
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Figure 2.1: Descriptive statistics on different categories of unforced CEO turnovers (Panel 
A) and the composition of the supervisory board (Panel B) for each sample year 
Panel A: CEO turnover 
 
Panel B: Firm-year observations 
 
This figure shows the frequency of unforced CEO turnover events and former CEOs on the supervisory board 
for the sample period 1998-2007. Based on press releases and additional news coverage, CEO turnovers are 
categorized into forced and unforced turnovers. Panel A shows the frequency of unforced CEO turnovers for 
each year of the sample period. Unforced CEO turnovers are further subdivided into the three categories CEO 
becomes chairman of the board, CEO becomes an ordinary board member and CEO leaves the firm. Panel B 
depicts different categories of the composition of the supervisory board for each year of the sample period. A 
firm-year observation is assigned to former CEO is chairman of the board if the chairman of the supervisory 
board in the respective year was the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 1987 
and 2006 or in 1985 or in 1982. The variable former CEO is ordinary board member equals one for the years 
1998–2007 if an ordinary member of the supervisory board in the respective year was the CEO of the same 
firm in at least one of the previous years between 1987 and 2006 or in 1985 or in 1982. All other firm-year 
observations are assigned to the category no former CEO on board.  
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CEO becomes chairman of the board CEO becomes ordinary board member 
CEO leaves the firm 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Former CEO is chairman of the board Former CEO is ordinary board member 
No former CEO on board 
 25 
During most of our sample period, firms were not required to publish executive 
compensation on an individualized basis.
15
 The commercial code did, however, require the 
disclosure of the aggregate compensation of the members of both boards. We collect this 
data from the annual reports for the fiscal years ending in 1998-2007 and combine it with 
information on the number of board members to obtain the per capita compensation of the 
board members.  
As mentioned above, concentrated ownership potentially leads to closer monitoring, since 
large blockholders have both the incentive and power to effectively control management. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find a negative relation between institutional ownership 
concentration and executive compensation. Similar findings for the German market are 
reported in Elston and Goldberg (2003), Kaserer and Wagner (2004), and Haid and 
Yurtoglu (2006). In addition, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that executives in 
firms without a large external blockholder tend to be rewarded for luck. 
To account for the relation between ownership structure and executive compensation, we 
collect data on all common and preferred shareholdings exceeding the threshold of 5% 
from the Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer.
16
 We construct two dummy variables to 
distinguish closely held firms from widely held firms. A firm is said to be closely held 
according to a 50% (25%) threshold if the largest shareholder holds at least 50% (25%) of 
the voting equity.
17
 If the largest shareholder holds less than 50% (25%) we classify the 
firm as widely held at the respective level. We follow the classification method proposed 
by da Silva et al. (2004) to determine the controlling shareholder at the ultimate level for 
each firm-year. The ownership data in Panel A of Table 2.1 is based on this methodology. 
                                                 
 
15
Only from 2006 onward did the law require the individualized disclosure of the compensation of the 
members of the executive board (but not of the members of the supervisory board) and its composition (fixed 
and variable parts). Prior to 2006 the German code recommended individual disclosure, but only a minority of 
firms complied with this recommendation.  
 
16
During our sample period, shareholdings had to be registered with the German Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) when they exceeded the threshold of 5%. In some but not all cases, shareholdings of less 
than 5% were also reported in Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. For reasons of data consistency, we also 
apply a 5% threshold in these cases.  
 
17
In addition to shareholder concentration, the identity of the controlling shareholder is a potentially 
important determinant of executive compensation. Identification of the controlling shareholder is complicated 
by the fact that German corporations often have complex control structures (Franks and Mayer, 2001). For 
example, a family can own a holding company that then owns the majority of a listed firm. If we only 
considered ownership at the first tier, we would misclassify the firm as being controlled by the holding 
company while it is in fact family controlled (Franks et al., 2012). Thus, we focus on ultimate ownership to 
identify the identity of the largest shareholder.  
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39% (63%) of the firms in our sample are classified as closely held based on a 50% (25%) 
threshold.
18
 We also collect the percentage of shares held by the CEO, the chairman of the 
board, as well as by the entire executive and supervisory board, respectively. The fraction 
of shares held by the members of the executive or supervisory board exceeds a 50% (25%) 
threshold for 21% (38%) of all firm-years. 
Table 2.1 also describes the ownership characteristics separately for firms with and without 
a former CEO on the supervisory board. The results suggest that widely and closely held 
firms are almost equally likely to have a former CEO on the supervisory board. Out of a 
total of 383 firm-years with a former CEO on the board, 249 (170) or 65% (44%) are 
widely held based on a 50% (25%) threshold. These values are similar to the 61% and 36% 
(858 and 514 out of 1,405 firm-years, respectively) for the whole sample. On the other 
hand, widely held firms are more likely to have a former CEO as chairman of the 
supervisory board: 176 (133) of 234 firm-year observations (75% (57%)) with a former 
CEO as chairman of the supervisory board relate to widely held firms based on a 50% 
(25%) threshold. 
The existence of controlling shareholders entails the risk of conflicts of interest between 
large and small shareholders. However, a second large shareholder can mitigate these 
conflicts and prevent the controlling shareholder from expropriating minority shareholders. 
To capture this effect, we follow the approach of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and divide 
our sample into “checked” and “unchecked” firms. Unchecked firms are those without a 
second large shareholder holding more than 5% of the voting shares, whereas checked 
firms are closely held and have at least one additional shareholder holding more than 5% of 
the votes. According to this definition, 12% (29%) of the firm-year observations in our 
sample are classified as checked based on a 50% (25%) threshold. 
In accordance with previous studies (Boyd, 1996; Gorton and Schmid, 2004; Linn and Park 
2005), we also control for firm size, board and CEO characteristics, firm performance, 
growth opportunities, codetermination, and bank representation in our panel regressions.
19
 
Information on codetermination was collected from Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. We 
                                                 
 
18
Among these firms, most companies are owned by families (69%), followed by other shareholders 
(21%), industrial (6%), and financial firms (4%). The results are similar for a 25% threshold.  
 
19
Codetermination is defined as the number of employee representatives on the supervisory board divided 
by the total number of supervisory board members. 
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follow Dittmann et al. (2010) in our definition of bank representation and check whether 
any supervisory board member is a current or retired member of the bank’s executive 
board. The other variables were obtained from Datastream. In our panel regressions with 
director compensation as independent variable we also include the number of board 
meetings in a year (obtained from the annual reports). This variable serves as a proxy for 
the effort associated with a board membership.  
Descriptive statistics and detailed definitions of these variables are presented in Panel B of 
Table 2.1. The means of most control variables are very similar for firms with and without 
a former CEO on the supervisory board. However, firms with a former CEO as chairman of 
the supervisory board are on average larger and firms with a former CEO as ordinary 
supervisory board member exhibit a higher share price performance and higher percentage 
of shares held by the executive board.  
2.5 Performance analysis 
2.5.1  Event studies 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the market reaction to CEO turnover 
announcements. Over the sample period from 1998-2007, we identify a total of 167 
turnover announcements. As hypothesized above, the transition of a former CEO to the 
supervisory board of the same firm might either be perceived as positive (H2.1a) or 
negative (H2.1b) news by market participants. We use the procedure described in the 
previous section to exclude all cases in which a CEO was fired (58 observations) and 
examine only cases in which a CEO stepped down voluntarily, leaving us with a sample of 
107 announcements.
20
 As noted previously we exclude cases of forced CEO turnover.  
We follow a standard event study approach (Brown and Warner, 1985), and estimate 
market-model parameters over the period from t=-250 to t=-31 (relative to the 
announcement day t=0). Our event period covers the 61 day period from t=-30 to t=+30. 
Statistical significance is tested using a t-test, the standardized cross-sectional t-statistic 
proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the Corrado (1989) rank test. 
                                                 
 
20
Two observations are dropped due to a lack of share price information. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics sorted by year 
Panel A Former CEO is 
on board 
Former CEO is 
chairman 
Former CEO is 
ordinary board 
member 
No former CEO  
is on board 
All observations 
Largest 50  134  (0.35) 58  (0.25) 76  (0.51) 413  (0.40) 547  (0.39) 
Widely 50 249  (0.65) 176  (0.75) 73  (0.49) 609  (0.60) 858  (0.61) 
Largest 25 213  (0.56) 101  (0.43) 112  (0.75) 678  (0.66) 891  (0.63) 
Widely 25 170  (0.44) 133  (0.57) 37 (0.25) 344 (0.34) 514  (0.37) 
Sum  383  234  149  1,022  1,405  
Checked 50 53  (0.14) 24  (0.10) 29  (0.19) 110  (0.11) 163  (0.12) 
               25 104  (0.27) 51  (0.22) 53  (0.36) 305 (0.30) 409  (0.29) 
 
Panel B Former CEO is 
on board 
Former CEO is 
chairman 
Former CEO is 
ordinary board 
member 
No former CEO  
is on board 
All observations 
Total assets  60, 300 90, 700 11, 900 21, 700 32, 300 
Market capitalization 9,219, 249 12,400, 000 3,971, 024 4,898, 059 6,078, 574 
Executive board size 5. 073 5. 278 4. 752 4. 156 4. 406 
Supervisory board size 13. 556 14. 402 12. 228 11. 021 11. 712 
Board meetings 4. 953 4. 991 4. 894 5. 215 5. 140 
CEO tenure 7. 211 7. 201 7. 228 9. 633 8. 995 
Joint tenure 2. 085 2. 313 1. 973 0. 000 0. 569 
Codetermination 0. 390 0. 400 0. 376 0. 337 0. 352 
Bank representation 0. 258 0. 209 0. 336 0. 227 0. 236 
Tobin´s Q 1. 049 1. 134 0. 908 1. 102 1. 088 
Share price performance 0. 066 0. 029 0. 126 0. 064 0. 065 
ROA 0. 078 0. 077 0. 080 0. 080 0. 079 
ROE 0. 036 0. 035 0. 038 0. 031 0. 033 
Stake executive board 10. 063 2. 650 21. 705 12. 133 11. 569 
Stake supervisory board 13. 122 14. 021 11. 711 10. 586 11. 278 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all sample firms and for sample firms sorted by dummy variables for the 
supervisory board composition. Panel A contains information on binary variables. Firms are categorized according to the 
variables former CEO is on board, former CEO is chairman, former CEO is ordinary board member and no former CEO on 
board. A firm-year observation is assigned to former CEO is on board (is chairman/is ordinary board member) if any 
supervisory board member (the chairman of the supervisory board/an ordinary supervisory board member) in the respective 
year was the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 1987 and 2006 or in 1985 or in 1982. All 
other firm-year observations are assigned to no former CEO on board. Panel A contains information on binary ownership 
variables. For each variable, the number (left column) and percentage (right column) of firms for each category are 
presented; the percentages are expressed in relation to the total number of firms in each category. Largest 50(25) corresponds 
to the number of firms with a largest shareholder holding at least 50% (25%) of the voting equity. Firms are classified as 
widely 50 (25) if their largest shareholder holds less than 50% (25%) of the voting equity. A firm is said to be checked 50 
(25) if the firm has a largest shareholder holding at least 50% (25%) of the voting equity and a second largest shareholder 
holding at least 5% of the voting shares. Panel B contains the means of cardinal variables for all sample firms and for sample 
firms sorted by dummy variables for the supervisory board composition. Total assets is measured as the book value of total 
assets in units of € 1,000; market capitalization is measured as the total market value of equity; executive (supervisory) board 
size is defined as the number of executive (supervisory) board members; board meetings is defined as the number of 
supervisory board meetings in the respective fiscal year; CEO tenure is defined as the number of years that the current CEO 
has served on the executive board (as either CEO or ordinary member); joint tenure is measured as average number of years 
that the former CEO spent together with the current executive board member on the executive board for firms with a former 
CEO on the supervisory board and zero otherwise; codetermination is calculated as the number of employee representatives 
on the supervisory board divided by the total number of supervisory board members; bank representation is a dummy that is 
set to one if a bank representative is a member of the supervisory board. Tobin’s Q is computed as the market value of equity 
plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets; share price performance is defined as the stock 
return minus the return of the CDAX performance index over the respective fiscal year; ROA is calculated as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items over book value of 
equity and stake executive (supervisory) board measures the percentage of shares held by the executive (supervisory) board. 
 29 
For the full sample of unforced turnover events, we find announcement returns that are 
close to zero and statistically insignificant (see Panel A of Table 2.2). This implies that the 
information of an unforced CEO turnover per se is not regarded as value relevant 
information on average. However, a more detailed analysis reveals significant differences 
in the market reaction, depending on whether the CEO will stay as member of the 
supervisory board or leave the firm. Panel B of Table 2.2 presents cumulative abnormal 
returns for CEO turnover announcements in which the departing CEO does not become 
member of the supervisory board. The announcement day return is -0.87%, significant at 
the 5% level based on the t-test. Cumulative abnormal returns for various event windows 
range from -0.68% (event window [-5;+5]) to -5.31% (event window [-30;+30]). The t-tests 
suggest that the CARs are significant while the two other test-statistics point towards 
insignificance. These findings indicate that the unforced departure of a CEO (i.e. a CEO 
who is not forced out of their job) is, if anything, seen as a loss of a valuable resource by 
shareholders. The share price reaction in those cases where the departing CEO becomes a 
member of the supervisory board is presented in Panel C. The CARs are positive 
irrespective of the event window considered. The CARs for longer event windows ([-
30;+30] and [-10;+30]) are large in magnitude (5.30% and 4.92%, respectively) and 
statistically significant.  
In additional analyses, we run OLS-regression that relate abnormal announcement returns 
to firm characteristics such as size, ownership structure, bank representation on the board, 
and industry.
21
 We find some evidence that the positive effect documented in Panel C of 
Table 2.2 is significantly related to firm size. The value of a departing CEO (measured as a 
percentage of the market value of equity) seems to be negatively related to firm size.  
In sum, our short-term event study provides evidence in favor of hypothesis H2.1a. On 
average, market participants seem to attribute value to the expertise of a retiring CEO and 
accordingly regard the announcement of a transition to the supervisory board as good news. 
Conversely, firm value is reduced when retiring CEOs say goodbye. We analyze a series of 
alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results.  
 
                                                 
 
21
The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.2 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 30 
Table 2.2: Short-run announcement returns 
Panel A: All CEO turnover events 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  54 : 53 0 .54% 0 .28 0 .06 0 .34 
[-10;+30]  49 : 48 2 .13% 1 .35 1 .13 1 .08 
[-5;+5]  58 : 49 1 .26% 1 .54 0 .33 0 .67 
[-1;+5]  53 : 54 -0 .33% -0 .51 -0 .64 -0 .29 
[0;+5]  55 : 52 -0 .42% -0 .70 -0 .84 -0 .47 
[0;+3]  45 : 62 -0 .23% -0 .47 -0 .65 -0 .02 
[0;+1]  46 : 61 -0 .36% -1 .02 -0 .94 0 .43 
[0]  60 : 47 -0 .31% -1 .24 -0 .80 0 .84 
 
Panel B: CEO leaves the firm 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30] 21 : 27 -5 .31% -1 .81* -1 .94* -1 .34 
[-10;+30] 24 : 24 -1 .30% -0 .54 -0 .71 -0 .54 
[-5;+5] 23 : 25 -0 .68% -0 .54 -0 .56 -0 .54 
[-1;+5] 23 : 25 -1 .71% -1 .72* -0 .76 -0 .68 
[0;+5] 24 : 24 -1 .80% -1 .95* -0 .97 -0 .97 
[0;+3] 17 : 31 -1 .14% -1 .51 -0 .85 -0 .53 
[0;+1] 20 : 28 -0 .93% -1 .74* -0 .94 -0 .53 
[0] 22 : 26 -0 .87% -2 .32** -1 .15 -0 .78 
 
Panel C: CEO becomes supervisory board member 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  33 : 26 5 .30% 2 .07* 1 .71* 1 .55 
[-10;+30]  35 : 24 4 .92% 2 .35** 2 .49** 1 .88* 
[-5;+5]  35 : 24 2 .84% 2 .62*** 1 .00 1 .34 
[-1;+5]  30 : 29 0 .79% 0 .91 -0 .13 0 .16 
[0;+5]  31 : 28 0 .70% 0 .88 -0 .19 0 .16 
[0;+3]  28 : 31 0 .51% 0 .77 -0 .04 0 .40 
[0;+1]  26 : 33 0 .11% 0 .24 -0 .36 1 .01 
[0]  38 : 21 0 .16% 0 .47 0 .02 1 .76 
This table contains cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unforced CEO turnover announcements for 
different event windows (expressed relative to the announcement date t=0). Panel A presents results for the 
full sample (107 observations), while Panel B (C) shows abnormal announcement returns for the subsample 
of CEOs who leave the firm (become member of the supervisory board) (48 and 59 observations, 
respectively). T-statistics, the test statistic proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and the non-parametric 
Corrado (1989) test are reported in columns 4, 5, and 6. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
First, we examine whether the future role of the former CEO on the supervisory board (i.e. 
chairman or ordinary board member) is systematically related to announcement returns.
22
 
We find qualitatively similar abnormal returns for the two groups. Second, we separate all 
events into two categories, depending on whether the decision of the CEO to leave or stay 
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The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.3 in the appendix of this chapter. 
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was announced at the same time as the retirement or at a later stage.
23
 Again, we do not find 
substantial differences between the two groups. Finally, we test whether the announcement 
of other potentially value-relevant information affects abnormal announcement returns. 
Controlling for confounding events, we are left with a sample of 99 CEO transitions.
24
 
Abnormal returns for this subsample are again very similar to those reported in Table 2.2. 
In addition to the short-run event study, we examine the long-run market performance 
following CEO turnover events. In particular, we estimate the abnormal performance for a 
portfolio of sample firms with a former CEO on the supervisory board for up to 12 months 
following the month of transition. As before, we consider all CEO turnover events, cases in 
which the CEO leaves the firm, and cases in which a former CEO becomes member of the 
supervisory board. We use the Fama-French 3-factor and the Carhart 4-factor models for 
the calendar-time approach and the market-model for the buy-and-hold approach.
25
 Data on 
the Carhart factors is obtained from the Centre for Financial Research in Cologne.
26
 
In contrast to the results presented above, we do not find significant abnormal returns in the 
long-run event study. As can be seen in Table 2.3 this holds for virtually all specifications, 
independent of the event window or the expected return model used. The signs of the 
intercept coefficients obtained in the calendar-time approach are in line with the results of 
the short-run event study (Panels B and C of Table 2.3). For firms with CEOs who leave 
the firm, the alpha coefficient is negative. For firms in which the CEO changes to the 
supervisory board, the coefficient is found to be positive. In both cases, however, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The analysis of buy and 
hold returns yields very similar results. The buy and hold returns are mostly negative for 
those firms where the CEO leaves the firm and are always positive in those cases where the 
departing CEO becomes a member of the supervisory board. Again, however, the 
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The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.4 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
24
The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.5 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
25
As discussed in Loughran and Ritter (2000) the calendar-time approach suffers from a potential bias, as 
all event months are weighted equally. It thus potentially overweighs returns of portfolios with only very few 
observations, while underweighting returns of portfolios with many observations. As a robustness test, we 
calculate BHARs relative to a group of matched firms. In a first step, we identify potential matches by 
selecting all (non-event) firms that fall within a range of 0.05 (0.1 as an alternative) in terms of market-to-
book value to each of our event firms. In a second step, for each event firm, we identify the firm with the 
lowest deviation in the momentum-factor (relative to our event firm) and use it as a matched firm to compute 
BHARs. The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.6 in the appendix of this chapter. Results 
obtained by this approach are very similar to the returns in Table 2.3. 
 
26
A detailed description of the data can be found in Artmann et al. (2012). 
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coefficients are insignificant (with one exception).
27
 
Table 2.3: Long-run announcement returns 
Panel A: 3-Factor model – calendar-time 
 Alpha 
(t-statistic) 
Beta 
(t-statistic) 
SMB 
(t-statistic)  
HML 
(t-statistic)  
Number of 
observations  
All turnover  
events  
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.12) 
 1 
(13 
.193*** 
.88) 
 0 
(4 
.618*** 
.89) 
 0 
(3 
.405*** 
.46) 
137 
CEO leaves firm   -0 
(-1 
.007 
.28) 
0 
(7  
.871*** 
.95) 
0 
(2  
.314** 
.18) 
 0 
(2 
.357*** 
.81) 
118 
CEO becomes  
board member  
 0 
(1 
.006 
.00) 
1  
(12 
.252*** 
.96) 
0  
(4 
.601*** 
.23) 
0  
(2 
.299** 
.27) 
137 
 
Panel B: 4-Factor model – calendar-time 
 Alpha 
(t-statistic) 
Beta 
(t-statistic) 
SMB 
(t-statistic)  
HML 
(t-statistic)  
MOM 
(t-statistic) 
Number of 
observations  
All turnover 
events  
0 
(0 
.003 
.51) 
 1 
(10 
.072*** 
.84) 
 0 
(3 
.519*** 
.96) 
 0 
(3 
.435*** 
.76) 
-0 
(-2 
.228** 
.37) 
137 
CEO leaves firm   -0 
(-1 
.006 
.02) 
0 
(6  
.832*** 
.76) 
0 
(1  
.281* 
.86) 
 0 
(2 
.369*** 
.88) 
-0 
(-0 
.080 
.71) 
118 
CEO becomes  
board member  
 0 
(1 
.009 
.50) 
1  
(10 
.137*** 
.17) 
0  
(3 
.507*** 
.43) 
0  
(2 
.327** 
.50) 
-0 
(-1 
.215** 
.98) 
137 
 
Panel C: Buy-and-hold returns 
 BHAR (t-statistic) 
All turnover events 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO leaves firm 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO becomes board 
member 
2 months 
-1 
(-0 
.51% 
.85) 
 -4 
(-1 
.22%* 
.82) 
 0 
(0 
.74% 
.28) 
4 months 
1 
(0 
.34% 
.48) 
-2 
(-0 
.67% 
.66) 
4 
(1 
.67% 
.22) 
6 months 
-0 
(-0 
.15% 
.05) 
-4 
(-0 
.05% 
.88) 
3 
(0 
.10% 
.75) 
8 months 
0 
(0 
.81% 
.22) 
-4 
(-1 
.93% 
.01) 
5 
(1 
.58% 
.04) 
10 months 
 3 
(0 
.98% 
.81) 
-2 
(-0 
.33% 
.40) 
9 
(1 
.22% 
.22) 
12 months 
 6 
(1 
.96% 
.20) 
2 
(0 
.87% 
.35) 
10 
(1 
.36% 
.26) 
This table contains results of long-run event studies following unforced CEO turnover announcements. 
Abnormal performance is measured for a portfolio of sample firms for up to 12 months following the month 
of the CEO change. Panels A and B present abnormal returns for a calendar-time approach based on the 
Fama-French 3-factor and the Carhart 4-factor model, while Panel C contains buy-and-hold returns based on a 
market-model approach. Factor information for the German market is obtained from the Centre for Financial 
Research Cologne. The number of observations corresponds to the number of months with a positive number 
of firms in the portfolio. In each month, firms are included in our portfolio "all turnover events (CEO leaves 
firm/CEO becomes board member)" if an unforced CEO turnover has occurred within the previous 12 months 
(and the CEO left the firm or changed to the supervisory board). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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In additional analyses, we estimate abnormal announcement returns for subsamples based on firm 
characteristics such as size, ownership structure, bank representation on the board, and industry. The results of 
this robustness check are given in Table A.7 (and in Panels C and D of A.6 using the matched firm approach) 
in the appendix of this chapter. Again, however, the coefficients for almost all subsamples are insignificant. 
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2.5.2  Operating performance 
As argued above, we expect former CEOs who serve on the supervisory board to also affect 
operating performance. This effect can either be positive (H2.2a) or negative (H2.2b) 
depending on whether potential benefits – former CEOs act as stewards of the firm and 
hence support their successors with their firm and industry expertise – outweigh potential 
agency costs (impeding necessary changes, too cozy relations between former and new 
CEO). In the following, we compare the operating performance of firms with former CEOs 
on their supervisory boards with firms in which CEOs leave the firm (voluntarily) using a 
difference-in-differences approach. 
In the analysis, we use the same sample as described in Section 2.5.1, but lose a few 
observations due to missing data. Operating performance is measured as return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). We examine both “raw” operating performance 
(measured as the average ROA and ROE, respectively) and “excess” operating performance 
(calculated as the excess performance relative to a group of control firms matched on 
industry, size, and prior performance as in Fahlenbrach et al., 2011). In all cases we 
compare the average operating performance in the two years prior to the CEO turnover 
event to the performance in the two years following the event. The event year itself is 
excluded from the analysis.  
Results of the difference-in-differences analysis are displayed in Table 2.4. The analysis of 
changes in raw operating performance (Panel A) shows evidence (significant at the 10% 
level) of a better performance of firms in which a former CEO is transferred to the 
supervisory board when operating performance is measured by the ROE but not when it is 
measured by the ROA. The analysis of excess operating performance (Panel B) yields 
insignificant estimates. Results of additional tests that take the position of the former CEO 
on the supervisory board (i.e. chairman or ordinary member) into account lead to 
qualitatively similar results.
28
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The results of this robustness check are given in Table A.8 (former CEO becomes chairman of the 
supervisory board) and Table A.9 (former CEO becomes ordinary supervisory board member) in the appendix 
of this chapter. The analysis indicates that the results for raw operating performance are driven by cases 
where the former CEO becomes an ordinary supervisory board member. 
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Table 2.4: Operating performance 
Panel A: Raw performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not 
change to the supervisory 
board  
Difference 
ROA       
Average ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.077 0 
 
.074 0 
(0 
.003 
.210) 
Average ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.077 0 
 
.063 0 
(0 
.014 
.105) 
Change in ROA 
 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.014) 
-0 
(-1 
.011 
.084) 
0 
(0 
.011 
.784) 
Observations  52  35  
 
ROE       
Average ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.033 0 
 
.041 -0 
(-0 
.009 
.669) 
Average ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.034 0 
 
.011 0 
(1 
.023 
.585) 
Change in ROE 
 
0 
(0 
.001 
.159) 
-0 
(-1 
.030* 
.881) 
0 
(1 
.032* 
.848) 
Observations  52  35  
 
Panel B: Excess performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not  
change to the supervisory  
board  
Difference 
ROA      
Average excess ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.013 0 
 
.017 -0 
(-0 
.003 
.530) 
Average excess ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.020 0 
 
.029 -0 
(-0 
.008 
.599) 
Change in excess ROA 
 
0 
(0 
.007 
.777) 
0 
(0 
.012 
.867) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.371) 
Observations  35  50  
 
ROE       
Average excess ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.008 0 
 
.017 -0 
(-0 
.009 
.114) 
Average excess ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.034 -0 
 
.003 0 
(0 
.037 
.394) 
Change in excess ROE 
 
0 
(0 
.026 
.334) 
-0 
(-0 
.020 
.959) 
0 
(0 
.046 
.483) 
Observations  48  33  
This table contains the results of a difference-in-differences analysis of operating performance around 
unforced CEO turnover events. We compare firms in which a former CEO changes to the supervisory board 
to firms in which a retiring CEO leaves the firm. ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets. ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items over book value of equity. Excess 
ROA and excess ROE are measured relative to a control group of firms matched on industry, size and prior 
performance. See Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) for details regarding the construction of our measures of excess 
operating performance. The difference-in-differences analysis compares average (excess) ROA and average 
(excess) ROE under the old CEO (average of years t-2 and t-1) to average (excess) performance under the 
new CEO (years t+1 and t+2, relative to the turnover year (t=0)). Each cell shows the estimated coefficient. 
The figures in the third row and third column (in bold in the lower right cell) of each sub-panel show the 
estimated coefficients and t-values (in parentheses) (of the difference-in-differences estimator). The 
superscript * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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The largely insignificant results are somewhat contradictory to those of the short-run event 
study. A possible explanation is that changes in operating performance only reflect changes 
in cash flow and/or accounting profits while the event study abnormal returns also reflect 
changes in the firm's cost of capital (i.e. discount rate news).  
2.6 Executive and director compensation 
We begin our compensation analysis by examining the time pattern of director and 
executive compensation (see Panel A of Table 2.5). Per capita director compensation 
during our sample period amounted to € 43,853 per year. Over our sample period it 
increased from € 30,757 in 1998 to € 60,437 in 2007. This corresponds to an increase of 
96.5%, or a compound annual growth rate of 7.8%. Per capita executive compensation is 
more than 20 times higher than per capita director compensation (€ 944,344 compared to € 
43,853). The time pattern is similar. Average executive compensation increased by 124.0% 
over our sample period, which corresponds to a compound annual growth rate of 9.4%. 
As argued before, we expect a higher director and executive compensation for firms with a 
former CEO on the supervisory board (H2.3, H2.4 and H2.5). The means, medians and 
standard deviations of director and executive compensation are displayed in Panel B of 
Table 2.5.
29
 We also test for significant differences between the means and medians of 
firms with a former CEO on the supervisory board (or with a former CEO as chairman of 
the board/ordinary board member, respectively) and firms without a former CEO serving 
on the supervisory board. We observe higher executive and director compensation for firms 
with a former CEO on the supervisory board. The differences are significant in 10 out of 12 
cases. The results further suggest that these differences are more pronounced in cases in 
which the former CEO is at the helm of the supervisory board. The univariate analysis thus 
provides evidence in favor of our hypotheses H2.3, H2.4 and H2.5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
29
We lose 34 (46) firm-year observations due to a lack of compensation data for the executive 
(supervisory) board. 
 36 
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics for director and executive compensation sorted by year 
(Panel A) and by dummy variables for the composition of the supervisory board (Panel B) 
Panel A 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 1998–2007 
Executive compensation            
  Mean 649, 684 770, 631 902, 040 1,136, 793 1,449, 404 944, 344 
  Median 517, 833 580, 000 656, 000 811, 500 1,140, 925 656, 000 
  Std. dev. 580, 240 720, 443 839, 870 1,161, 696 1,165, 000 907, 752 
  Observations  122  145  145  140  131 1, 359 
              
Director compensation        
  Mean 32,  404 42, 546 40, 085 48, 184 60, 437 43, 853 
  Median 24, 010 25, 250 27, 157 36, 690 43, 333 30, 000 
  Std. dev. 27, 686 67, 578 34, 854 38, 748 49, 675 48, 899 
  Observations  126  146  145  140  131 1, 371 
 
Panel B                                                                                                Former CEO is
on board 
Former CEO is
chairman 
Former CEO is 
ordinary board 
member 
No former  
CEO  
is on board 
Executive compensation  
  Mean 1202, 
(6. 
105*** 
61) 
1366, 
(8. 
321*** 
12) 
945, 
(1. 
795 
49) 
844, 659 
  Median 763, 
(5. 
600*** 
65) 
907, 
(6. 
667*** 
59) 
648, 
(1. 
071 
41) 
619, 833 
  Std. dev. 1205,  028 1313,  252 962, 825 739, 380 
  Observations  379  231  148  980 
     
Director compensation  
  Mean 59, 
(7. 
037*** 
24) 
65, 
(7. 
227*** 
61) 
49, 
(2. 
374*** 
77) 
38, 051 
  Median 46, 
(8. 
667*** 
65) 
50, 
(8. 
000*** 
81) 
37, 
(3. 
083*** 
79) 
25, 841 
  Std. dev. 49,  487 54,  772 38, 052 47, 430 
  Observations  379  231  148  992 
This table presents descriptive statistics for director and executive compensation. For each variable, Panel A 
shows the mean, median, standard deviation, and number of observations for selected years from 1998 to 
2007 and for the entire sample period. The variable director compensation is measured as the total 
compensation of the supervisory board in Euros divided by the number of supervisory board members in the 
respective year. The variable executive compensation is measured as the total compensation of the executive 
board in Euros divided by the number of executive board members in the respective year. A firm-year 
observation is assigned to former CEO is on board (is chairman/is ordinary board member) if any 
supervisory board member (the chairman of the supervisory board/an ordinary supervisory board member) in 
the respective year was the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 1987 and 2006 
or in 1985 or in 1982. All other firm-year observations are assigned to the category no former CEO on board. 
Panel B contains the mean, median, standard deviation and number of observations sorted by dummy 
variables for the supervisory board composition. Values in parentheses in the first three columns correspond 
to test statistics for tests of equality of means and medians across firm-years assigned to the categories former 
CEO is on board (is chairman/is ordinary board member) and the category no former CEO on board. The 
superscript *** denote statistical significance of the differences at the 1% level. 
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The empirical literature has identified a number of factors that have a significant impact on 
executive (and director) compensation. We therefore estimate the following multivariate 
panel regression model for our analysis of the determinants of director and executive 
compensation: 
yit =  + (Former CEO on board) + (control variables) + (year dummies) + it       (2.1) 
where yit is our measure of per capita compensation for firm i at time t. The presence of a 
CEO on the supervisory board is captured in two different ways. In models (1) and (3) of 
Table 2.6 and 2.9 we include a dummy variable that is set to one when a former CEO is a 
current member of the supervisory board. In models (2) and (4) we include two dummy 
variables. The first dummy is set to one when a former CEO is the current chair of the 
supervisory board. The second dummy is set to one when a former CEO acts as an ordinary 
member (but not as the chair) of the supervisory board. Of all firm-years in which a former 
CEO acts as director of the same firm, about 61% are cases in which the former CEO is the 
chairman of the supervisory board.  
In models (5) to (8) in our regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable we replace the dummies by continuous variables that measures the 
average time (measured in years) the former CEO (who now is a member of the 
supervisory board) was sitting on the executive board jointly with the current executive 
board members.
30
 We refer to this variable as "joint tenure". The larger its value the more 
intense will be the personal relation between the current CEO and the current executives, 
and the larger will be the set of joint experiences they share. In models (5) and (7) we 
estimate one slope coefficient for all cases in which a former CEO sits on the supervisory 
board. In models (6) and (8) we estimate different slope coefficients for cases in which the 
former CEO is the chair or an ordinary member of the supervisory board, respectively. We 
do not include the "joint tenure" variable in our regressions with director compensation as 
the dependent variable because it is not plausible that the compensation of the members of 
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The joint tenure variable is zero in all cases in which a departing CEO does not become a member of the 
supervisory board. We estimate an alternative specification were we include the tenure of the departing CEO 
(whether or not he becomes a member of the supervisory board) instead of the joint tenure variable. The 
results of this robustness check are given in Table A.10a (A.16) in the appendix of this chapter for regressions 
with executive (director) compensation as dependent variable. The results are similar to those reported in 
Table 2.6. 
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the supervisory board depends on how long one of its members (the former CEO) sat on the 
executive board together with the current executives. 
We include firm size (measured by either the log of total assets or the log of market 
capitalization
31
), the size of the executive (supervisory) board (measured as the log of the 
number of executives (supervisory board members)), codetermination, bank representation 
on the supervisory board, as well as Tobin’s Q (defined as the market value of equity plus 
the book value of debt over the book value of total assets) as control variables. In addition, 
in models (1) and (2) (as well as in models (5) and (6) in our regressions with executive 
compensation as dependent variable) we include abnormal share price performance 
measured over one year and index-adjusted using the CDAX performance index) as 
performance measure whereas accounting performance (return on assets, defined as 
earnings before interest and taxes over total assets) is used as performance measure in 
models (3) and (4) (as well as in models (7) and (8) in our regressions with executive 
compensation as dependent variable).  
For our analysis of the determinants of executive compensation we include CEO tenure 
(number of years that the current CEO has served on the executive board) as additional 
control variable.
32
 In our regressions with per capita director compensation as the 
dependent variable we control for the number of board meetings. Finally, we include year 
dummies. In our baseline specification, the ownership structure is captured by two dummy 
variables (largest shareholder holds more than 50%
33
; checked or unchecked).  
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In the tables we report the results obtained when using the log of market capitalization as our size 
measure. Results are similar when we use the log of total assets instead. The results of this robustness check 
are given in Table A.10 (A.16) in the appendix of this chapter for regressions with executive (director) 
compensation as dependent variable. We also included leverage as an additional control variable. The results 
of this robustness check are given in Table A.11 (A.17) in the appendix of this chapter for regressions with 
executive (director) compensation as dependent variable. Again the results were similar to those reported in 
Table 2.6 and 2.9.  
 
32
We do not control for CEO tenure in our regressions with director compensation as the dependent 
variable because it is not obvious that the tenure of the current CEO should be related to the compensation of 
the members of the supervisory board. 
 
33
In additional regressions we use an alternative definition based on a 25% threshold. The results of this 
robustness check are given in Table A.11 (A.17) in the appendix of this chapter for regressions with executive 
(director) compensation as dependent variable. We further re-estimate our models using the shareholdings of 
the largest shareholder instead of a dummy variable. Finally, we also estimate models in which we include 
dummy variables that control for the identity of a controlling shareholder (family, industrial firm, financial 
institution, other). The results of these robustness checks are given in Table A.12 (A.18) in the appendix of 
this chapter for regressions with executive (director) compensation as dependent variable. The results of all 
these specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.6 and 2.9. 
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We employ the fixed effects estimator in all regressions because a Hausman test indicates 
that the regressors are correlated with the error term. We test for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity using the test procedures proposed by Baum (2001) and Drukker 
(2003).
34
 Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, our regression 
results are based on the estimator proposed in Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
2.6.1  Executive compensation 
Table 2.6a and 2.6b report the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive 
compensation as the dependent variable (expressed in thousands of Euros). In Table 2.6a 
the presence of a former CEO on the supervisory board is captured by dummy variables. 
The presence of a former CEO on the supervisory board has a positive but insignificant 
effect on executive compensation. In Table 2.6b we explicitly control for the joint tenure. 
Again we find that all coefficients are positive, and four out of six are significant. Thus, in 
firms in which a former CEO sits on the supervisory board, per-capita executive 
compensation is increasing in the average time the former CEO and the current executives 
spent on the executive board together. This is consistent with our hypothesis 2.4. The effect 
is driven by those cases in which the former CEO is at the helm of the supervisory board.  
With respect to the control variables, we find that per-capita executive compensation is 
increasing in firm size. This is consistent with previous findings (see Schmid, 1997 for 
evidence from Germany and Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008 for international evidence). Per-capita executive compensation is further 
decreasing in the size of the executive board and increasing in CEO tenure. The latter 
finding is consistent with results reported in Hill and Phan (1991) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001). 
Previous papers found that executive compensation is lower in firms with concentrated 
ownership (see Hartzell and Starks, 2003 for the US; Sapp, 2008 for Canada and Schmid, 
1997; Elston and Goldberg, 2003 and Kaserer and Wagner, 2004 for Germany). Our results 
point in the same direction. The coefficient on the dummy variable that identifies firms 
with a dominating shareholder is negative and statistically significant in all eight models. 
                                                 
 
34The test procedure developed by Baum (2001) is based on Greene (2000, p. 598), and Drukker’s (2003) 
method follows Wooldridge (2002, pp. 282-283).  
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The existence of a second large shareholder, on the other-hand side, has a positive and 
significant impact on executive compensation. As argued in Gorton and Schmid (2000) 
bank representatives serving on the supervisory board may have a positive influence on a 
firm’s governance. Our findings can be interpreted as supportive of this reasoning, as we 
find a significantly negative influence on executive compensation. The equity stake held by 
executive directors has no impact on executive compensation. On the other hand, the stake 
held by members of the supervisory board is significantly positively related to per-capita 
executive compensation.  
Our results so far were based on an analysis of the level of executive and director 
compensation. An alternative and more direct way to test whether the presence of a former 
CEO on the supervisory board affects executive and director compensation is to test 
whether compensation changes after a CEO transition event. We therefore now turn to a 
difference-in-differences analysis of CEO turnover events.  
Our treatment group consists of CEOs who step down and become members of the 
supervisory board of the same firm. We analyze three treatment groups, (1) all cases in 
which a departing CEO becomes a member of the supervisory board, (2) only cases in 
which the departing CEO becomes the chairman of the supervisory board and (3) only 
cases in which the departing CEO becomes an ordinary member of the supervisory board. 
These CEOs usually step down because they have reached retirement age. We construct a 
control group that consists of unforced CEO turnovers (as defined previously) but only 
contains cases in which the departed CEO did not become a member of the supervisory 
board. A control group that also includes forced CEO turnovers would be inappropriate. 
The control group is the same for all three treatment groups described above.  
We want to test whether per-capita executive compensation changes significantly when a 
departing CEO becomes a member of the supervisory board. To this end we compare the 
average per-capita compensation in the two years prior to the CEO turnover to the average 
per-capita compensation in the five years after the turnover. The year of the turnover is 
discarded. We use a five-year average after the turnover because the typical term of an 
executive's contract in Germany is five years. It may thus take up to five years until the 
contracts of all executives have been renewed. 
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Table 2.6a: Determinants of executive compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
-1808 
(-2 
.25** 
.88) 
-1811 
(-2 
.21** 
.81) 
-1659 
(-2 
.16* 
.04) 
-1658 
(-2 
.08* 
.01) 
Former CEO on board 
 
123 
(1 
.31 
.29) 
 103 
(1 
.07 
.06) 
 
Former CEO is chairman  125 
(1 
.42 
.38) 
 
 
102 
(1 
.42 
.12) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
 
 
119 
(1 
.14 
.02) 
 104 
(0 
.48 
.85) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-517 
(-4 
.90*** 
.10) 
-517 
(-4 
.97*** 
.11) 
-493 
(-4 
.88*** 
.10) 
-493 
(-4 
.85*** 
.12) 
CEO tenure 
 
7 
(5 
.02*** 
.42) 
7 
(5 
.03*** 
.38) 
6 
(5 
.29*** 
.51) 
6 
(5 
.29*** 
.47) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 
(0 
.82 
.53) 
0 
(0 
.82 
.53) 
0 
(0 
.35 
.23) 
0 
(0 
.35 
.23) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 
(2 
.10** 
.44) 
4 
(2 
.09** 
.46) 
3 
(2 
.98** 
.44) 
3 
(2 
.99** 
.45) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-100 
(-2 
.60** 
.87) 
-100 
(-2 
.64** 
.85) 
-95 
(-2 
.92** 
.30) 
-95 
(-2 
.90** 
.30) 
Checked 
 
141 
(2 
.01** 
.78) 
140 
(2 
.97** 
.77) 
137 
(2 
.10** 
.29) 
137 
(2 
.12** 
.28) 
Codetermination -4 
(-0 
.94 
.03) 
-5 
(-0 
.60 
.04) 
58 
(0 
.11 
.46) 
58 
(0 
.33 
.47) 
Bank representation 
 
-223 
(-7 
.80*** 
.39) 
-223 
(-7 
.63*** 
.54) 
-234 
(-7 
.51*** 
.08) 
-234 
(-7 
.56*** 
.19) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
276 
(5 
.17*** 
.59) 
276 
(5 
.41*** 
.49) 
259 
(4 
.50*** 
.18) 
259 
(4 
.41*** 
.14) 
Share price performance 
 
-17 
(-0 
.63 
.73) 
-17 
(-0 
.56 
.74) 
  
ROA   545 
(1 
.25* 
.88) 
545 
(1 
.30* 
.88) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-49 
(-1 
.97 
.19) 
-50 
(-1 
.01 
.19) 
-47 
(-1 
.53 
.15) 
-47 
(-1 
.52 
.15) 
R² within 0. 344 0 .344 0. 340 0. 340 
Observations     1,281      1,281     1,287     1,287 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the dependent variable. 
The variable executive compensation is measured as the total compensation of the executive board in units of € 1,000 divided 
by the number of executive board members in the respective year. The first column shows the independent variables. Former 
CEO is on board (is chairman/is ordinary board member) is equal to one, if any supervisory board member (the chairman of 
the supervisory board/an ordinary supervisory board member) in the respective year was the CEO of the same firm in at least 
one of the previous years between 1987 and 2006 or in 1985 or in 1982 and zero otherwise. Ln (number of executives) is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of executive board members. CEO tenure is defined as the number of years 
that the current CEO has served on the executive board (as either CEO or ordinary member). Stake executive (supervisory) 
board measures the percentage of shares held by members of the executive (supervisory) board. Largest shareholder > 50% 
is a dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder holding at least 50% of the voting equity. A firm is said 
to be checked if largest shareholder > 50% is set to one and the second largest shareholder holds at least 5% of the voting 
shares. Codetermination is defined as the number of employee representatives divided by the number of supervisory board 
members in the respective year; bank representation is a dummy that is set to one if a supervisory board member represents 
the interest of a bank. Ln (market capitalization) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity; share 
price performance is computed as the annual return in the previous year minus the return of the CDAX performance index; 
ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; and Tobin’s Q is defined as the market 
value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the 
estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.6b: Determinants of executive compensation 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 
 
-1797 
(-2 
.40** 
.95) 
-1798 
(-2 
.31** 
.95) 
-1652 
(-2 
.85* 
.11) 
-1655 
(-2 
.94* 
.12) 
Former CEO on board* 
joint tenure 
37 
(2 
.89** 
.43) 
 
 
35 
(1 
.12* 
.99) 
 
Former CEO is chairman* 
joint tenure 
 
 
39 
(2 
.50** 
.54) 
 34 
(1 
.82* 
.99) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*joint tenure 
 
 
23 
(1 
.08 
.28) 
 23 
(1 
.38 
.09) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-511 
(-4 
.79*** 
.05) 
-510 
(-4 
.39*** 
.06) 
-489 
(-4 
.15*** 
.04) 
-488 
(-4 
.33*** 
.05) 
CEO tenure 
 
6 
(5 
.43*** 
.54) 
6 
(5 
.26*** 
.09) 
5 
(4 
.93*** 
.94) 
5 
(4 
.79*** 
.56) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 
(0 
.77 
.50) 
0 
(0 
.83 
.54) 
0 
(0 
.34 
.22) 
0 
(0 
.38 
.25) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 
(2 
.19** 
.35) 
4 
(2 
.20** 
.33) 
4 
(2 
.06** 
.33) 
4 
(2 
.07** 
.32) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-98 
(-2 
.65** 
.78) 
-99 
(-2 
.08* 
.72) 
-93 
(-2 
.30* 
.18) 
-93 
(-2 
.65* 
.12) 
Checked 
 
139 
(2. 
.59** 
80) 
135 
(2 
.14* 
.75) 
136 
(2 
.48** 
.32) 
133 
(2 
.02** 
.28) 
Codetermination -25 
(-0 
.89 
.19) 
-37 
(-0 
.94 
.29) 
39 
(0 
.74 
.36) 
31 
(0 
.45 
.30) 
Bank representation 
 
-225 
(-6 
.74*** 
.15) 
-224 
(-6 
.18*** 
.35) 
-235 
(-5 
.76*** 
.99) 
-234 
(-6 
.63*** 
.15) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
277 
(5 
.42*** 
.64) 
277 
(5 
.96*** 
.64) 
260 
(4 
.52*** 
.26) 
261 
(4 
.14*** 
.26) 
Share price performance 
 
-15 
(-0 
.20 
.63) 
-14 
(-0 
.79 
.61) 
  
ROA   551 
(1 
.90* 
.91) 
548 
(1 
.23* 
.89) 
Tobin´s Q  
 
-52 
(-1 
.55 
.26) 
-52 
(-1 
.78 
.27) 
-49 
(-1 
.73 
.21) 
-49 
(-1 
.75 
.21) 
R² within 0 .345 0 .345 0 .341 0 .341 
Observations      1,281      1,281      1,287      1,287 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the dependent variable. 
Executive compensation is measured as total compensation of the executive board in units of € 1,000 divided by the number 
of executive board members. The first column shows the independent variables. Former CEO is on board (is chairman/is 
ordinary board member) equals one, if any supervisory board member (the chairman of the supervisory board/an ordinary 
supervisory board member) in the respective year was the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 
1987-2006 or in 1985 or in 1982 and zero otherwise. Joint tenure measures the average number of years that the former CEO 
spent together with the current executive board member on the executive board. Ln (number of executives) is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of executive board members. CEO tenure is defined as the number of years that the current 
CEO has served on the executive board (as either CEO or ordinary member). Stake executive (supervisory) board measures 
the percentage of shares held by members of the executive (supervisory) board. Largest shareholder > 50% is equal to one if 
the largest shareholder holds at least 50% of the voting equity. Checked equals one if largest shareholder > 50% is set to one 
and the second largest shareholder holds at least 5% of the voting shares.  Codetermination is defined as the number of 
employee representatives divided by the number of supervisory board members; bank representation is a dummy equal to 
one if a supervisory board member represents the interest of a bank. Ln (market capitalization) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the total market value of equity; share price performance is computed as the annual return in the previous year 
minus the return of the CDAX performance index; ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets; Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total 
assets. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as 
obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.7: Director and executive compensation: Difference-in-differences 
Panel A:  
Executive compensation 
 Treatment group  
(1) 
Control group 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
CEO changes to the board  
  Before  1,020, 818 707, 939 312, 879 
  After  1,568, 073 990, 482 577, 591** 
  Difference  547, 255*** 282, 543*** 264, 711 
  Observations  45 23  
CEO becomes chairman   
  Before  1,211, 208 707, 939 503, 269* 
  After  1,760, 873 990, 482 770, 390* 
  Difference  549, 665*** 282, 543*** 267, 122 
  Observations  27 23  
CEO becomes ordinary board member  
  Before  735, 233 707, 939 27, 294 
  After  1,278, 873 990, 482 288, 391 
  Difference  543, 640*** 282, 543*** 261, 097 
  Observations  18 23  
 
Panel B:  
Director compensation 
 Treatment group  
(1) 
Control group 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
CEO changes to the board  
  Before  53, 104 28, 179 24, 924*** 
  After  78, 518 44, 409 34, 109*** 
  Difference  25, 414*** 16, 229*** 9, 185 
  Observations  44 24  
CEO becomes chairman   
  Before  57, 172 28, 179 28, 992*** 
  After  81, 624 44, 409 37, 215*** 
  Difference  24, 452*** 16, 229*** 8, 223 
  Observations  27 24  
CEO becomes ordinary board member   
  Before  46, 643 28, 179 18, 463*** 
  After  73, 584 44, 409 29, 175** 
  Difference  26, 941*** 16, 229*** 10, 712 
  Observations  17 24  
This table shows the levels and changes of director and executive compensation around unforced CEO 
turnovers using the difference-in-differences methodology. Before corresponds to the average per capita 
executive (director) compensation (in Euro) in the last two years of the CEO under consideration on the 
executive board, whereas after refers to the average per capita executive (director) compensation (in Euro) in 
the five years following the CEO turnover. All firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory board 
(becomes the chairman of the supervisory board/becomes an ordinary supervisory board member) are defined 
as the treatment group, whereas all firms whose retiring CEO leaves the firm are defined as the control group. 
The third row shows the difference in director or executive compensation before and after CEO turnover. The 
third column gives the differences between the treatment and control groups before and after CEO turnover 
and the difference between the differences in executive or director compensation before and after CEO 
turnover for the treatment and control groups. The mean is reported for each table cell. For the third row and 
third column, t-tests are used to test if the mean difference is significantly different from zero. The 
superscripts ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Panel A (B) contains the 
analysis for executive (director) compensation. 
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Panel A in Table 2.7 shows the results of the difference-in-differences analysis. Per-capita 
executive compensation in the treatment groups increase by about € 540,000. The increase 
is remarkably similar in the three treatment groups. The increase in the control group is 
about € 280,000. The difference, although large, is not statistically significant. This may be 
due to the fact that the analysis so far includes neither the control variables introduced 
above, nor firm or year fixed effects. We therefore estimate the following regression model 
using the fixed effects estimator: 
yit =  + (post) + (post*treatment) + (control variables) + (year dummies) + it     (2.2) 
yit 
is our measure of per-capita executive compensation in firm i at time t. Treatment is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one (for the pre- and the post-period) if the former CEO 
becomes a member of the supervisory board in the post-period, and zero otherwise. 
Post*treatment is our difference-in-differences estimator. It captures the difference between 
the change in per capita executive pay from the pre- to the post-period between the 
treatment and control groups. The results are shown in Table 2.8. Consistent with the 
descriptive results shown in Table 2.7 above, the coefficient for post*treatment is positive. 
The magnitude of the effect ranges from € 123,000 in cases in which the departing CEO 
becomes an ordinary member of the supervisory board to € 277,000 in cases in which he 
becomes the chair. In all cases, the effect is statistically significant. Thus, our difference-in-
differences analysis provides support for our hypothesis that executive compensation 
increases when a former CEO becomes a member (or the chairman) of the supervisory 
board.
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As for the analysis of the level of executive and director compensation we perform several robustness 
checks. We re-estimate our models using the log of total assets as size measure. We also included leverage as 
an additional control variable (see Table A.13 in the appendix of this chapter). Furthermore we use an 
alternative definition for a controlling shareholder based on a 25% threshold and account for the 
shareholdings of the largest shareholder instead of a dummy variable (see Table A.14 in the appendix of this 
chapter). Finally we control for the identity of the largest shareholder (see Table A.15 in the appendix of this 
chapter). The results of almost all these specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 2.8. The coefficient for post*treatment is only insignificant for the last robustness test in 
Table A.15 in cases in which the departing CEO becomes an ordinary member of the supervisory board. 
However, the magnitude of the effect also amounts to €123,000.  
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Table 2.8: Determinants of executive compensation: Difference-in-differences 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant -216 .26 -310 .44 -2687 .14* -2736 .14* 908 .73 724 .82 
 (-0 .24) (-0 .33) (-1 .82) (-1 .89) (0 .82) (0 .61) 
Post -40 .21 -30 .75 -6 .45 6 .46 -210 .62 -201 .56 
 (-0 .53) (-0 .44) (-0 .10) (0 .11) (-1 .38) (-1 .43) 
Post*treatment 158 .79** 163 .81* 274 .76*** 277 .17** 122 .52* 123 .34* 
 (2 .81) (2 .05) (3 .09) (2 .55) (1 .94) (1 .78) 
Ln (number of executives) -626 .78** -609 .37* -549 .88* -533 .46* -680 .25* -657 .62* 
 (-2 .16) (-2 .04) (-1 .99) (-1 .84) (-2 .12) (-1 .93) 
CEO tenure 14 .19*** 13 .69*** 21 .39*** 19 .95*** -7 .46 -7 .08 
 (6 .64) (5 .66) (4 .95) (4 .38) (-0 .82) (-0 .94) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 359 .61*** 334 .01*** 373 .89** 345 .10*** 286 .44*** 274 .40*** 
 (3 .17) (3 .23) (2 .91) (2 .98) (3 .87) (3 .87) 
Checked -9 .50 13 .27 -35 .05 15 .14 109 .43 115 .06* 
 (-0 .14) (0 .19) (-0 .46) (0 .21) (1 .75) (1 .85) 
Stake executive board -3 .48 -3 .68 -3 .76 -3 .13 -5 .47 -6 .27 
 (-0 .71) (-0 .78) (-0 .58) (-0 .49) (-0 .91) (-1 .07) 
Stake supervisory board -1 .43 -1 .71 -3 .42 -3 .38 -3 .09 -3 .34 
 (-0 .38) (-0 .45) (-0 .76) (-0 .72) (-0 .81) (-0 .81) 
Codetermination 205 .49 183 .35 551 .30 554 .95 -360 .38 -355 .61 
 (0 .33) (0 .31) (0 .83) (0 .90) (-0 .38) (-0 .37) 
Bank representation -441 .68*** -491 .36*** -161 .85** -197 .73** -708 .84*** -749 .11*** 
 (-5 .22) (-5 .45) (-2 .35) (-2 .83) (-4 .27) (-3 .94) 
Ln (market capitalization) 73 .26 72 .14 173 .77** 170 .79** 91 .56* 95 .52* 
 (1 .72) (1 .52) (2 .36) (2 .34) (1 .84) (1 .78) 
Share price performance 107 .64*  146 .43**  70 .76  
 (2 .01)  (2 .49)  (1 .20)  
ROA  2527 .51*  1959 .34  1030 .71 
  (2 .05)  (1 .74)  (0 .68) 
Tobin´s Q 53 .36 36 .49 50 .94 49 .51 86 .64 62 .94 
 (0 .89) (0 .57) (0 .90) (0 .80) (0 .81) (0 .43) 
R² within 0 .369 0 .385 0 .428 0 .439 0 .344 0 .346 
Observations 413 413 301 301 238 238 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per capita 
executive compensation as the dependent variable. Executive compensation is the total compensation of the executive board 
(in € 1,000), divided by the number of executive board members. The first column lists the independent variables. Post is 
equal to one in the period after the CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. Post*treatment is the difference-in-differences 
estimator. In columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 41 firms whose former CEO transfers to the 
supervisory board (25 (16) firms where he becomes the chairman of the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board 
member)). The control group consists of 18 firms whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. 
Ln (number of executives) is the natural logarithm of the number of executive board members. CEO tenure is the number of 
years that the current CEO served on the executive board (as either CEO or ordinary member). Largest shareholder > 50% is 
equal to one if the largest shareholder holds at least 50% of the voting equity. Checked equals one if largest shareholder > 
50%  is set to one and the second largest shareholder holds at least 5% of the voting shares. Codetermination is defined as the 
number of employee representatives divided by the number of supervisory board members; bank representation is a dummy 
that is set to one if a supervisory board member is a bank representative; stake executive (supervisory) board is the 
percentage of shares held by members of the executive (supervisory) board; ln (market capitalization) is the natural 
logarithm of the total market value of equity; share price performance is computed as the annual return in the previous year 
minus the return of the CDAX performance index. ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Summarizing our results on executive compensation, we find some evidence in support of 
hypotheses H2.3 and H2.4. Executive compensation in firms with a former CEO on the 
supervisory board is higher than executive compensation in the control firms (Table 2.5). 
When we control for other determinants of executive compensation we obtain positive but 
insignificant coefficients for the difference in executive compensation (Table 2.6a). In 
firms in which a former CEO sits on the supervisory board, per capita executive 
compensation is increasing in the joint tenure (the average time the former CEO and the 
current executives spent together on the executive board).  
This supports hypothesis 2.4 and the existence and relevance of a leniency bias (Table 
2.6b). The strongest results are obtained in the difference-in-differences analysis. When a 
former CEO becomes the a member (or the chairman) of the supervisory board upon 
retirement, we observe a significant increase in per capita executive compensation relative 
to a control group of firms that do not transfer their retiring CEO to the supervisory board.  
2.6.2  Director compensation 
Table 2.9 contains our regression results with per capita director compensation as the 
dependent variable. The results indicate that a former CEO serving as ordinary member of 
the supervisory board does not affect the level of director compensation. However, when 
the former CEO chairs the supervisory board, per capita director compensation is 
significantly (at the 10% level) higher than in firms without a former CEO on the board 
(specifications (2) and (4)). We thus find at least partial support for hypothesis 2.5. We 
further find that director compensation increases in firm size. The presence of a bank 
representative on the supervisory board is negatively related to per capita compensation. 
We also note that the explanatory power of the model is much lower than that of the model 
for executive compensation discussed above.  
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Table 2.9: Determinants of director compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
 -36 
(-2 
.06** 
.52) 
 -43 
(-2 
.50** 
.35) 
-23 
(-1 
.24 
.31) 
 -30 
(-1 
.99 
.51) 
Former CEO on board 
 
 3 
(1 
.80 
.82) 
   3 
(1 
.32 
.55) 
  
Former CEO is chairman 
 
  8  
(2 
.64* 
.14) 
  7  
(1 
.72* 
.96) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
 -5 
(-1 
.60 
.27) 
 -6 
(-1 
.07 
.30) 
Ln (number of directors) 
 
 1 
(0 
.17 
.16) 
 1 
(0 
.80 
.24) 
 -0 
(-0 
.50 
.07) 
 0 
(0 
.18 
.02) 
Largest shareholder > 50%  4 
(0 
.74 
.52) 
 4 
(0 
.69 
.52) 
 6 
(0 
.05 
.67) 
 5 
(0 
.99 
.67) 
Stake executive board 
 
0  
(0 
.07 
.85) 
 0 
(0 
.07 
.89) 
 0 
(0 
.06 
.81) 
 0 
(0 
.07 
.84) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
 -0 
(-2 
.09* 
.15) 
 -0 
(-2 
.09** 
.38) 
 -0 
(-2 
.09* 
.13) 
 -0 
(-2 
.09** 
.34) 
Checked 
 
 -2 
(-1 
.40 
.01) 
 -2 
(-0 
.58 
.97) 
 -3 
(-1 
.18 
.06) 
 -3 
(-1 
.44 
.06) 
Codetermination 
 
 -35 
(-1 
.13 
.59) 
 -38 
(-1 
.59 
.65) 
 -31 
(-1 
.61 
.55) 
 -34 
(-1 
.85 
.63) 
Bank representation 
 
-6 
(-3 
.86*** 
.22) 
-6 
(-2 
.24** 
.92) 
-5 
(-2 
.67** 
.58) 
-5 
(-2 
.20* 
.25) 
Board meetings 
 
 0 
(1 
.41 
.70) 
 0 
(1 
.41 
.62) 
 0 
(3 
.70*** 
.58) 
 0 
(3 
.70** 
.14) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
 7 
(12 
.30*** 
.22) 
 7 
(9 
.83*** 
.12) 
 6 
(7 
.29*** 
.20) 
 6 
(7 
.83*** 
.00) 
Share price performance 
  
-0 
(-0  
.21 
.13) 
-0 
(-0  
.08 
.05) 
  
ROA    29 
(2 
.49* 
.09) 
 29 
(2 
.77* 
.03) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
 -1 
(-1 
.41* 
.91) 
 -1 
(-1 
.43* 
.95) 
 -2 
(-3 
.42*** 
.54) 
 -2 
(-3 
.42*** 
.50) 
R² within 0 .069 0 .072 0 .071 0 .074 
Observations      1,195      1,195      1,198      1,198 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita director compensation as the dependent variable. The 
variable director compensation is measured as the total compensation of the supervisory board in units of € 1,000 divided by 
the number of supervisory board members in the respective year. The first column shows the independent variables. The 
variable Former CEO is on board (is chairman/is ordinary board member) is equal to one, if any supervisory board member 
(the chairman of the supervisory board/an ordinary supervisory board member) in the respective year was the CEO of the 
same firm in at least one of the previous years between 1987 and 2006 or in 1985 or in 1982 and zero otherwise. Ln (number 
of directors) is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of supervisory board members. The variable largest 
shareholder > 50% is a dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder holding at least 50% of the voting 
equity, and zero otherwise. The variable stake executive (supervisory) board measures the percentage of shares held by 
members of the executive (supervisory) board. Checked equals one if largest shareholder > 50% is set to one and the second 
largest shareholder holds at least 5% of the voting shares. The variable codetermination is defined as the number of 
employee representatives divided by the number of supervisory board members in the respective year; bank representation is 
a dummy that is set to one if a supervisory board member represents the interest of a bank. Board meetings is measured as 
the number of board meetings in the respective year; ln (market capitalization) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total 
market value of equity; share price performance is computed as the annual return in the previous year minus the return of the 
CDAX performance index, ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; and Tobin’s Q 
is defined as the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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As in the previous section, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis of the change in 
director compensation around unforced CEO turnovers. Descriptive results are included in 
Panel B of Table 2.7. The results of fixed effects regressions (including the same control 
variables as before) are displayed in Table 2.10. The coefficient of the difference-in-
differences estimator is only positive in cases in which the former CEO is chair of the 
supervisory board, but never statistically significant.
36
 
In summary, the evidence in favor of hypothesis 2.5 is modest. Per-capita director 
compensation is higher in firms in which a former CEO sits on the supervisory board 
(Table 2.5). 
When we control for other variables that affect director compensation (Table 2.9) we obtain 
significantly positive coefficients only for those cases in which the former CEO chairs the 
supervisory board (and only at the 10% level). The difference-in-differences analysis does 
not yield significant results.  
We offer a potential explanation for these weak results (and in particular those of the 
difference-in-differences analysis). If a former executive who is now a member or the chair 
of the supervisory board exerts his influence to increase the compensation of the members 
of the supervisory board, he is effectively increasing his own pay. This may well be 
interpreted as self-dealing by shareholders and the public. One such case occurred during 
our sample period and attracted a lot of attention. Former Lufthansa CEO Jürgen Weber 
became chairman of the supervisory board right after stepping down as CEO. In one of the 
first board meetings, the new supervisory board proposed a resolution to double the base 
salary of all members of the supervisory board and to triple the salary of the chairman 
(which the annual general meeting approved). These decisions led to an outcry in the 
German public and the media accused the supervisory board of self-dealing at the expense 
of employees and shareholders (Spiegel, 2003). As a reaction, Mr. Weber decided to donate 
his pay raise as chairman to charity. With regard to our hypothesis, the public attention to 
Mr. Weber’s actions may imply that former executives are more reluctant to raise their own  
                                                 
 
36
Again we perform robustness checks based on the same criteria as for the analysis of the level of director 
compensation. The results of these robustness checks are given in Table A.19, A.20 and A.21 in the appendix 
of this chapter. The results of all these specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 2.10. 
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Table 2.10: Determinants of director compensation: Difference-in-differences 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant  -252 .70*** -121 .28*** -405 .90*** -235 .70*** -230 .55*** -221 .89*** 
  (-6 .85) (-3 .27)  (-6 .33) (-3 .83)  (-3 .82) (-3 .33)  
Post 3 .20 2 .51 5 .78 5 .53 9 .49 6 .37 
 (0 .70) (0 .62)  (1 .64) (1 .64)  (1 .05) (0 .78)  
Post*treatment -0 .05 0 .92 2 .69 3 .03 -3 .23 -1 .22 
 (-0 .01) (0 .15)  (0 .51) (0 .59)  (-0 .37) (-0 .14)  
Ln (number of directors) -11 .77 -12 .78 -9 .58 -12 .50 -4 .45 -1 .16 
 (-0 .77) (-0 .88)  (-0 .77) (-0 .96)  (-0 .16) (-0 .04)  
Largest shareholder > 50% -10 .94** -10 .39* -8 .05* -7 .95 -17 .56*** -14 .26*** 
 (-2 .46) (-2 .03)  (-1 .86) (-1 .68)  (-6 .07) (-3 .24)  
Checked 6 .89 5 .82 9 .88** 9 .05** 11 .74** 9 .10 
 (1 .70) (1 .28)  (2 .88) (2 .33)  (2 .39) (1 .62)  
Stake executive board 0 .35* 0 .29 0 .40* 0 .36* 1 .02*** 0 .73** 
 (1 .92) (1 .53)  (2 .10) (1 .77)  (3 .21) (2 .33)  
Stake supervisory board -0 .08 -0 .13 0 .09 0 .07 -0 .19 -0 .25 
 (-0 .85) (-1 .24)  (1 .10) (0 .73)  (-1 .50) (-1 .65)  
Codetermination -27 .71* -26 .25* -24 .66 -23 .19 -36 .22 -37 .73 
 (-1 .96) (-1 .83)  (-1 .39) (-1 .29)  (-1 .36) (-1 .39)  
Bank representation -15 .76* -17 .20** -10 .33* -11 .63** -14 .68 -16 .70 
 (-2 .11) (-2 .19)  (-1 .91) (-2 .16)  (-1 .01) (-1 .03)  
Board meetings 1 .92 2 .05* 1 .69 1 .71 3 .16* 3 .31** 
 (1 .72) (1 .78)  (1 .03) (0 .99)  (2 .04) (2 .29)  
Ln (market capitalization) 14 .91*** 14 .46*** 21 .37*** 21 .33*** 11 .96*** 11 .31*** 
 (11 .41) (10 .09)  (9 .09) (7 .38)  (6 .39) (7 .09)  
Share price performance -4 .53  -6 .20  -7 .99*  
 (-1 .11)  (-1 .03)  (-1 .84)  
ROA  90 .71**  74 .01**  92 .66 
  (2 .37)   (2 .43)   (1 .44)  
Tobin´s Q -2 .35** -4 .42*** -0 .79 -2 .77*** -0 .72 -6 .32 
 (-2 .58) (-3 .40)  (-0 .69) (-3 .02)  (-0 .21) (-1 .13)  
R² within 0 .292 0 .300 0 .465 0 .469 0 .240 0 .243 
Observations 385 385 287 287 217 217 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per capita director 
compensation as the dependent variable. Director compensation is the total compensation of the supervisory board (in € 
1,000), divided by the number of supervisory board members. The first column lists the independent variables. Post is equal 
to one in the period after the CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. Post*treatment is the difference-in-differences estimator. In 
columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 48 firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory 
board (29 (19) firms where he becomes the chairman of the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The 
control group consists of 12 firms whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. Ln (number of 
directors) is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of supervisory board members. Largest shareholder > 50% is 
equal to one if the largest shareholder holds at least 50% of the voting equity. Stake executive (supervisory) board measures 
the percentage of shares held by members of the executive (supervisory) board. Checked equals one if largest shareholder > 
50% is set to one and the second largest shareholder holds at least 5% of the voting shares. Codetermination is defined as the 
number of employee representatives divided by the number of supervisory board members; bank representation is a dummy 
that is set to one if a supervisory board member is a bank representative; board meetings is measured as the number of board 
meetings in the respective year; ln (market capitalization) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total market value of 
equity; share price performance is computed as the annual return in the previous year minus the return of the CDAX 
performance index; ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, and Tobin’s Q is 
defined as the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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salary and the salary of the supervisory board in general due to the risk of being accused of 
self-dealing.  
2.7 Conclusion 
CEO transitions have been discussed controversially. While proponents argue that the firm 
and industry expertise of former CEOs make them good monitors and valuable advisors, 
the critics point at various conflicts of interest and their potentially negative consequences. 
Based on a panel of 150 German firms, this paper provides evidence that executive pay 
increases when a former CEO becomes a member or the chairman of the supervisory board. 
The increase is economically significant at € 123,000 and € 276,000, respectively. We 
further document that executive compensation is increasing in the joint tenure of the former 
CEO and the current executives on the executive board. This is consistent with previous 
results by Fiss (2006) and Westphal and Zajac (2005) who argue that greater similarity 
between the CEO and the board results in higher pay.  
We only find weak evidence in favor of an increase in director compensation. We argue 
that the effect is weak because the former CEOs on the supervisory board may be afraid of 
allegations of self-dealing.  
Our short-run event study results imply that the stock market considers the announcement 
of a CEO transition as good news. The result of the long-run event study and of the analysis 
of operating performance point in the same direction but are mostly insignificant.  
In summary, we can conclude that CEO transitions, despite the fact that they are associated 
with increasing executive compensation, are not a cause of concern for shareholders. 
Consequently, the new law which came into force in 2009 and which aims at preventing, or 
at least delaying, CEO transitions cannot be justified on the grounds of shareholder 
protection.  
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A  Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table A.1: Variable definitions to Chapter 2 
This table presents the definitions of the variables used in the Appendix to Chapter 2. Information on board 
meetings is obtained from annual reports. All other board and manager characteristics as well as ownership 
structure are obtained or derived from the Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. All other firm characteristics are 
obtained from Datastream. 
Variable Definition 
 
Board characteristics 
 
Bank representation A dummy that is set to one if a supervisory board member represents 
the interest of a bank and zero otherwise. 
 
Board meetings Number of board meetings in the respective year. 
 
Codetermination Number of employee representatives divided by the number of 
supervisory board members. 
 
Director compensation Total compensation of the supervisory board in units of € 1,000 divided 
by the number of supervisory board members. 
 
Executive compensation Total compensation of the executive board in units of € 1,000 divided 
by the number of executive board members. 
 
Ln (number of directors) Natural logarithm of the number of supervisory board members. 
 
Ln (number of executives) Natural logarithm of the number of executive board members. 
 
No bank representation 
 
A dummy that is set to one if no supervisory board member represents 
the interest of a bank and zero otherwise. 
 
Stake executive board Percentage of shares held by members of the executive board. 
 
Stake supervisory board Percentage of shares held by members of the supervisory board. 
 
Manager characteristics 
CEO tenure 
 
Number of years that the current CEO has served on the executive 
board (as either CEO or ordinary member). 
 
Former CEO tenure Number of years that the former CEO has served on the executive 
board (as either CEO or ordinary member).  
 
Joint tenure 
 
Average number of years that the former CEO spent together with the 
current executive board member on the executive board for firms with 
a former CEO on the supervisory board and zero otherwise. 
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Manager characteristics (continued) 
 
Former CEO is chairman 
 
A dummy that equals one, if the chairman of the supervisory board was 
the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 
1987-2006 or in 1985 or 1982 and zero otherwise. 
 
Former CEO is on board 
 
A dummy that equals one, if any supervisory board member was the 
CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years between 
1987-2006 or in 1985 or 1982 and zero otherwise. 
 
Former CEO is ordinary  
board member 
A dummy that equals one, if an ordinary supervisory board member 
was the CEO of the same firm in at least one of the previous years 
between 1987-2006 or in 1985 or 1982 and zero otherwise. 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
 
Checked A firm is said to be checked if the firm has a largest shareholder 
holding at least 50% (25%) of the voting equity and a second largest 
shareholder holding at least 5% of the voting shares. 
 
Excess ROA 
 
ROA minus the average ROA of a control group of firms matched on 
industry, size and prior performance. See Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) for 
details regarding the construction of our measures of excess operating 
performance. 
 
Excess ROE 
 
ROE minus the average ROE of a control group of firms matched on 
industry, size and prior performance. See Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) for 
details regarding the construction of our measures of excess operating 
performance. 
 
Family > 50% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a family holding at least 
50% of the voting equity, and zero otherwise. We follow the 
classification method proposed by da Silva et al. (2004) to determine 
the controlling shareholder at the ultimate level. 
 
Finance & services 
 
All firms classified as either “Finance & Insurance”, “Personal & 
Business Services” or “Health & Legal Services” according to SIC one-
digit codes.  
 
Financials > 50% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a financial firm holding at 
least 50% of the voting equity, and zero otherwise. We follow the 
classification method proposed by da Silva et al. (2004) to determine 
the controlling shareholder at the ultimate level. 
 
Industrials > 50% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with an industrial firm at least 
50% of the voting equity, and zero otherwise. We follow the 
classification method proposed by da Silva et al. (2004) to determine 
the controlling shareholder at the ultimate level. 
 
Largest shareholder > 25% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder 
holding at least 25% of the voting equity and zero otherwise. 
 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder 
holding at least 50% of the voting equity and zero otherwise. 
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Firm characteristics (continued) 
 
Leverage  
 
Ratio of the book value of total debt to total assets. 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
Natural logarithm of the total market value of equity. 
Ln (total assets) 
 
Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in units of € 1,000. 
Manufacturing 
 
All firms classified as “Manufacturing” according to SIC one-digit 
codes. 
 
Mining & construction 
 
All firms classified as either “Mining”, “Construction”, 
“Transportation” or “Wholesale & Retail Trade” according to SIC one-
digit codes. 
 
Others > 50% 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder other 
than a family, a financial firm or an industrial firm holding at least 50% 
of the voting equity, and zero otherwise. We follow the classification 
method proposed by da Silva et al. (2004) to determine the controlling 
shareholder at the ultimate level. 
 
Ownership 0-25 
 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder 
holding not more than 25% of the voting equity and zero otherwise.  
Ownership 25-50 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder 
holding more than 25% and up to 50% of the voting equity and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Ownership 50+ 
 
A dummy that is set to one for all firms with a largest shareholder 
holding more than 50% of the voting equity and zero otherwise. 
 
 
ROA 
 
Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
ROE 
 
Income before extraordinary items over book value of equity. 
Share price performance 
 
Annual return in the previous year minus the return of the CDAX 
performance index. 
 
Size quartile 1 
 
Observations belonging to the quartile of smallest firms based on 
market capitalization as size measure. 
 
Size quartile 2 
 
Observations belonging to the quartile of the second smallest firms 
based on market capitalization as size measure. 
 
Size quartile 3 
 
Observations belonging to the quartile of second largest firms based on 
market capitalization as size measure. 
 
Size quartile 4 
 
Observations belonging to the quartile of largest firms based on market 
capitalization as size measure. 
 
Stake largest shareholder 
 
Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
 
Tobin´s Q 
 
Market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, 
divided by total assets. 
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Table A.2: Short-run announcement returns – regression analysis 
This table shows the results of OLS regressions with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the dependent 
variable. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unforced CEO turnover announcements are measured for 
different event windows (expressed relative to the announcement date t=0). The first column lists the 
independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table A.1. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and 
t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5%, respectively. 
 [-30 ;+30] [-5 ;+5] [0 ;+5] [0 ;+1] 
Constant 
 
0 
(1 
.010 
.26) 
0 
(1 
.104 
.51) 
0 
(0 
.040 
.81) 
0 
(1 
.029 
.62) 
CEO becomes chairman  
of the board 
0 
(0 
.004 
.68) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.12) 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.09) 
0 
(1 
.011 
.00) 
Bank representation -0 
(-1 
.009 
.63) 
0 
(0 
.005 
.12) 
-0 
(-0 
.010 
.31) 
-0 
(-1 
.017 
.39) 
Finance & services -0 
(-0 
.002 
.27) 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.59) 
-0 
(-0 
.012 
.31) 
-0 
(-1 
.019 
.32) 
Manufacturing -0 
(-0 
.002 
.41) 
0 
(0 
.019 
.39) 
0 
(0 
.021 
.59) 
-0 
(-0 
.007 
.59) 
Ownership 0-25 0 
(0 
.000 
.00) 
0 
(0 
.027 
.47) 
0 
(0 
.020 
.48) 
-0 
(-1 
.021 
.39) 
Ownership 25-50 0 
(0 
.007 
.99) 
-0 
(-0 
.007 
.11) 
0 
(0 
.001 
.02) 
-0 
(-0 
.004 
.23) 
Size quartile 1 -0 
(-0 
.004 
.58) 
-0 
(-2 
.150** 
.35) 
-0 
(-1 
.083* 
.80) 
-0 
(-0 
.013 
.80) 
Size quartile 2 -0 
(-0 
.006 
.88) 
-0 
(-2 
.122** 
.09) 
-0 
(-1 
.057 
.35) 
-0 
(-0 
.010 
.63) 
Size quartile 3 -0 
(-1 
.008 
.07) 
-0 
(-1 
.073 
.10) 
-0 
(-0 
.039 
.81) 
-0 
(-0 
.014 
.78) 
R²  0 .122 0 .158 0 .110 0 .141 
Observations  59  59  59  59 
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Table A.3: Short-run announcement returns – ordered by the position of the former CEO on 
the supervisory board 
This table contains cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unforced CEO turnover announcements for 
different event windows (expressed relative to the announcement date t=0). Panel A presents results for the 
subsample of CEOs who become chairmen of the supervisory board, while Panel B shows abnormal 
announcement returns for the subsample of CEOs who become ordinary members of the supervisory board 
(34 and 25 observations, respectively). T-statistics, the test statistic proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and 
the non-parametric Corrado (1989) test are reported in columns 4, 5, and 6. The superscripts *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: CEO becomes chairman of the board 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  18 : 16 2 .17% 0 .72 0 .98 1 .35 
[-10;+30]  22 : 12 3 .79% 1 .53 2 .12** 1 .80 
[-5;+5]  22 : 12 1 .35% 1 .05 0 .37 0 .81 
[-1;+5]  19 : 15 -0 .01% -0 .10 -0 .27 -0 .08 
[0;+5]  19 : 15 -0 .17% -0 .18 -0 .33 0 .07 
[0;+3]  16 : 18 0 .18% 0 .24 -0 .06 0 .48 
[0;+1]  16 : 18 0 .24% 0 .44 -0 .27 0 .80 
[0]  23 : 11 0 .18% 0 .46 0 .06 1 .82* 
 
Panel B: CEO becomes ordinary supervisory board member 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30] 15 : 10 9 .56% 2 .16** 1 .44 0 .90 
[-10;+30] 13 : 12 6 .46% 1 .78* 1 .35 0 .89 
[-5;+5] 13 : 12 4 .88% 2 .59*** 1 .09 1 .21 
[-1;+5] 11 : 14 2 .00% 1 .33 0 .15 0 .36 
[0;+5] 12 : 13 1 .89% 1 .36 0 .11 0 .18 
[0;+3] 12 : 13 0 .95% 0 .84 0 .01 0 .08 
[0;+1] 10 : 15 0 .06% -0 .08 -0 .32 0 .68 
[0] 15 : 10 0 .12% 0 .22 -0 .09 0 .68 
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Table A.4: Short-run announcement returns – decision of the CEO to leave or stay was 
announced at the same time as the retirement 
This table contains cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unforced CEO turnover announcements for 
different event windows (expressed relative to the announcement date t=0). The table contains only cases 
where the decision of the CEO to leave or stay was announced at the same time as the retirement. Panel A 
presents results for the full sample (92 observations), while Panel B (C) shows abnormal announcement 
returns for the subsample of CEOs who leave the firm (become member of the supervisory board) (48 and 44 
observations, respectively). T-statistics, the test statistic proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and the non-
parametric Corrado (1989) test are reported in columns 4, 5, and 6. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: All CEO turnover events 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  48 : 44 0 .54% 0 .54 0 .24 0 .31 
[-10;+30]  52 : 40 1 .57% 1 .57 1 .19 0 .96 
[-5;+5]  48 : 44 1 .43% 1 .43 0 .21 0 .40 
[-1;+5]  45 : 47 -0 .66% -0 .66 -0 .67 -0 .58 
[0;+5]  46 : 46 -0 .89% -0 .89 -0 .86 -0 .69 
[0;+3]  37 : 55 -0 .35% -0 .35 -0 .42 -0 .04 
[0;+1]  42 : 50 -0 .94% -0 .94 -0 .71 0 .54 
[0]  51 : 41 -1 .17% -1 .17 -0 .53 1 .10 
 
Panel B: CEO leaves the firm 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30] 21 : 27 -5 .31% -1 .81* -1 .94* -1 .34 
[-10;+30] 24 : 24 -1 .30% -0 .54 -0 .71 -0 .54 
[-5;+5] 23 : 25 -0 .68% -0 .54 -0 .56 -0 .54 
[-1;+5] 23 : 25 -1 .71% -1 .72* -0 .76 -0 .68 
[0;+5] 24 : 24 -1 .80% -1 .95* -0 .97 -0 .97 
[0;+3] 17 : 31 -1 .14% -1 .51* -0 .85 -0 .53 
[0;+1] 20 : 28 -0 .93% -1 .74* -0 .94 -0 .53 
[0] 22 : 26 -0 .87% -2 .32** -1 .15 -0 .78 
 
Panel C: CEO becomes supervisory board member 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  27 : 17 8 .17% 2 .73*** 2 .12** 1 .72* 
[-10;+30]  28 : 16 7 .07% 2 .87*** 2 .72*** 1 .87* 
[-5;+5]  25 : 19 3 .40% 2 .67*** 0 .85 1 .08 
[-1;+5]  22 : 22 0 .89% 0 .87 -0 .16 -0 .16 
[0;+5]  22 : 22 0 .73% 0 .78 -0 .21 -0 .04 
[0;+3]  20 : 24 0 .85% 1 .10 0 .33 0 .45 
[0;+1]  22 : 22 0 .27% 0 .49 0 .01 1 .27 
[0]  29 : 15 0 .29% 0 .77 0 .46 2 .30** 
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Table A.5: Short-run announcement returns – no confounding events 
This table contains cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unforced CEO turnover announcements for 
different event windows (expressed relative to the announcement date t=0). This table does not include cases 
with other potentially value-relevant information which could affect abnormal announcement returns. Panel A 
presents results for the full sample (99 observations), while Panel B (C) shows abnormal announcement 
returns for the subsample of CEOs who leave the firm (become member of the supervisory board) (46 and 53 
observations, respectively). T-statistics, the test statistic proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and the non-
parametric Corrado (1989) test are reported in columns 4, 5, and 6. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: All CEO turnover events 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  48 : 51 0 .35% 0 .17 -0 .05 0 .05 
[-10;+30]  53 : 46 1 .55% 0 .93 0 .65 0 .56 
[-5;+5]  55 : 44 1 .43% 1 .66* 0 .55 0 .87 
[-1;+5]  49 : 50 -0 .13% -0 .19 -0 .33 0 .01 
[0;+5]  52 : 47 -0 .11% -0 .17 -0 .39 -0 .06 
[0;+3]  44 : 55 0 .02% 0 .04 -0 .16 0 .36 
[0;+1]  45 : 54 -0 .15% -0 .42 -0 .44 0 .89 
[0]  58 : 41 -0 .16% -0 .63 -0 .14 1 .27 
 
Panel B: CEO leaves the firm 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30] 19 : 27 -5 .84% -1 .94* -2 .13** -1 .59 
[-10;+30] 22 : 24 -2 .27% -0 .91 -1 .08 -0 .93 
[-5;+5] 22 : 24 -1 .27% -0 .99 -0 .84 -0 .79 
[-1;+5] 21 : 25 -2 .01% -1 .97** -0 .91 -0 .79 
[0;+5] 23 : 23 -1 .91% -2 .02** -1 .01 -0 .96 
[0;+3] 16 : 30 -1 .26 % -1 .64 -0 .98 -0 .69 
[0;+1] 19 : 27 -1 .04% -1 .90* -1 .09 -0 .64 
[0] 21 : 25 -0 .91% -2 .35** -1 .15 -0 .76 
 
Panel C: CEO becomes supervisory board member 
 Pos : Neg CAR t-test Boehmer  
test 
Corrado  
test 
[-30;+30]  29 : 24 5 .72% 2 .08** 1 .75* 1 .43 
[-10;+30]  31 : 22 4 .86% 2 .15** 2 .16** 1 .56 
[-5;+5]  33 : 20 3 .77% 3 .23*** 1 .64 1 .88* 
[-1;+5]  28 : 25 1 .51% 1 .62 0 .53 0 .69 
[0;+5]  29 : 24 1 .45% 1 .68* 0 .65 0 .74 
[0;+3]  28 : 25 1 .13% 1 .61 0 .97 1 .08 
[0;+1]  26 : 27 0 .61% 1 .23 0 .86 1 .78* 
[0]  37 : 16 0 .48% 1 .37 1 .43 2 .41** 
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Table A.6: Long-run announcement returns – matched-firm-approach 
This table contains results of long-run event studies following unforced CEO turnover announcements. 
Abnormal performance is measured for a portfolio of sample firms for up to 12 months following the month 
of the CEO change. Abnormal performance is measured for a portfolio of sample firms for up to 12 months 
following the month of the CEO change. Abnormal performance is measured as buy-and-hold returns relative 
to a group of matched firms. In a first step, we identify potential matches by selecting all (non-event) firms 
that fall within a range of 0.05 (Panel A) or 0.1 (Panel B) in terms of market-to-book value to each of our 
event firms. In a second step, for each event firm, we identify the firm with the lowest deviation in the 
momentum-factor (relative to our event firm) and use it as a matched firm to compute BHARs. Panel C and D 
present results for the subsample of firms where the CEO changes to the supervisory board upon retirement. 
Panel C (D) contains the results based on the approach used in Panel A (B) ordered by different firm 
characteristics. The first column in Panel C and D lists the firm characteristics. All variables are defined as in 
Table A.1. Factor information for the German market is obtained from the Centre for Financial Research 
Cologne. The number of observations corresponds to the number of months with a positive number of firms 
in the portfolio. In each month, firms are included in our portfolio "all turnover events (CEO leaves firm/CEO 
becomes board member)" if an unforced CEO turnover has occurred within the previous 12 months (and the 
CEO left the firm or changed to the supervisory board). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold returns – 0.05 deviation 
 BHAR (t-statistic) 
All turnover events 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO leaves firm 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO becomes board 
member 
2 months 
-1 
(-0 
.40% 
.60) 
-6 
(-2 
.72%** 
.34) 
2 
(0 
.84% 
.82) 
4 months 
-0 
(-0 
.31% 
.08) 
-4 
(-0 
.05% 
.93) 
2 
(0 
.66% 
.45) 
6 months 
-0 
(-0 
.82% 
.17) 
-8 
(-1 
.44% 
.34) 
5 
(0 
.24% 
.75) 
8 months 
-1 
(-0 
.19% 
.24) 
-8 
(-1 
.38% 
.44) 
4 
(0 
.54% 
.59) 
10 months 
0 
(0 
.43% 
.07) 
-3 
(-0 
.54% 
.52) 
3 
(0 
.58% 
.40) 
12 months 
7 
(1 
.17% 
.07) 
5 
(0 
.03% 
.52) 
8 
(0 
.88% 
.95) 
 
Panel B: Buy-and-hold returns – 0.1 deviation 
 BHAR (t-statistic) 
All turnover events 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO leaves firm 
BHAR (t-statistic) 
CEO becomes board 
member 
2 months 
-0 
(-0 
.45% 
.16) 
-4 
(-1 
.99% 
.53) 
3 
(0 
.17% 
.77) 
4 months 
2 
(0 
.88% 
.70) 
-1 
(-0 
.88% 
.38) 
6 
(1 
.67% 
.07) 
6 months 
-0 
(-0 
.14% 
.03) 
-10 
(-1 
.04% 
.34) 
7 
(0 
.74% 
.34) 
8 months 
-0 
(-0 
.05% 
.01) 
-11 
(-1 
.05% 
.01) 
8 
(0 
.70% 
.96) 
10 months 
2 
(0 
.84% 
.38) 
-3 
(-0 
.16% 
.38) 
7 
(0 
.62% 
.63) 
12 months 
9 
(1 
.96% 
.27) 
4 
(0 
.97% 
.27) 
13 
(1 
.94% 
.22) 
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Panel C: Buy-and-hold returns – 0.05 deviation 
 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mining & 
construction 
4 
(1 
.40% 
.43) 
4 
(0 
.93% 
.67) 
8 
(0 
.03% 
.91) 
9 
(1 
.39% 
.02) 
0 
(0 
.90% 
.08) 
-0 
(-0 
.46% 
.05) 
Manufacturing 
 
5 
(0 
.92% 
.97) 
7 
(0 
.40% 
.73) 
8 
(0 
.17% 
.68) 
8 
(0 
.29% 
.74) 
10 
(0 
.34% 
.71) 
17 
(1 
.77% 
.10) 
Finance & services -4 
(-0 
.04% 
.91) 
-7 
(-0 
.85% 
.91) 
-2 
(-0 
.26% 
.22) 
-6 
(-0 
.03% 
.35) 
-7 
(-0 
.08% 
.44) 
-0 
(-0 
.86% 
.06) 
Bank 
representation 
1 
(0 
.51% 
.22) 
1 
(0 
.34% 
.10) 
6 
(0 
.62% 
.48) 
-0 
(-0 
.08% 
.01) 
-0 
(-0 
.04% 
.29) 
-2 
(-0 
.12% 
.18) 
No bank 
representation 
3 
(0 
.57% 
.90) 
3 
(0 
.37% 
.55) 
4 
(0 
.50% 
.56) 
7 
(0 
.04% 
.83) 
7 
(0 
.71% 
.66) 
14 
(1 
.85% 
.16) 
Ownership 0-25 
 
10 
(2 
.27%** 
.02) 
11 
(1 
.42% 
.31) 
17 
(2 
.10% 
.06) 
12 
(1 
.90% 
.26) 
13 
(1 
.79% 
.09) 
21 
(1 
.00% 
.50) 
Ownership 25-50 -6 
(-1 
.84% 
.15) 
-7 
(-1 
.61% 
.23) 
-5 
(-0 
.53% 
.36) 
2 
(0 
.11% 
.18) 
-2 
(-0 
.27% 
.17) 
7 
(0 
.46% 
.60) 
Ownership 50+ 
 
-3 
(-0 
.47% 
.58) 
-5 
(-0 
.95% 
.40) 
-9 
(-0 
.51% 
.57) 
-11 
(-0 
.06% 
.55) 
-12 
(-0 
.58% 
.58) 
-15 
(-0 
.80% 
.77) 
Size quartile 1 
 
5 
(1 
.07% 
.16) 
-7 
(-1 
.70% 
.26) 
-14 
(-1 
.78% 
.33) 
-16 
(-1 
.33% 
.29) 
-16 
(-1 
.44% 
.62) 
-1 
(-0 
.69% 
.20) 
Size quartile 2 
 
7 
(0 
.83% 
.94) 
19 
(1 
.15%* 
.73) 
29 
(2 
.37%** 
.37) 
32 
(2 
.39%** 
.07) 
24 
(1 
.99% 
.59) 
15 
(1 
.89% 
.07) 
Size quartile 3 
 
-11 
(-1 
.05% 
.61) 
-15 
(-1 
.51% 
.16) 
-8 
(-0 
.18% 
.51) 
-8 
(-0 
.14% 
.52) 
-16 
(-0 
.89% 
.91) 
-16 
(-0 
.18% 
.90) 
Size quartile 4 
 
8 
(1 
.98% 
.32) 
14 
(0 
.22% 
.97) 
14 
(0 
.25% 
.97) 
9 
(0 
.69% 
.64) 
22 
(0 
.55% 
.94) 
37 
(1 
.78% 
.34) 
 
Panel D: Buy-and-hold returns – 0.1 deviation 
 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mining & 
construction 
3 
(0 
.59% 
.88) 
9 
(1 
.36%* 
.65) 
13 
(1 
.19% 
.64) 
13 
(1 
.84% 
.48) 
7 
(0 
.74% 
.64) 
10 
(0 
.16% 
.88) 
Manufacturing 
 
10 
(1 
.22% 
.46) 
18 
(1 
.22%* 
.84) 
21 
(1 
.48%* 
.80) 
21 
(1 
.04% 
.54) 
26 
(1 
.45% 
.48) 
32 
(1 
.41%* 
.73) 
Finance & services -10 
(-2 
.31%** 
.05) 
-16 
(-1 
.88% 
.68) 
-21 
(-1 
.90% 
.55) 
-18 
(-1 
.08% 
.00) 
-27 
(-1 
.61% 
.10) 
-17 
(-0 
.78% 
.99) 
Bank 
representation 
-2 
(-0 
.30% 
.33) 
3 
(0 
.41% 
.30) 
10 
(0 
.97% 
.86) 
8 
(0 
.36% 
.61) 
-0 
(-0 
.15% 
.81) 
6 
(0 
.45% 
.53) 
No bank 
representation 
6 
(1 
.14% 
.21) 
8 
(1 
.44% 
.13) 
5 
(0 
.99% 
.60) 
8 
(0 
.89% 
.74) 
11 
(0 
.84% 
.75) 
18 
(1 
.00% 
.10) 
Ownership 0-25 
 
11 
(1 
.09%* 
.66) 
11 
(1 
.67% 
.03) 
8 
(0 
.85% 
.67) 
11 
(0 
.05% 
.73) 
8 
(0 
.65% 
.41) 
21 
(1 
.11% 
.06) 
Ownership 25-50 -6 
(-1 
.85% 
.11) 
-0 
(-0 
.27% 
.04) 
14 
(1 
.19% 
.20) 
13 
(1 
.91% 
.21) 
12 
(0 
.13% 
.98) 
15 
(1 
.20% 
.14) 
Ownership 50+ 
 
-3 
(-0 
.88% 
.71) 
2 
(0 
.82% 
.48) 
-1 
(-0 
.09% 
.10) 
-1 
(-0 
.56% 
.10) 
1 
(0 
.30% 
.08) 
-2 
(-0 
.79% 
.17) 
Size quartile 1 
 
-3 
(-0 
.08% 
.58) 
-18 
(-1 
.05%* 
.75) 
-23 
(-1 
.74% 
.56) 
-27 
(-1 
.01%* 
.71) 
-38 
(-1 
.74% 
.49) 
-18 
(-0 
.65% 
.96) 
Size quartile 2 
 
-13 
(-0 
.44% 
.37) 
25 
(2 
.34%** 
.26) 
35 
(2 
.68%*** 
.62) 
39 
(2 
.22%** 
.34) 
38 
(2 
.57%** 
.44) 
33 
(2 
.76%*** 
.67%) 
Size quartile 3 
 
-9 
(-1 
.86% 
.49) 
-3 
(-0 
.26% 
.70) 
2 
(0 
.94% 
.28) 
2 
(0 
.54% 
.81) 
-2 
(-0 
.00% 
.15) 
-5 
(-0 
.03% 
.36) 
Size quartile 4 
 
11 
(1 
.87% 
.28) 
23 
(1 
.10% 
.33) 
16 
(0 
.36% 
.86) 
20 
(0 
.46% 
.86) 
33 
(1 
.83% 
.04) 
46 
(1 
.65% 
.33) 
 
 
 
 
 60 
Table A.7: Long-run announcement returns – ordered by firm characteristics 
This table contains results of long-run event studies following unforced CEO turnover announcements 
ordered by firm characteristics. Abnormal performance is measured for a portfolio of sample firms for up to 
12 months following the month of the CEO change. The table is based on the subsample of firms where the 
former CEO becomes a member of the supervisory board. The first column lists the firm characteristics. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. Panels A and B present abnormal returns for a calendar-time approach 
based on the Fama-French 3-factor and the Carhart 4-factor model, while Panel C contains buy-and-hold 
returns based on a market-model approach. Factor information for the German market is obtained from the 
Centre for Financial Research Cologne. The number of observations corresponds to the number of months 
with a positive number of firms in the portfolio. In each month, firms are included in our portfolio "CEO 
becomes board member" if an unforced CEO turnover has occurred within the previous 12 months and the 
CEO changed to the supervisory board. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: 3-Factor model – calendar-time  
 Alpha 
(t-statistic) 
Beta 
(t-Statistic) 
SMB 
(t-statistic) 
HML 
(t-Statistic) 
Number of 
observations 
Mining & construction 
 
0 
(1 
.010 
.05) 
1 
(8 
.227*** 
.27) 
0 
(3 
.869*** 
.71) 
0 
(2 
.766*** 
.64) 
92 
Manufacturing 
 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.03) 
1 
(9 
.079*** 
.36) 
0 
(3 
.519*** 
.24) 
0 
(2 
.462*** 
.80) 
115 
Finance & services 
 
0 
(0 
.005 
.65) 
1 
(7 
.029*** 
.33) 
0 
(1 
.198 
.04) 
-0 
(-0 
.009 
.05) 
112 
Bank representation 
 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.44) 
0 
(7 
.887*** 
.51) 
0 
(1 
.216 
.36) 
0 
(3 
.678*** 
.99) 
91 
No bank representation 
 
0 
(1 
.010 
.52) 
1 
(11 
.299*** 
.00) 
0 
(3 
.540*** 
.12) 
0 
(0 
.101*** 
.63) 
137 
Ownership 0-25 
 
0 
(0 
.002 
.39) 
1 
(14 
.393*** 
.00) 
0 
(5 
.891*** 
.96) 
0 
(4 
.827*** 
.65) 
118 
Ownership 25-50 
 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.24) 
0 
(6 
.681*** 
.10) 
0 
(1 
.226 
.37) 
0 
(2 
.565*** 
.97) 
104 
Ownership 50+ 
 
0 
(1 
.009 
.05) 
0 
(5 
.910*** 
.70) 
0 
(0 
.122 
.55) 
-0 
(-1 
.256 
.38) 
100 
Size quartile 1 
 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.42) 
1 
(10 
.379*** 
.46) 
0 
(1 
.219 
.05) 
0 
(1 
.292 
.38) 
69 
Size quartile 2 
 
0 
(1 
.011 
.28) 
1 
(8 
.138*** 
.29) 
0 
(3 
.633*** 
.00) 
0 
(0 
.135 
.53) 
105 
Size quartile 3 
 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.36) 
0 
(6 
.855*** 
.48) 
0 
(2 
.487*** 
.57) 
0 
(1 
.211 
.25) 
97 
Size quartile 4 
 
0 
(1 
.012 
.15) 
0 
(4 
.863*** 
.76) 
0 
(1 
.411 
.57) 
0 
(1 
.347 
.37) 
88 
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Panel B: 4-Factor model – calendar-time  
 Alpha 
(t-statistic) 
Beta 
(t-Statistic) 
SMB 
(t-statistic)  
HML 
(t-Statistic)  
MOM 
(t-statistic) 
Number of 
observations  
Mining & 
construction 
0 
(1 
.010 
.04) 
1 
(6 
.216*** 
.37) 
0 
(3 
.862*** 
.42) 
0 
(2 
.765*** 
.62) 
-0 
(-0 
.017 
.09) 
92 
Manufacturing 
 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.02) 
1 
(8 
.077*** 
.38) 
0 
(3 
.516*** 
.02) 
0 
(2 
.462*** 
.78) 
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.04) 
115 
Finance & services 0 
(1 
.008 
.04) 
0 
(6 
.937*** 
.06) 
0 
(0 
.107 
.53) 
0 
(0 
.035 
.20) 
-0 
(-1 
.208 
.40) 
112 
Bank representation 0 
(0 
.001 
.21) 
0 
(5 
.750*** 
.52) 
0 
(0 
.089 
.52) 
0 
(3 
.668*** 
.99) 
-0 
(-1 
.276* 
.96) 
91 
No bank 
representation 
0 
(1 
.012* 
.69) 
1 
(8 
.238*** 
.95) 
0 
(2 
.491*** 
.68) 
0 
(0 
.117 
.72) 
-0 
(-0 
.114 
.85) 
137 
Ownership 0-25 
 
0 
(1 
.007 
.10) 
1 
(10 
.233*** 
.65) 
0 
(4 
.750*** 
.79) 
0 
(4 
.828*** 
.77) 
-0 
(-2 
.314** 
.55) 
118 
Ownership 25-50 
 
0 
(0 
.001 
.09) 
0 
(5 
.628*** 
.02) 
0 
(1 
.174 
.00) 
0 
(2 
.553*** 
.91) 
-0 
(-0 
.134 
.95) 
104 
Ownership 50+ 
 
0 
(0 
.005 
.50) 
1 
(5 
.028*** 
.91) 
0 
(0 
.221 
.97) 
-0 
(-1 
.308* 
.65) 
0 
(1 
.286 
.63) 
100 
Size quartile 1 
 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.32) 
1 
(8 
.358*** 
.41) 
0 
(0 
.202 
.91) 
0 
(1 
.292 
.37) 
-0 
(-0 
.036 
.23) 
69 
Size quartile 2 
 
0 
(1 
.013 
.40) 
1 
(6 
.076*** 
.45) 
0 
(2 
.579** 
.56) 
0 
(0 
.132 
.52) 
-0 
(-0 
.120 
.67) 
105 
Size quartile 3 
 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.44) 
0 
(5 
.876*** 
.88) 
0 
(2 
.501** 
.56) 
0 
(1 
.200 
.16) 
0 
(0 
.047 
.32) 
97 
Size quartile 4 
 
0. 
(1 
013 
.19) 
0 
(3 
.829*** 
.99) 
0 
(1 
.379 
.36) 
0 
(1 
.346 
.36) 
-0 
(-0 
.078 
.35) 
88 
 
 
Panel C: Buy-and-hold returns  
 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mining & 
construction 
-0 
(-0 
.95% 
.17) 
0 
(0 
.43% 
.07) 
0 
(0 
.56% 
.08) 
1 
(0 
.56% 
.20) 
0 
(0 
.74% 
.07) 
2 
(0 
.61% 
.23) 
Manufacturing 
 
7 
(1 
.25%* 
.83) 
11 
(1 
.55%* 
.67) 
8 
(1 
.44% 
.22) 
9 
(1 
.97% 
.08) 
16 
(1 
.36% 
.21) 
18 
(1 
.71% 
.24) 
Finance & services -9 
(-2 
.08%*** 
.86) 
-3 
(-1 
.81% 
.15) 
-4 
(-0 
.08% 
.70) 
1 
(0 
.15% 
.14) 
3 
(0 
.54% 
.36) 
2 
(0 
.04% 
.22) 
Bank representation -1 
(-0 
.77% 
.55) 
5 
(1 
.70% 
.52) 
5 
(1 
.73% 
.12) 
6 
(1 
.02% 
.12) 
7 
(1 
.75% 
.34) 
1 
(0 
.29% 
.21) 
No bank 
representation 
1 
(0 
.93% 
.54) 
4 
(0 
.19% 
.78) 
1 
(0 
.84% 
.33) 
5 
(0 
.37% 
.71) 
9 
(0 
.92% 
.92) 
14 
(1 
.67% 
.25) 
Ownership 0-25 
 
3 
(0 
.11% 
.68) 
7 
(1 
.66% 
.10) 
6 
(0 
.21% 
.89) 
8 
(0 
.59% 
.92) 
14 
(1 
.71% 
.05) 
18 
(1 
.39% 
.22) 
Ownership 25-50 0 
(0 
.07% 
.02) 
1 
(0 
.89% 
.42) 
2 
(0 
.59% 
.37) 
2 
(0 
.81% 
.44) 
2 
(0 
.08% 
.34) 
-1 
(-0 
.39% 
.16) 
Ownership 50+ 
 
-3 
(-0 
.17% 
.80) 
1 
(0 
.32% 
.34) 
-2 
(-0 
.33% 
.41) 
2 
(0 
.17% 
.26) 
4 
(0 
.75% 
.55) 
4 
(0 
.84% 
.56) 
Size quartile 1 
 
-3 
(-1 
.61% 
.22) 
-3 
(-1 
.88% 
.36) 
-2 
(-0 
.73% 
.70) 
-3 
(-0 
.95% 
.99) 
1 
(0 
.75% 
.27) 
1 
(0 
.41% 
.23) 
Size quartile 2 
 
1 
(0 
.81% 
.44) 
3 
(0 
.57% 
.78) 
3 
(0 
.48% 
.62) 
8 
(0 
.07% 
.88) 
10 
(1 
.96% 
.28) 
7 
(0 
.80% 
.93) 
Size quartile 3 
 
-2 
(-1 
.08% 
.23) 
0 
(0 
.08% 
.03) 
-2 
(-0 
.74% 
.56) 
-0 
(-0 
.14% 
.04) 
-3 
(-0 
.51% 
.86) 
-10 
(-2 
.56%** 
.31) 
Size quartile 4 
 
7 
(1 
.26% 
.44) 
19 
(1 
.93% 
.38) 
15 
(1 
.19% 
.02) 
19 
(0 
.24% 
.98) 
29 
(0 
.02% 
.98) 
45 
(1 
.10% 
.44) 
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Table A.8: Operating performance – former CEO becomes chairman of the supervisory 
board vs. former CEO does not change to the supervisory board 
This table contains the results of a difference-in-differences analysis of operating performance around 
unforced CEO turnover events. We compare firms in which a former CEO becomes the chairman of the 
supervisory board to firms in which a retiring CEO leaves the firm. All variables are defined as in Table A.1. 
The difference-in-differences analysis compares average (excess) ROA and average (excess) ROE under the 
old CEO (average of years t-2 and t-1) to average (excess) performance under the new CEO (years t+1 and 
t+2, relative to the turnover year (t=0)). Each cell shows the estimated coefficient. The figures in the third row 
and third column (in bold in the lower right cell) of each sub-panel show the estimated coefficients and t-
values (in parentheses) (of the difference-in-differences estimator). The superscript * denotes statistical 
significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A: Raw performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not 
change to the supervisory 
board  
Difference 
ROA    
Average ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.088 0 
 
.074 0 
(0 
.014 
.918) 
Average ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.072 0 
 
.063 0 
(0 
.010 
.641) 
Change in ROA 
 
-0 
(-1 
.016* 
.744) 
-0 
(-1 
.011 
.084) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.330) 
Observations  33   35  
 
ROE      
Average ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.046 0 
 
.041 0 
(0 
.005 
.400) 
Average ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.036 0 
 
.011 0 
(1 
.025 
.423) 
Change in ROE 
 
-0 
(-0 
.011 
.159) 
-0 
(-1 
.030* 
.881) 
0 
(1 
.020 
.103) 
Observations  33   35  
 
Panel B: Excess performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not  
change to the supervisory  
board  
Difference 
ROA    
Average excess ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.008 0 
 
.017 -0 
(-1 
.008 
.436) 
Average excess ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.019 0 
 
.029 -0 
(-0 
.010 
.575) 
Change in excess ROA 
 
0 
(0 
.010 
.923) 
0 
(0 
.012 
.867) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.474) 
Observations  32   35  
 
ROE      
Average excess ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.004 0 
 
.017 -0 
(-1 
.013* 
.873) 
Average excess ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.112 -0 
 
.003 0 
(1 
.115 
.316) 
Change in excess ROE 
 
0 
(1 
.107 
.202) 
-0 
(-0 
.020 
.959) 
0 
(1 
.128 
.451) 
Observations  30   33  
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Table A.9: Operating performance – former CEO becomes ordinary supervisory board 
member vs. former CEO does not change to the supervisory board 
This table contains the results of a difference-in-differences analysis of operating performance around 
unforced CEO turnover events. We compare firms in which a former CEO becomes an ordinary member of 
the supervisory board to firms in which a retiring CEO leaves the firm. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. The difference-in-differences analysis compares average (excess) ROA and average (excess) ROE under 
the old CEO (average of years t-2 and t-1) to average (excess) performance under the new CEO (years t+1 
and t+2, relative to the turnover year (t=0)). Each cell shows the estimated coefficient. The figures in the third 
row and third column (in bold in the lower right cell) of each sub-panel show the estimated coefficients and t-
values (in parentheses) (of the difference-in-differences estimator). The superscript * denotes statistical 
significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A: Raw performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not 
change to the supervisory 
board  
Difference 
ROA    
Average ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.058 0 
 
.074   -0 
(-0 
.016 
.887) 
Average ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.085 0 
 
.063 0 
(0 
.023 
.016) 
Change in ROA 
 
0 
(1 
.028 
.445) 
-0 
(-1 
.011 
.084) 
0 
(1 
.039* 
.948) 
Observations  19   35  
 
ROE    
Average ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.009 0 
 
.041 -0 
(-1 
.032* 
.762) 
Average ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.031 0 
 
.011 0 
(0 
.020 
.964) 
Change in ROE 
 
0 
(1 
.022 
.051) 
-0 
(-1 
.030* 
.881) 
0 
(1 
.053* 
.962) 
Observations   19   35  
 
Panel B: Excess performance 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
 
Former CEO does not  
change to the supervisory  
board  
Difference 
ROA    
Average excess ROA 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.022 0 
 
.017 0 
(0 
.006 
.629) 
Average excess ROA 
(t+1, t+2)  
0 
 
.022 0 
 
.029 -0 
(-0 
.006 
.334) 
Change in excess ROA 
 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.002) 
0 
(0 
.012 
.867) 
-0 
(-0 
.012 
.569) 
Observations  18   35  
 
ROE    
Average excess ROE 
(t-2, t-1)  
0 
 
.014 0 
 
.017 -0 
(-0 
.002 
.202) 
Average excess ROE 
(t+1, t+2)  
-0 
 
.095 -0 
 
.003 -0 
(-0 
.092 
.852) 
Change in excess ROE 
 
-0 
(-0 
.110 
.766) 
-0 
(-0 
.020 
.959) 
-0 
(-0 
.089 
.823) 
Observations  18   33  
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Table A.10a: Determinants of executive compensation – tenure of the former CEO & total 
assets 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
-1806 
(-2 
.53** 
.89) 
-1772 
(-2 
.61** 
.80) 
-4008 .29*** -4005 .41*** 
(-4 .19) (-4 .18) 
Former CEO on board* 
Former CEO tenure 
13 
(1 
.49 
.77) 
   
  
Former CEO is chairman* 
Former CEO tenure 
 10 
(1 
.79 
.49) 
  
  
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*f. CEO ten. 
 20 
(1 
.50* 
.99) 
  
  
Former CEO on board 
 
  89 .11  
(1 .06)  
Former CEO is chairman 
 
  
 
84 .15 
(1 .06) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
  
 
98 .28 
(0 .96) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-517 
(-4 
.68*** 
.10) 
-518 
(-4 
.16*** 
.09) 
-570 .17*** -570 .07*** 
(-4 .37) (-4 .37) 
CEO tenure 
 
7 
(5 
.76*** 
.54) 
7 
(5 
.71*** 
.25) 
6 .79*** 6 .77*** 
(5 .84) (5 .74) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 
(0 
.66 
.44) 
0 
(0 
.65 
.44) 
0 .21 0 .21 
(0 .15) (0 .14) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 
(2 
.19** 
.45) 
4 
(2 
.19** 
.45) 
3 .79* 3 .79* 
(2 .06) (2 .08) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-95 
(-2 
.57** 
.95) 
-93 
(-2 
.41** 
.79) 
-63 .05 -63 .00 
(-1 .66) (-1 .65) 
Checked 
 
134 
(2 
.06** 
.82) 
135 
(2 
.08** 
.84) 
97 .78* 97 .92* 
(2 .06) (2 .07) 
Codetermination -18 
(-0 
.80 
.13) 
-12 
(-0 
.89 
.09) 
-118 .89 -117 .34 
(-0 .69) (-0 .69) 
Bank representation -231 .37*** -234 .32*** -207 .57*** -208 .00*** 
(-6 .62) (-6 .58) (-4 .65) (-4 .74) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
276 
(5 
.32*** 
.62) 
273 
(5 
.52*** 
.51) 
  
Ln (total assets) 
 
  417 .21*** 416 .96*** 
(5 .92) (5 .91) 
Share price performance 
 
-15 
(-0 
.86 
.65) 
-16 
(-0 
.40 
.68) 
46 .29 46 .01 
(1 .40) (1 .39) 
Tobin´s Q  
 
-52 
(-1 
.34 
.24) 
-52 
(-1 
.15 
.23) 
53 .95** 53 .84** 
(2 .68) (2 .67) 
R² within 0 .346 0 .346 0 .347 0 .347 
Observations      1,281      1,281      1,289      1,289 
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Table A.10b: Determinants of executive compensation – total assets 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (5) (6) 
Constant -3981 .61*** -3986 .24*** 
(-4 .08) (-4 .09) 
Former CEO on 
board*joint tenure 
28 .30*   
  (2 .03) 
Former CEO is 
chairman*joint tenure  
30 .88* 
(2 .21) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*joint tenure  
11 .71 
(0 .65) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-565 .37*** -564 .31*** 
(-4 .34) (-4 .36) 
CEO tenure 
 
6 .41*** 6 .20*** 
(4 .46) (4 .06) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 .19 0 .24 
(0 .13) (0 .16) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
3 .85* 3 .86* 
(2 .02) (2 .01) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-61 .39 -62 .14 
(-1 .65) (-1 .65) 
Checked 
 
96 .78* 92 .37* 
(2 .08) (2 .02) 
Codetermination -134 .37 -146 .98 
(-0 .84) (-0 .94) 
Bank representation 
 
-208 .75** -207 .10*** 
(-4 .35) (-4 .46) 
Ln (total assets) 
 
416 .70*** 417 .58*** 
(5 .67) (5 .66) 
Share price performance 
 
48 .32 49 .08 
(1 .44) (1 .44) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
52 .34** 52 .27** 
(2 .63) (2 .65) 
R² within 0 .347 0 .347 
Observations      1,289      1,289 
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Table A.11a: Determinants of executive compensation – leverage & largest shareholder > 
25% 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts ** and *** denote significance at the 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -1863 .77** -1866 .72** -1711 .39** -1707 .51** 
(-2 .49) (-2 .45) (-2 .91) (-2 .84) 
Former CEO on board 
 
122 .70 
 
128 .21   
  (1 .30) (1 .43) 
Former CEO is chairman  
 
124 .80     125 .57 
(1 .40)   (1 .44) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member  
118 .54   
  
133 .39 
(1 .02) (1 .27) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-517 .37*** -517 .44*** -525 .76*** -525 .69*** 
(-4 .12) (-4 .13) (-4 .20) (-4 .20) 
CEO tenure 
 
7 .00*** 7 .00*** 7 .39*** 7 .38*** 
(5 .62) (5 .57) (5 .58) (5 .37) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 .82 0 .82 1 .26 1 .26 
(0 .53) (0 .53) (0 .96) (0 .96) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 .07** 4 .06** 4 .41** 4 .41** 
(2 .52) (2 .54) (2 .76) (2 .79) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-98 .09*** -98 .13*** 
  (-3 .32) (-3 .29) 
Largest shareholder > 25% 
  
-204 .67*** -204 .96*** 
(-5 .92) (-6 .10) 
Checked 
 
140 .00** 139 .96** 83 .84*** 83 .86*** 
(2 .86) (2 .85) (3 .93) (3 .94) 
Codetermination -3 .32 -3 .98 9 .27 10 .06 
(-0 .02) (-0 .03) (0 .06) (0 .07) 
Bank representation 
 
-222 .49*** -222 .32*** -223 .69*** -223 .91*** 
(-7 .51) (-7 .65) (-7 .18) (-7 .25) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
278 .97*** 279 .21*** 274 .52*** 274 .22*** 
(5 .03) (4 .95) (5 .89) (5 .79) 
Share price performance 
 
-17 .35 -17 .28 -12 .85 -12 .92 
(-0 .72) (-0 .72) (-0 .53) (-0 .53) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-50 .74 -50 .77 -47 .76 -47 .71 
(-1 .16) (-1 .16) (-1 .16) (-1 .15) 
Leverage 60 .77 60 .76 -12 .85 -12 .92 
(0 .40) (0 .39) (-0 .53) (-0 .53) 
R² within 0 .344 0. 344 0 .348 0 .348 
Observations      1,281      1,281      1,281      1,281 
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Table A.11b: Determinants of executive compensation – leverage & largest shareholder > 
25% 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts ** and *** denote significance at the 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -1849 .80** -1857 .74** -1701  .45** -1703 .87** 
(-2 .50) (-2 .52) (-2  .96) (-2 .96) 
Former CEO on 
board*joint tenure 
37 .72**   35  .74**   
(2 .45)   (2  .31)   
Former CEO is 
chairman*joint tenure 
   39 .43**   37 .48** 
  (2 .56)   (2 .39) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*joint tenure 
   22 .74    21 .28 
  (1 .25)   (1 .25) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-511 .32*** -509 .86 -518  .51*** -517 .12*** 
(-4 .07) (-4 .08) (-4  .13) (-4 .15) 
CEO tenure 
 
6 .42*** 6 .24 6  .60*** 6 .44*** 
(5 .58) (5 .09) (5  .00) (4 .56) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 .77 0 .84 1  .15 1 .20 
(0 .50) (0 .54) (0  .88) (0 .92) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 .16** 4 .16 4  .49** 4 .49** 
(2 .42) (2 .40) (2  .65) (2 .64) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 
 
-96 .29*** -96 .41**     
(-3 .25) (-3 .18)     
Largest shareholder > 25%     -193  .97*** -192 .43*** 
    (-5  .43) (-5 .58) 
Checked 
 
138 .64** 134 .04** 82  .06*** 80 .01*** 
(2 .90) (2 .85) (4  .07) (3 .95) 
Codetermination -24 .27 -36 .26 -10  .47 -22 .66 
(-0 .18) (-0 .28) (-0  .08) (-0 .18) 
Bank representation 
 
-224 .50*** -222 .74*** -226  .71*** -225 .03*** 
(-6 .30) (-6 .51) (-6  .08) (-6 .31) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
280 .05*** 280 .95*** 275  .68*** 276 .26*** 
(5 .03) (5 .03) (5  .92) (5 .92) 
Share price performance 
 
-14 .94 -14 .48 -193  .97*** -192 .43*** 
(-0 .61) (-0 .59) (-5  .43) (-5 .58) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-53 .26 -53 .59 -10  .83 -10 .47 
(-1 .23) (-1 .23) (-0  .45) (-0 .43) 
Leverage 57 .28 64 .91 -50  .56 -50 .85 
(0 .35) (0 .39) (-1  .23) (-1 .24) 
R² within 0 .345 0 .345 0 .348 0 .348 
Observations      1,281      1,281      1,281      1,281 
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Table A.12a: Determinants of executive compensation – stake largest shareholder & 
identity largest shareholder 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -1650 .14** -1641 .23** -1872 .97** -1874 .00** 
(-2 .86) (-2 .78) (-2 .93) (-2 .85) 
Former CEO on board 
 
112 .15   117 .64   
(1 .21)   (1 .23)   
Former CEO is chairman   
  
106 .29     118 .37 
(1 .22)   (1 .31) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
  
   
123 .49     116 .19 
(1 .11)  (0 .98) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-526 .69*** -526 .59*** -505 .52*** -505 .55*** 
(-4 .14) (-4 .15) (-3 .93) (-3 .94) 
CEO tenure 
 
6 .58*** 6 .55*** 6 .85*** 6 .85** 
(6 .13) (5 .86) (5 .21) (5 .13) 
Stake executive board 
 
1 .37 1 .37 0 .01 0 .01 
(0 .94) (0 .95) (0 .01) (0 .01) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 .48** 4 .49** 3 .14** 3 .14** 
(2 .86) (2 .90) (2 .38) (2 .40) 
Stake largest shareholder 
 
-3 .53*** -3 .54***   
(-4 .22) (-4 .39)   
Family > 50%   17 .40 17 .37 
  (1 .09) (1 .08) 
Financials > 50%   -242 .16*** -242 .13*** 
  (-4 .95) (-5 .20) 
Industrials > 50%   -200 .87* -200 .88* 
  (-1 .90) (-1 .89) 
Others > 50%   -228 .49* -228 .48* 
  (-2 .23) (-2 .23) 
Checked 
 
127 .18** 127 .44** 131 .12** 131 .11** 
(2 .89) (2 .90) (2 .60) (2 .60) 
Codetermination -19 .47 -17 .81 5 .72 5 .49 
(-0 .13) (-0 .12) (0 .04) (0 .04) 
Bank representation 
 
-229 .93*** -230 .45*** -203 .45*** -203 .40*** 
(-7 .28) (-7 .36) (-7 .30) (-7 .15) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
273 .11*** 272 .45*** 280 .54*** 280 .63*** 
(5 .86) (5 .77) (5 .58) (5 .47) 
Share price performance 
 
-14 .99 -15 .16 -22 .83 -22 .81 
(-0 .63) (-0 .64) (-0 .97) (-0 .98) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-45 .52 -45 .39 -50 .90 -50 .92 
(-1 .12) (-1 .11) (-1 .19) (-1 .19) 
R² within 0 .350 0 .350 0 .350 0 .350 
Observations      1,280      1,280      1,281      1,281 
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Table A.12b: Determinants of executive compensation – stake largest shareholder & 
identity largest shareholder 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita executive compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -1643 .03** -1643 .64*** -1865 .97** -1867 .29** 
(-2 .93) (-2 .94) (-2 .98) (-2 .98) 
Former CEO on 
board*joint tenure 
32 .87*   36 .63**   
(2 .11)   (2 .28)   
Former CEO is 
chairman*joint tenure 
    33 .15*     37 .87** 
  (2 .17)   (2 .39) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*joint tenure 
    21 .46     23 .42 
  (1 .19)   (1 .33) 
Ln (number of executives) 
 
-520 .66*** -519 .40*** -499 .33*** -498 .05*** 
(-4 .10) (-4 .11) (-3 .87) (-3 .88) 
CEO tenure 
 
5 .99*** 5 .83*** 6 .33*** 6 .17*** 
(4 .69) (4 .22) (5 .87) (5 .44) 
Stake executive board 
 
1 .30 1 .34 -0 .03 0 .03 
(0 .89) (0 .92) (-0 .02) (0 .03) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
4 .56** 4 .57** 3 .22** 3 .23* 
(2 .72) (2 .71) (2 .27) (2 .24) 
Stake largest shareholder 
 
-3 .43*** -3 .42***   
(-4 .29) (-4 .37)   
Family > 50%   18 .16 17 .85 
  (1 .18) (1 .09) 
Financials > 50%   -227 .86*** -227 .53*** 
  (-4 .64) (-4 .68) 
Industrials > 50%   -206 .69* -206 .48* 
  (-1 .91) (-1 .90) 
Others > 50%   -217 .39* -218 .91* 
  (-2 .10) (-2 .15) 
Checked 
 
125 .57** 121 .85** 131 .15** 126 .99** 
(2 .96) (2 .93) (2 .63) (2 .59) 
Codetermination -37 .23 -45 .90 -13 .89 -24 .86 
(-0 .28) (-0 .36) (-0 .11) (-0 .21) 
Bank representation 
 
-231 .96*** -230 .85*** -206 .26*** -204 .77*** 
(-6 .21) (-6 .41) (-5 .74) (-5 .89) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
274 .25*** 274 .63*** 281 .92*** 282 .44*** 
(5 .90) (5 .91) (5 .61) (5 .62) 
Share price performance 
 
-12 .96 -12 .74 -20 .30 -19 .97 
(-0 .55) (-0 .53) (-0 .85) (-0 .83) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-47 .98 -48 .15 -53 .42 -53 .62 
(-1 .18) (-1 .19) (-1 .26) (-1 .27) 
R² within 0 .350 0 .350 0 .350 0 .350 
Observations      1,280      1,280      1,280      1,280 
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Table A.13: Determinants of executive compensation: Difference-in-differences – total 
assets & leverage 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita executive compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 41 
firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (25 (16) firms where he becomes the chairman of 
the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 18 firms 
whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant -2820 .43 -417 .25 -2877 .16 -3222 .31* -2351 .28 821 .03 
 (-1 .18) (-0 .46) (-1 .59) (-2 .05) (0 .76) (0 .74) 
Post -14 .70 -40 .42 15 .66 3 .59 -197 .05 -206 .21 
 (-0 .17) (-0 .55) (0 .21) (0 .06) (-1 .18) (-1 .39) 
Post*treatment 143 .02** 173 .93*** 259 .57*** 295 .72*** 106 .52* 132 .21** 
 (2 .85) (2 .95) (2 .96) (3 .02) (1 .83) (2 .26) 
Ln (number of executives) -654 .11** -632 .53** -557 .57* -552 .50* -661 .89* -682 .28* 
 (-2 .13) (-2 .16) (-2 .00) (-1 .93) (-2 .02) (-2 .11) 
CEO tenure 15 .00*** 14 .25*** 20 .87*** 21 .77*** -6 .03 -6 .92 
 (5 .41) (6 .93) (4 .59) (5 .06) (-0 .63) (-0 .74) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 382 .21*** 349 .81*** 379 .53** 369 .79*** 307 .66*** 275 .54*** 
 (3 .39) (3 .06) (2 .90) (2 .94) (4 .50) (3 .54) 
Checked -20 .76 0 .15 -36 .19 -24 .62 88 .43 116 .20 
 (-0 .29) (0 .00) (-0 .46) (-0 .32) (1 .32) (1 .74) 
Stake executive board -2 .69 -3 .10 -2 .51 -3 .17 -6 .61 -5 .38 
 (-0 .54) (-0 .63) (-0 .37) (-0 .51) (-1 .20) (-0 .91) 
Stake supervisory board 0 .85 -1 .46 -3 .22 -3 .27 -2 .70 -3 .20 
 (0 .21) (0 .39) (-0 .69) (-0 .73) (-0 .68) (-0 .83) 
Codetermination 171 .70 255 .64 405 .95 628 .47 -347 .74 -252 .28 
 (0 .28) (0 .41) (0 .66) (0 .97) (-0 .35) (-0 .25) 
Bank representation -413 .51*** -436 .24*** -141 .94** -152 .12** -708 .34*** -718 .60*** 
 (-4 .55) (-5 .73) (-2 .20) (-2 .73) (-4 .24) (-4 .35) 
Ln (market capitalization)  90 .08*  204 .24**  100 .74* 
  (2 .11)  (2 .59)  (2 .07) 
Ln (total assets)  284 .05  273 .10**  335 .68 73 .06 
 (1 .63)  (2 .15)  (1 .69) (1 .29) 
Share price performance 132 .11** 106 .43* 158 .27** 141 .47** 96 .31  
 (2 .33) (2 .03) (2 .47) (2 .45) (1 .63)  
Tobin´s Q 66 .87 51 .93 53 .46 53 .09 105 .46 77 .11 
 (1 .00) (0 .89) (0 .89) (0 .96) (0 .99) (0 .71) 
Leverage  -555 .77**  -565 .50*  -473 .66 
  (-2 .34)  (-1 .80)  (-1 .25) 
R² within 0 .374 0 .372 0 .428 0 .432 0 .348 0 .346 
Observations 413 413 301 301 238 238 
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Table A.14: Determinants of executive compensation: Difference-in-differences – largest 
shareholder > 25% & stake largest shareholder 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita executive compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 41 
firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (25 (16) firms where he becomes the chairman of 
the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 18 firms 
whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant 204 .97 215 .41 -2003 .25 -2139 .86 1481 .25 842 .32 
 (0 .24) (0 .28) (-1 .13) (-1 .49) (1 .17) (0 .69) 
Post -129 .86 -86 .48 -96 .18 -43 .00 -294 .58 -249 .26* 
 (-1 .51) (-1 .15) (-1 .26) (-0 .66) (-1 .73) (-1 .78) 
Post*treatment 221 .27*** 215 .79** 304 .88** 325 .94** 282 .73*** 200 .53** 
 (2 .94) (2 .89) (2 .58) (2 .73) (5 .16) (2 .78) 
Ln (number of executives) -638 .11** -635 .60** -601 .77** -587 .55** -635 .73* -655 .92* 
 (-2 .31) (-2 .22) (-2 .25) (-2 .17) (-2 .00) (-1 .97) 
CEO tenure 11 .29*** 13 .80*** 18 .61*** 20 .86*** -7 .12 -4 .81 
 (5 .72) (4 .39) (5 .99) (3 .93) (-0 .69) (-0 .48) 
Largest shareholder > 25% 162 .98*  -12 .90  464 .59***  
 (1 .84)  (-0 .08)  (4 .01)  
Stake largest shareholder  7 .52***  6 .77***  8 .47** 
  (3 .92)  (4 .06)  (2 .86) 
Checked -10 .20 135 .68*** 27 .04 140 .64*** 26 .07 192 .12*** 
 (-0 .23) (4 .81) (0 .37) (3 .24) (0 .52) (3 .69) 
Stake executive board -3 .33 -3 .86 -2 .16 -3 .93 -5 .44 -5 .49 
 (-0 .65) (-0 .79) (-0 .36) (-0 .62) (-0 .95) (-0 .99) 
Stake supervisory board -1 .52 -1 .31 -2 .71 -3 .47 -3 .82 -2 .75 
 (-0 .42) (-0 .35) (-0 .68) (-0 .78) (-0 .95) (-0 .74) 
Codetermination 74 .71 136 .92 361 .45 475 .03 -229 .12 -287 .75 
 (0 .13) (0 .24) (0 .61) (0 .78) (-0 .26) (-0 .31) 
Bank representation -445 .61*** -438 .04*** -178 .17* -183 .03** -766 .81*** -677 .19*** 
 (-4 .54) (-4 .88) (-2 .10) (-2 .41) (-3 .83) (-3 .99) 
Ln (market capitalization) 66 .20 62 .67 164 .14* 162 .53** 48 .63 75 .60 
 (1 .55) (1 .61) (1 .88) (2 .19) (0 .88) (1 .49) 
Share price performance 111 .75* 104 .87* 146 .23** 141 .76** 101 .83 65 .86 
 (1 .99) (1 .79) (2 .54) (2 .18) (1 .45) (0 .96) 
Tobin´s Q 83 .79 50 .04 86 .99 48 .76 108 .91 76 .11 
 (1 .29) (0 .90) (1 .46) (0 .96) (0 .99) (0 .73) 
R² within 0 .347 0 .364 0 .398 0 .416 0 .341 0 .349 
Observations 413 413 301 301 238 238 
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Table A.15: Determinants of executive compensation: Difference-in-differences – identity 
largest shareholder  
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita executive compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 (2/3) the treatment group consists of all 41 firms whose 
former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (25 (16) firms where he becomes the chairman of the 
supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 18 firms whose 
departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell 
shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to 
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes 
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes 
ordinary board member 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 376 .88 -2116 .84 1151 .49 
 (0 .48) (-1 .32) (1 .00) 
Post -6 .23 55 .54 -200 .60 
 (-0 .08) (0 .80) (-1 .28) 
Post*treatment 166 .63** 289 .18** 122 .79 
 (2 .48) (2 .45) (1 .39) 
Ln (number of executives) -625 .60** -541 .40** -713 .54** 
 (-2 .48) (-2 .37) (-2 .28) 
CEO tenure 16 .98*** 25 .66*** -5 .45 
 (4 .00) (3 .83) (-0 .50) 
Family > 50%  313 .76* 416 .08** 264 .49 
 (1 .90) (2 .36) (1 .61) 
Financials > 50% -332 .13 -171 .94 -340 .63 
 (-1 .24) (-0 .64) (-0 .83) 
Industrials > 50% 1693 .38*** 1714 .31*** 737 .43*** 
 (4 .10) (3 .99) (9 .06) 
Others > 50% 172 .39 135 .98 344 .96** 
 (1 .46) (0 .73) (2 .38) 
Checked 102 .46 80 .97 150 .49** 
 (1 .35) (1 .28) (2 .15) 
Stake executive board -4 .75 -6 .71 -6 .10 
 (-1 .54) (-1 .55) (-0 .97) 
Stake supervisory board -1 .58 -5 .29 -1 .89 
 (-0 .54) (-1 .53) (-0 .61) 
Codetermination 103 .15 421 .53 -194 .31 
 (0 .18) (0 .72) (-0 .21) 
Bank representation -497 .56*** -236 .94*** -805 .01*** 
 (-5 .63) (-3 .55) (-4 .19) 
Ln (market capitalization) 64 .45 167 .12* 75 .99 
 (1 .59) (2 .05) (1 .47) 
Share price performance 65 .04 102 .66* 22 .03 
 (1 .09) (1 .80) (0 .31) 
Tobin´s Q 54 .07 43 .26 98 .86 
 (0 .85) (0 .76) (0 .90) 
R² within 0 .389 0 .468 0 .350 
Observations  413  301  238 
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Table A.16: Determinants of director compensation: tenure former CEO & total assets 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita director compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
-35 
(-2 
.95** 
.49) 
-43 
(-2 
.44** 
.45) 
-147 .02** -148 .62** 
(-2 .81) (-2 .74) 
Former CEO on board* 
Former CEO tenure 
0 
(1 
.22 
.53) 
    
  
Former CEO is chairman* 
Former CEO tenure 
  0 
(2 
.76** 
.63) 
   
  
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member*f. CEO ten. 
 -0 
(-1 
.69 
.59) 
   
  
Former CEO on board 
 
  3 .21   
(1 .47)   
Former CEO is chairman 
 
      7 .55 
  (1 .79) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member. 
      -4 .61 
  (-1 .17) 
Ln (number of directors) 
 
1 
(0 
.33 
.19) 
1 
(0 
.64 
.23) 
-1 .14 -0 .64 
(-0 .17) (-0 .09) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 4 
(0 
.82 
.52) 
4 
(0 
.62 
.51) 
5 .68 5 .66 
(0 .62) (0 .62) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 
(0 
.06 
.78) 
0 
(0 
.06 
.72) 
0 .04 0 .05 
(0 .53) (0 .57) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
-0 
(-2 
.08* 
.00) 
-0 
(-2 
.08* 
.09) 
-0 .10** -0 .11** 
(-2 .74) (-2 .93) 
Checked 
 
-2 
(-1 
.65 
.08) 
-2 
(-1 
.69 
.03) 
-3 .62 -3 .81 
(-1 .37) (-1 .32) 
Codetermination 
 
-35 
(-1 
.63 
.62) 
-38 
(-1 
.66 
.70) 
-35 .15 -38 .14 
(-1 .62) (-1 .68) 
Bank representation 
 
-7 
(-3 
.20*** 
.28) 
-6 
(-2 
.31** 
.81) 
-5 .93*** -5 .35** 
(-3 .28) (-3 .11) 
Board meetings 
 
0 
(1 
.40* 
.85) 
0 
(1 
.41 
.73) 
0 .25 0 .24 
(1 .01) (0 .98) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
7 
(12 
.31*** 
.12) 
7 
(9 
.89*** 
.34) 
  
  
Ln (total assets) 
 
    14 .81*** 14 .92*** 
(4 .10) (4 .03) 
Share price performance -0 
(-0 
.18 
.11) 
-0 
(-0 
.16 
.10) 
1 .39 1 .62 
(1 .15) (1 .41) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-1 
(-2 
.44* 
.04) 
-1 
(-1 
.40* 
.93) 
1 .95** 2 .08** 
(2 .71) (2 .73) 
R² within 0 .071 0 .077 0 .077 0 .080 
Observations      1,195      1,195      1,203      1,203 
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Table A.17: Determinants of director compensation: leverage & largest shareholder > 25% 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita director compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
-68 .51** -75 .14** -35 .81** -43 .77** 
(-2 .78) (-2 .65) (-2 .47) (-2 .31) 
Former CEO on board 
 
3 .34   3 .75*   
(1 .57)   (1 .92)   
Former CEO is chairman 
 
    8 .00*     8 .75* 
  (2 .00)   (2 .20) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
    -5 .67     -5 .92 
 (-1 .28)   (-1 .26) 
Ln (number of directors) 
 
0 .35 0 .97 0 .23 0 .89 
(0 .06) (0 .15) (0 .03) (0 .12) 
Largest shareholder > 50% 6 .55 6 .47   
(0 .71) (0 .71)   
Largest shareholder > 25%   4 .42 4 .98 
  (0 .43) (0 .48) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 .05 0 .06 0 .07 0 .07 
(0 .69) (0 .74) (0 .82) (0 .81) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
-0 .11** -0 .12** -0 .09** -0 .10** 
(-2 .57) (-2 .79) (-2 .31) (-2 .54) 
Checked 
 
-3 .28 -3 .44 0 .18 0 .06 
(-1 .37) (-1 .29) (0 .08) (0 .02) 
Codetermination 
 
-33 .24 -36 .59 -34 .51 -38 .03 
(-1 .60) (-1 .66) (-1 .53) (-1 .61) 
Bank representation 
 
-6 .16** -5 .57* -7 .23*** -6 .59** 
(-2 .39) (-2 .18) (-3 .41) (-3 .10) 
Board meetings 
 
0 .20 0 .20 0 .42* 0 .41 
(0 .75) (0 .74) (1 .91) (1 .72) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
8 .90*** 9 .39*** 7 .32*** 7 .86*** 
(6 .30) (5 .68) (11 .45) (8 .74) 
Share price performance       -0 .37 -0 .25 
    (-0 .22) (-0 .15) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-0 .13 -0 .01 -1 .34 -1 .37 
(-0 .07) (-0 .07) (-1 .59) (-1 .65) 
Leverage -1 .44* -1 .46*     
(-1 .83) (-1 .86)     
R² within 0 .078 0 .081 0 .069 0 .072 
Observations      1,195      1,195      1,195      1,195 
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Table A.18: Determinants of director compensation: stake largest shareholder & identity 
largest shareholder 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions with per capita director compensation as the 
dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. All variables are defined as in Table 
A.1. All regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed 
effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses) 
based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
-36 .74** -45 .01* -47 .80** -54 .92** 
(-2 .35) (-2 .21) (-2 .79) (-2 .61) 
Former CEO on board 
 
3 .94   3 .04   
(1 .71)   (1 .34)   
Former CEO is chairman 
 
    9 .04*     7 .71* 
  (1 .94)   (1 .88) 
Former CEO is ordinary 
board member 
     -5 .83     -5 .99 
  (-1 .29)  (-1 .42) 
Ln (number of directors) 
 
0 .55 1 .27 4 .09 4 .68 
(0 .08) (0 .17) (0 .62) (0 .68) 
Stake largest shareholder  0 .07 0 .09   
(0 .30) (0 .35)   
Family > 50%   18 .63* 18 .48* 
  (2 .21) (2 .21) 
Financials > 50%   -17 .73* -17 .50* 
  (-2 .04) (-2 .03) 
Industrials > 50%   -17 .94 -17 .81 
  (-1 .63) (-1 .64) 
Others > 50%   -0 .34 -0 .38 
  (-0 .05) (-0 .06) 
Stake executive board 
 
0 .07 0 .07 -0 .03 -0 .02 
(0 .64) (0 .63) (-0 .41) (-0 .31) 
Stake supervisory board 
 
-0 .09 -0 .10* -0 .19*** -0 .19*** 
(-1 .68) (-1 .84) (-4 .32) (-4 .59) 
Checked 
 
-1 .15 -1 .44 -4 .58** -4 .74* 
(-1 .02) (-1 .09) (-2 .34) (-2 .15) 
Codetermination 
 
-34 .72 -38 .29 -37 .36 -40 .67 
(-1 .57) (-1 .65) (-1 .67) (-1 .74) 
Bank representation 
 
-6 .91** -6 .22** -3 .64 -3 .07 
(-3 .15) (-2 .84) (-1 .73) (-1 .45) 
Board meetings 
 
0 .37 0 .35 0 .31 0 .31 
(1 .26) (1 .03) (1 .51) (1 .47) 
Ln (market capitalization) 
 
7 .34*** 7 .89*** 7 .85*** 8 .35*** 
(11 .51) (8 .57) (9 .79) (8 .00) 
Share price performance -0 .30 -0 .17 -0 .86 -0 .73 
(-0 .18) (-0 .10) (-0 .56) (-0 .49) 
Tobin´s Q 
 
-1 .37* -1 .41* -1 .56* -1 .58* 
(-2 .00) (-2 .09) (-2 .18) (-2 .23) 
R² within 0 .068 0 .073 0 .085 0 .089 
Observations      1,194      1,194      1,195      1,195 
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Table A.19: Determinants of director compensation: Difference-in-differences – total 
assets & leverage 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita director compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 48 
firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (29 (19) firms where he becomes the chairman of 
the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 12 firms 
whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant -274 .42*** -128 .14*** -312 .64** -248 .62*** -49 .16 -242 .74*** 
 (-3 .29) (-3 .54) (-2 .64) (-5 .03) (-0 .41) (-3 .43) 
Post 3 .56 3 .28 7 .09* 5 .89 7 .48 9 .40 
 (0 .80) (0 .72) (1 .84) (1 .73) (0 .88) (1 .02) 
Post*treatment -0 .21 0 .02 3 .15 2 .92 -1 .08 -3 .48 
 (-0 .04) (0 .00) (0 .69) (0 .54) (-0 .12) (-0 .39) 
Ln (number of directors) -16 .38 -12 .04 -13 .67 -10 .00 -1 .28 -3 .63 
 (-1 .09) (-0 .81) (-1 .07) (-0 .82) (-0 .04) (-0 .13) 
Largest shareholder > 50% -9 .91** -10 .96** -6 .85 -7 .96* -17 .44*** -17 .41*** 
 (-2 .14) (-2 .46) (-1 .36) (-1 .84) (-4 .68) (-6 .11) 
Checked 5 .36 7 .03 8 .98*** 10 .06* 9 .95* 11 .91** 
 (1 .35) (1 .67) (3 .15) (2 .88) (1 .79) (2 .29) 
Stake executive board 0 .47** 0 .36* 0 .49** 0 .42* 1 .12*** 0 .98*** 
 (2 .60) (1 .94) (2 .31) (2 .14) (3 .37) (3 .02) 
Stake supervisory board -0 .03 -0 .09 0 .10 0 .10 -0 .13 -0 .20 
 (-0 .34) (-0 .84) (1 .04) (1 .17) (-1 .13) (-1 .51) 
Codetermination -43 .44** -25 .75* -46 .62** -21 .48 -51 .78** -31 .32 
 (-2 .55) (-1 .85) (-2 .53) (-1 .27) (-2 .16) (-1 .13) 
Bank representation -13 .18 -15 .61** -7 .63 -10 .06* -11 .97 -15 .25 
 (-1 .70) (-2 .15) (-1 .28) (-1 .94) (-0 .83) (-1 .00) 
Board meetings 0 .83 2 .00* 1 .04 1 .82 2 .17 3 .33* 
 (0 .73) (1 .83) (0 .70) (1 .16) (1 .14) (1 .95) 
Ln (market capitalization)  15 .33***  22 .18***  12 .57*** 
  (13 .76)  (8 .81)  (7 .70) 
Ln (total assets) 25 .87***  28 .45***  8 .50  
 (3 .76)  (3 .69)  (0 .91)  
Share price performance -1 .81 -4 .38 -4 .19 -6 .09 -5 .68 -7 .51 
 (-0 .60) (-1 .09) (-0 .85) (-1 .02) (-1 .59) (-1 .64) 
Tobin´s Q -1 .71 -2 .51** 0 .93 -0 .90 1 .08 -1 .81 
 (-1 .25) (-2 .67) (0 .59) (-0 .77) (0 .23) (-0 .57) 
Leverage  -11 .93  -14 .03  -16 .61 
  (-1 .10)  (-1 .03)  (-0 .63) 
R² within 0 .277 0 .293 0 .445 0 .466 0 .217 0 .241 
Observations 385 385 287 287 217 217 
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Table A.20: Determinants of director compensation: Difference-in-differences – largest 
shareholder > 25% & stake largest shareholder 
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita director compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4/5 & 6) the treatment group consists of all 48 
firms whose former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (29 (19) firms where he becomes the chairman of 
the supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 12 firms 
whose departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to  
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes  
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes  
ordinary board member 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
Constant -131 .90*** -132 .36*** -341 .72*** -347 .02*** -192 .25*** -181 .34*** 
 (-3 .89) (-3 .85) (-6 .19) (-5 .47) (-3 .44) (-3 .61) 
Post 4 .68 4 .54 6 .68 6 .31 11 .72 12 .65 
 (0 .83) (0 .79) (1 .66) (1 .50) (1 .10) (1 .32) 
Post*treatment -1 .49 -2 .47 2 .02 0 .93 -5 .30 -7 .14 
 (-0 .21) (-0 .33) (0 .35) (0 .15) (-0 .51) (-0 .72) 
Ln (number of directors) -9 .31 -8 .85 -8 .59 -7 .33 2 .04 -1 .08 
 (-0 .63) (-0 .60) (-0 .68) (-0 .59) (0 .07) (-0 .04) 
Largest shareholder > 25% -3 .53  -4 .35  -3 .27  
 (-0 .73)  (-0 .86)  (-0 .55)  
Stake largest shareholder  -0 .25*  -0 .18*  -0 .23* 
  (-2 .00)  (-2 .11)  (-1 .82) 
Checked 2 .60 2 .83 3 .84 6 .66** 6 .55 5 .05 
 (1 .03) (0 .63) (1 .03) (2 .28) (0 .97) (0 .96) 
Stake executive board 0 .30* 0 .34* 0 .39* 0 .39* 0 .87*** 0 .93** 
 (1 .53) (1 .77) (1 .88) (2 .11) (3 .17) (2 .90) 
Stake supervisory board -0 .11 -0 .09 0 .08 0 .09 -0 .26* -0 .24* 
 (-1 .16) (-0 .85) (0 .88) (1 .08) (-1 .98) (-1 .80) 
Codetermination -26 .41* -25 .47* -24 .81 -23 .14 -44 .00 -42 .95 
 (-1 .88) (-1 .78) (-1 .43) (-1 .22) (-1 .61) (-1 .73) 
Bank representation -15 .15* -16 .05* -9 .00 -10 .38* -14 .74 -13 .87 
 (-1 .95) (-2 .04) (-1 .58) (-1 .86) (-0 .80) (-0 .96) 
Board meetings 1 .87 2 .19* 1 .63 1 .85 2 .99* 3 .13* 
 (1 .60) (1 .82) (0 .94) (1 .14) (1 .91) (1 .92) 
Ln (market capitalization) 14 .96*** 15 .25*** 21 .28*** 21 .50*** 12 .34*** 12 .50*** 
 (12 .15) (11 .75) (10 .15) (9 .01) (7 .32) (7 .53) 
Share price performance -4 .07 -4 .28 -5 .71 -6 .31 -6 .12 -6 .64* 
 (-1 .01) (-1 .18) (-0 .98) (-1 .08) (-1 .50) (-1 .86) 
Tobin´s Q -2 .90 -2 .02* -1 .12 -0 .45 -1 .71 -1 .21 
 (-3 .10) (-1 .80) (-1 .04) (-0 .39) (-0 .53) (-0 .38) 
R² within 0 .287 0 .292 0 .458 0 .464 0 .226 0 .228 
Observations 385 385 287 287 217 217 
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Table A.21: Determinants of director compensation: Difference-in-differences – identity 
largest shareholder  
This table shows the results of fixed effects regressions using difference-in-differences methodology with per 
capita director compensation as the dependent variable. The first column lists the independent variables. All 
variables are defined as in Table A.1. In columns 1 (2/3) the treatment group consists of all 48 firms whose 
former CEO transfers to the supervisory board (29 (19) firms where he becomes the chairman of the 
supervisory board (an ordinary supervisory board member)). The control group consists of 12 firms whose 
departing CEO did not become a member of the supervisory board. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
The coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell 
shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Former CEO changes to 
the supervisory board 
Former CEO becomes 
chairman of the board 
Former CEO becomes 
ordinary board member 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -137  .98*** -257 .76*** -179  .20***  
 (-4  .00) (-5 .05)  (-3 .87)  
Post 6 .44 7 .79* 14 .27 
 (1 .13) (1 .79) (1 .41) 
Post*treatment -3 .97 -0 .67 -8 .65 
 (-0 .69) (-0 .14) (-1 .03) 
Ln (number of directors) -9 .39 -5 .26 -4 .78 
 (-0 .68) (-0 .43) (-0 .20) 
Family > 50%  -8 .61 -0 .61 -16 .15* 
 (-0 .93) (-0 .11) (-1 .99) 
Financials > 50% -40 .46*** -33 .75** -43 .32*** 
 (-3 .45) (-2 .19) (-3 .25) 
Industrials > 50% -34 .25** -39 .95***   
 (-2 .43) (-3 .01)   
Others > 50% -8 .37 -6 .73 -7 .54 
 (-1 .30) (-1 .66) (-0 .91) 
Checked 2 .81 6 .16* 6 .30 
 (0 .48) (1 .78) (0 .93) 
Stake executive board 0 .34* 0 .33* 0 .99*** 
 (1 .87) (1 .77) (3 .18) 
Stake supervisory board -0 .07 0 .05 -0 .17 
 (-0 .55) (0 .50) (-1 .00) 
Codetermination -25 .43* -21 .39 -41 .15 
 (-1 .84) (-1 .16) (-1 .56) 
Bank representation -17 .91** -12 .52** -21 .31 
 (-2 .49) (-2 .66) (-1 .33) 
Board meetings 2 .11* 1 .89 3 .17* 
 (1 .88) (1 .13) (1 .99) 
Ln (market capitalization) 15 .43*** 21 .89*** 12 .61*** 
 (12 .07) (8 .64) (7 .72) 
Share price performance -4 .41 -6 .39 -7 .29* 
 (-1 .08) (-1 .04) (-1 .76) 
Tobin´s Q -2 .02 -0 .53 -1 .10 
 (-1 .72) (-0 .47) (-0 .35) 
R² within 0 .295 0 .472 0 .238 
Observations 385  287  217 
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Chapter 3    
Executive Attributes, Director Attributes, 
and Firm Performance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Monitoring by the board of directors is of key importance for the protection of 
shareholders’ interests. From the perspective of agency theory, a more effective monitoring 
of executives should lead to higher firm performance (Fama, 1980). Consequently, 
empirical studies related to the board of directors focus primarily on the monitoring 
function of the board of directors (Adams et al., 2010). In most studies the monitoring 
function is related to observable board characteristics like the size of the board or the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. In contrast to this, prior research neglected the 
impact of unobserved heterogeneity of managers
1
 with monitoring tasks on firm 
performance. However, combining aspects of the agency and resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) as done by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) implies that the 
effectiveness of monitoring should depend on both the incentives and the skills of the 
board. The skills of the board may be determined by unobservable and time invariant 
characteristics of individual directors (e.g. experience, expertise, reputation) that require the 
estimation of director fixed effects.  
                                                 
 
1
The German Stock Corporation Act prescribes a two-tiered board structure with an executive board and 
a supervisory board. I use the term "executives" for the members of the executive board, the term "directors" 
for the members of the supervisory board and the term “managers” as generic term for executives and 
directors. Further details about the two-tiered board structure are given in Section 3.2. 
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What complicates the analysis of the relation between the individual impact of managers 
with monitoring tasks and firm performance, though, is the dual role of the board of 
directors in the one-tier-board system. As emphasized by Adams and Ferreira (2007) 
boards have a dual role as advisor and monitor of executives in the one-tier board system. 
Thus, relating firm performance to individual managers with monitoring tasks requires the 
assignment of these tasks to individual managers. An assignment of the monitoring and 
advisory tasks to individual managers would also allow assessing the importance of the 
monitoring task for firm performance relative to the leadership/advisory task.   
In this paper, I distinguish between individual managers with different tasks by analyzing a 
data set of German firms – an economy with a two-tiered board system consisting of an 
executive and a supervisory board. For German firms, the tasks of running and monitoring 
the firm can be clearly assigned to the members of the executive and the supervisory board, 
respectively. My study is based on a comprehensive panel data set of 889 German listed 
firms for the period 1993-2011. In the empirical analysis, I use manager fixed effects which 
allows me to estimate the impact of individual managers on firm performance and to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity of managers. Manager fixed effects are estimated with 
the AKM method and are net of match effects as well as a wide array of board, firm and 
manager characteristics that have been identified as determinants of firm performance by 
the previous literature.   
My results suggest that not only executive, but also director fixed effects explain a 
significant proportion of the variation in firm performance. Even though firm fixed effects 
explain an even higher proportion of the variation in firm performance on the manager-
firm-year-level (47-50%), manager fixed effects (22-23%) are as important as observable 
board, manager and firm characteristics in explaining firm performance. Splitting the 
sample into executive- and director-firm-years shows that director fixed effects explain as 
much of the variation in firm performance as executive fixed effects. When manager fixed 
effects are estimated over a pre-period (1993-2002) and are used as proxy of skills for 
newly appointed managers in a post-period (2003-2011), I find a significant positive impact 
of manager fixed effects on firm performance suggesting an active impact of managers on 
firm performance. Using the manager fixed effects estimated by regressions on the 
manager-firm-level indicates that the aggregate sum of manager fixed effects has an impact 
on firm performance, but not the distribution of these fixed effects within or between the 
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executive and supervisory board. Furthermore the AKM method is applied to reinvestigate 
changes of CEOs
2
 to the supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement on the level of 
individual persons. The results corroborates the finding in the study by Andres et al. 
(2013c) that transitions of former executives to the supervisory board are not a cause of 
concern for shareholders. Finally, the comparison of coefficient estimates between models 
with and without manager and match fixed effects reveals an omitted variable bias. For 
instance, the coefficient of free float changes by approximately 37% when manager or 
manager and match fixed effects are included. 
The separation of managers with monitoring and advisory tasks would be much more 
complicated in the one-tier board system. Several factors in the one-tier board system 
complicate the separation of managers with different tasks: On the one hand, Coles and Li 
(2012) report that 33% of the five highest paid executives in ExecuComp firms are also 
members of the respective board of directors. For this proportion of managers, their 
leadership task due to their position as executive and their advisory/monitoring task due to 
their membership on the board of directors cannot be distinguished. Consequently, studies 
focusing on the differences between the leadership/advisory and the monitoring task would 
need to exclude the corresponding managers. A related problem refers to the assignment of 
these tasks to single board members. Due to their higher degree of independence from the 
CEO, outside directors are often considered to be better monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
On the other hand, inside directors usually possess better firm-specific information (Raheja, 
2005; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010) qualifying them for the monitoring of executives.
3
 
Similarly, Faleye et al. (2011) provide evidence for an adverse effect of independent 
directors who primarily focus on their monitoring tasks. This implies that board 
effectiveness could be improved if independent directors allocate their time to both 
advising and monitoring responsibilities. Moreover, Coles et al. (2008) find that the 
advisory role of outside directors is more important for complex firms. For all these 
reasons, a separation of managers with monitoring and managers with advisory tasks is 
difficult for the one-tier board system.  
                                                 
 
2It may be incorrect to translate “chairman of the executive board” as “CEO”. However, for expositional 
efficiency, I stick to the term CEO. For further details, see Footnote 1 of Chapter 2 (p. 10).  
 
3
See also Masulis and Mobbs (2011), who question the assumption of inside directors as a homogenous 
group and build upon the opposing views concerning the role of inside directors according to agency and 
optimal contracting theory.  
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In contrast to this, these two tasks are separated in the two-tiered board system, which can 
be found in Germany and several other European countries. The two-tiered board system 
formally assigns the advisory function to the members of the executive and the monitoring 
function to the members of the supervisory board. Thus, the two-tiered board system allows 
the cleanest separation (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) of the leadership/advisory and 
monitoring task and the assignment of these tasks to the individual members of the two 
boards.   
This paper is related to a growing body of the literature that investigates the impact of 
individual managers on firm performance. Most of the studies consider the impact of 
executives and most importantly CEOs on firm performance. Studies using CEO deaths 
(e.g. Johnson et al., 1985; Fee et al. 2013) or CEO hospitalization events (Bennedsen et al., 
2012) as exogenous shocks on CEO’s actions, suggest a meaningful impact of individual 
CEOs on firm performance. Starting with the seminal paper by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), 
several studies draw on manager fixed effects to estimate an impact of individual 
executives on firm performance. Leadership style (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) and 
reputation (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005) are just two of many examples for unobservable 
and time invariant characteristics that can be proxied by manager fixed effects and could 
explain the impact of individual executives on firm performance.  
The impact of individual managers presumed to have monitoring functions (i.e. outside 
directors) received less attention by the prior literature.  Analyzing the stock price reactions 
to first-time director appointments, Fich (2005) finds significantly positive cumulative 
abnormal returns for appointments of the CEOs of other companies as directors. Nguyen 
and Nielsen (2010) also draw on sudden deaths as an exogenous source of variation. They 
find a significant drop in firm value following the sudden deaths of independent directors. 
In further robustness tests they also consider director fixed effects and find that the adjusted 
R² of their regression model with the stock price reaction around sudden deaths of directors 
as dependent variable increases by about 50 percentage points. However, their 
identification of director fixed effects hinges on multiple directorships and variation in the 
degree of independence within individual director observations. This reduces their sample 
size to 30 directors and 74 directorships and thus only provides a first indication of the 
importance of unobserved director heterogeneity such as skills or ability. Moreover, all 
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papers alluded to above focus on either the impact of individual managers with leadership 
or monitoring tasks, but do not analyze their relative importance. 
The paper further builds upon the progress in the adequate estimation of manager fixed 
effects. The relative importance of managers with leadership and monitoring tasks can be 
estimated by manager fixed effects. One important method for the estimation of manager 
fixed effects is the mover dummy variable (henceforth MDV) method by Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003). This method requires the change of a manager between firms in order to 
separately identify the manager and the firm fixed effect. Thus, by using this method, the 
sample size decreases dramatically and complicates the interpretation of the results. 
Recently, Graham et al. (2012) introduce the method by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(henceforth AKM) (1999) to the corporate finance (specifically executive compensation) 
literature. This method allows the estimation of manager fixed effects based on a 
considerable larger sample of managers. The use of manager fixed effects allows to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity of managers and thereby to deal with one important source of 
endogeneity – the omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias problems could also result 
from the non-consideration of match effects. Match effects allow controlling for the fit 
between an individual manager and the respective firm, which is a potentially important 
determinant in explaining firm performance. Woodcock (2011) derives a match effects 
model and shows that match effects explain a considerable proportion of wage dispersion in 
the US and allow a more precise estimation of manager fixed effects. 
My study contributes to the literature in several important respects. First, and most 
importantly, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on the role of 
the unobserved heterogeneity of managers with monitoring tasks in explaining firm 
performance and the first study that simultaneously includes executive and director fixed 
effects.
4
 This allows a separation of the fixed effects of individual managers with 
leadership/advisory and monitoring tasks as well as an evaluation of their relative 
importance in explaining firm performance. Since this study also controls for match effects, 
manager fixed effects can be estimated more precisely. According to Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) studies about the relation between board characteristics and firm 
                                                 
 
4
Gantenbein and Volonte (2011) consider director fixed effects for listed firms in Switzerland. However, 
they do not examine executive fixed effects. Moreover, as they only consider cross-sectional observations for 
the year 2008, they cannot control for firm fixed effects. 
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performance implicitly assume a link between board characteristics and board actions. As 
my results suggest that director fixed effects are as important as executive fixed effects in 
explaining firm performance, director effects potentially explain a high proportion of the 
variance in certain board actions such as CEO turnover and executive compensation as 
well. 
Second, the inclusion of director fixed effects allows the reexamination of the relation 
between board structure and firm performance. My results show that only a small part of 
the variance in firm performance is explained by observable board characteristics. 
Furthermore, the size and the significance of some board characteristics changes in 
regressions accounting for manager or manager and match fixed effects. Unobservable and 
time-invariant characteristics of individual directors (e.g. skills, motivation or reputation), 
i.e. director fixed effects, appear to be more important for the relation between board 
structure and firm performance than observable board characteristics.  
Third, my results provide insights into the working of the two-tiered board system. The 
costs and benefits of changes from executives to the supervisory board upon retirement 
have been discussed controversially. Previous empirical studies have investigated this issue 
on the firm-level. When manager fixed effects are interpreted as proxy for skills the 
empirical setting of this study allows the reinvestigation of this issue on the level of 
individual managers. Furthermore, the AKM method enables the estimation of the fixed 
effects of all managers in firms with at least one mover, which allows the analysis of the 
impact of the skill mix (based on the most common interpretation of manager fixed effects) 
within and across the two boards on firm performance.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the institutional setting 
in Germany. In Section 3.3, different methods for the estimation of executive and director 
fixed effects are discussed. Section 3.4 presents the sample and descriptive statistics. The 
results on the manager-firm-level are discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 contains the 
results of the analysis on the firm-level, and Section 3.7 concludes.   
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3.2 Institutional setting  
This section briefly describes those aspects of the institutional environment of German 
firms which are particularly important for the empirical analysis.  
The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG) requires setting up an executive 
board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). According to § 105 AktG a person 
cannot be a member of both boards simultaneously. 
The main task of the executive board is to run the firm (§ 76 (1) AktG). Furthermore, the 
executive board represents the firm in judicial and extra-judicial matters (§ 78 (1) AktG). 
Even though running the firm is the joint responsibility of the entire executive board, the 
chief executive officer (CEO) takes a prominent position and coordinates the work of the 
executive board members (executives).
5
 
The main task of the supervisory board is the monitoring of the executive board (§ 111 (1) 
AktG). In particular, the members of the supervisory board (directors) are responsible for 
the appointment, dismissal and compensation of executives. Moreover, the supervisory 
board is involved in decisions of fundamental importance.
6
 According to the 
Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, MitbestG), the supervisory board has to elect 
a chairman (§ 27 MitbestG). The chairman of the supervisory board plays an important role 
as he is in most cases the chair of the compensation committee (section 5.2 of the German 
Corporate Governance Code) and is attributed a double-voting right in firms subject to 
parity codetermination. Codetermination is a peculiarity of the German corporate 
governance system and describes the allocation of control rights to employees through seats 
on the supervisory board. The fraction of employee representatives on the supervisory 
board depends on the number of employees. Firms with more than 500 (2,000) employees 
are subject to one-third (parity) codetermination.
7
 The size of the supervisory board 
                                                 
 
5
The election of a CEO is not mandated by law (§ 84 (2) AktG). However, the election of a CEO is 
intended in almost all articles of incorporation (see also section 4.2.1 of the German Corporate Governance 
Code. See the foreword of the code.
 
 
6
See section 5.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code. 
 
7
Different regulations apply to firms in the coal and steel industry. At least half of the members of the 
supervisory boards of firms in these industries and with more than 1,000 employees must represent 
employees.  
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depends on the size of the firm. The maximal number of supervisory board members 
increases steadily with firm size.
8
 
The personal qualifications for the election to the supervisory board are regulated in § 100 
AktG. Members of the supervisory board must not hold more than 10 supervisory board 
seats, whereby positions as chairman of the supervisory board are double-counted. 
Supervisory board members are also not allowed to be a member of an executive board, 
where an executive - who is supposed to be monitored - sits on the supervisory board.  
Many of the recent regulatory changes concerning the personal qualifications for a 
supervisory board seat are related to the efforts to improve the corporate governance of 
German firms and finally the appeal of Germany as a financial centre. In order to obtain 
this objective, Germany introduced the German Corporate Governance Code (hereafter “the 
code”) in 2002. The code is revised regularly and contains recommendations and 
suggestions, inter alia, concerning the executive and supervisory board and the cooperation 
between the executive and the supervisory board. The compliance with the 
recommendations and suggestions is not binding, though. However, the code is based on 
the “comply-or-explain principle”, whereby deviations from the recommendations need to 
be published in an annual declaration of conformity.  
The recommendations concerning the supervisory board are mainly aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of the monitoring of the executive board. For instance, the legal limit of 10 
simultaneous supervisory board seats is further restricted by section 5.4.5 of the code. 
According to this recommendation, directors should ensure to have sufficient time to 
perform their tasks as supervisory board members by not holding more than three 
simultaneous supervisory board seats. Moreover, transfers of CEOs of German corporations 
to the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement have been subjected to 
ongoing criticism. Opponents of this practice argue that former executives monitor their 
former colleagues leniently and hamper the criticism of managerial decisions during their 
own tenure (Andres et al., 2013c). In 2009, a “cooling-off period” has been introduced as 
another personal qualification of supervisory board members. According to the “cooling-
off-period” the election of former executives to the supervisory board must be preceded by 
                                                 
 
8
The supervisory board of firms with a share capital of up to 1,500,000 Euro can consist of up to 9, with a 
share capital of up to 10,000,000 Euro of up to 15 and with a share capital larger than 10,000,000 Euro of up 
to 21 members (§ 95 AktG).  
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two years following the retirement from the executive board; however, an exception from 
the ban allows the immediate change of former executives to the supervisory board. This 
exception requires a quorum of 25% of the shareholders’ votes.9  
These qualifications refer to information that is observable for the econometrician. In 
addition to that, the initial version of the code in 2002 has already contained a provision 
recommending that the supervisory board is composed in such a way, that their members 
“have the required knowledge, abilities and expert experience to properly complete their 
tasks and are sufficiently independent”.10 Knowledge, abilities and experience are examples 
for time-invariant unobservable factors that can be captured by director fixed effects. 
3.3 Empirical methodology  
My empirical analysis is based on the following regression model:  
 yijt = Xijtß + Mijti + j + t + ijt                                                                (3.1) 
The dependent variable is measured for firm i and manager j at year t. Xijt denotes 
observable and time-variant firm and board characteristics and Mijt observable and time-
variant manager characteristics. i represents firm fixed effects, j manager fixed effects and 
t year fixed effects. In this model, j is assumed to be constant over time and across all 
firms at which the respective manager has been employed. Since executives as well as 
directors potentially have an impact on firm performance, both are considered here. The 
main problem for the estimation of equation (3.1) refers to the perfect collinearity between 
j andi for those managers, who have been employed in only one firm during the sample 
period (“stayers”). In the literature several methods are discussed to deal with this problem.  
The MDV method is based on Bertrand and Schoar (2003). This method has been used by 
several other papers in the field of corporate finance (e.g. Fee et al., 2013; Graham et al., 
                                                 
 
9
This exception was introduced to serve the interests of family firms whose founders or other family 
members should be able to monitor executives after they step down as executive board members. The 
cooling-off-period concerning the transfer of former executives to the supervisory board upon retirement was 
preceded by a provision recommending that the former CEO or a former executive should not generally 
become the chairman of the supervisory board, which was added to the code in 2005. However, this 
recommendation had little practical effect (Andres et al., 2013c). 
 
10
For a detailed discussion on the tasks, the conditions for an effective work and current deficits of 
supervisory board members see Cahn (2011). 
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2012). Using this method, only those managers are considered who have been employed in 
at least two firms during the sample period (“movers”). Thus, j andi can be disentangled 
for the group of movers. Equation (3.1) is then estimated only for the group of movers by 
the least square dummy variable (henceforth LSDV) method. Three problems are 
associated with this method: Depending on the degree of mobility, i.e. the frequency of 
managerial changes within the sample, the sample size could decrease considerably. On the 
other hand, this method could give rise to a sample selection bias, as movers are likely to be 
different from stayers (e.g. with respect to their skills or risk aversion) (Graham et al., 
2012). A further disadvantage of the MDV method is that considerable computer memory 
is required which could make the application computationally infeasible in large data sets 
(Andrews et al., 2006).
11
 
Several studies analyzing wage differences use the spell method (e.g. Abowd et al., 1999; 
Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Cornelissen and Hübler, 2011).
12
 These studies try to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity on the firm- and manager-level that otherwise would result in 
an omitted variable bias. A spell S denotes a unique combination of manager j and firm i. 
Equation (3.2) can then be displayed as follows:  
yijt = Xijtß + MijtSij + t + ijt                                                                 (3.2) 
where Sij represents the manager-firm-combination ij. Since manager-firm-combinations 
can be generated for each manager-firm-year, the sample size is not affected by the spell 
method and a sample selection bias can be avoided. However, using the spell method, 
jandi cannot be disentangled.  
The AKM method based on Abowd et al. (1999) allows for a separate identification of 
jandi without decreasing the sample size as much as under the MDV method. The 
authors use this method in order to investigate the role of unobserved heterogeneity of 
French employees in explaining wage differences. For the first time, Graham et al. (2012) 
                                                 
 
11
In a model with N person years, K firms and J observable regressors, the storage of a matrix with 
dimension N*(K+J) is required. Assuming memory requirements of 8 byte for each matrix element, the 
memory requirements for this data set consisting of 95,477 manager-firm-years, 889 firms and 39 regressors 
already amounts to 0.78 GB (see Cornelissen, 2008).  
 
12
The spell method is also used by several studies in the field of corporate finance. For instance, Frank and 
Goyal (2010) consider manager fixed effects as determinant of capital structure, whereas Graham et al. (2012) 
study the role of manager fixed effects in executive compensation.  
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apply this method to an issue in the field of corporate finance.
13
 As demonstrated by 
Abowd et al. (1999), using the LSDV method with the entire set of dummy variables and 
the following transformation and estimation of equation (3.1) are identical: First, the within 
transformation is applied to the level of each individual manager j: 
yijt -    = (Xijt -  )ß + (Mijt -  )    
 
    (   
    
 
 )+ ijt                                  (3.3) 
The AKM method involves then the estimation of equation (3.3) by the LSDV method. The 
AKM method allows the identification of jandi for all firms with at least one mover – 
i.e. the same firms as under the MDV method. However, in contrast to the MDV method, 
the fixed effects of not only the movers, but of all managers employed in these firms can be 
identified (Graham et al., 2012). Using the AKM method, the fixed effects of firms and 
managers can be compared within one “group”. A group thereby consists of firms and 
managers connected by at least one mover.
14
 Since the fixed effects within one group are 
only identified relative to a benchmark, i cannot be identified for the firms without any 
mover manager. In general, the comparison of jandi is possible, albeit difficult, across 
groups by using a normalization procedure.
15
 Since the application of the AKM method on 
the subset of movers and the MDV method are equivalent within one group, the restriction 
to the largest group allows me to apply the AKM method on the subset of movers as a 
robustness check. Hence, problems with the memory requirements as under the MDV 
method can be avoided.  
The assumption that the manager fixed effect j is constant across time and all firms, in 
which the manager has been employed during the sample period, is modified in my study as 
follows: First, I take into account that the same skills or attributes of one person could have 
a different impact on firm performance depending on whether the person is a member of 
                                                 
 
13
Graham et al. (2012) investigate the impact of unobserved manager heterogeneity on the determinants of 
executive compensation. Further examples of papers that analyze the impact of individual executives on firm 
policy or performance include Frank and Goyal (2010) (capital structure) or Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
(mutual fund performance). Hillier et al. (2013) investigate the role of unobservable time-invariant individual 
characteristics in explaining the performance of corporate insider trading. Coles and Li (2012) apply the 
AKM method to numerous issues in corporate finance (executive compensation, financial policy, payout 
policy, firm performance, corporate control, board structure and investment policy).  
 
14
See Abowd et al. (2002) for a detailed description of the underlying algorithm.  
 
15
The normalization procedure used by Cornelissen (2008) describes the fixed effects j andi as 
deviations from their means. As pointed out by Graham et al. (2012), such normalization changes the relative 
level and variation of the fixed effects j andi across the different groups; the MDV method leads to the 
same groups and for this reason to the same problems.  
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the executive or the supervisory board. Therefore, I add two fixed effects for each person 
who has been employed as executive and as director of at least one firm (not necessarily the 
same firm) in the sample. One fixed effect is added for all observations in the supervisory 
board and the other fixed effect refers to all observations in the executive board.  
Furthermore, the model is modified such that the same manager (executive or director) 
could have a different impact in different firms on firm performance depending on the 
quality of the match between the manager and the firm (hereafter match quality). In this 
context, a better match quality should lead to a higher firm performance for a given 
manager with individual fixed effect j. In equation (3.1), the match effect is absorbed into 
the error term. Leaving out match effects leads to upward biased coefficients (Woodcock, 
2011). Based on the match effects model of Woodcock (2011), one match effect Sij is added 
to each manager-firm-combination in equation (3.1); equation (3.1) can then be rewritten in 
the following way:  
yijt = Xijtß + Mijti + j + t + Sij + ijt                                                         (3.4) 
If equation (3.4) is expressed as deviations from match specific means, match effects, 
manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects can be eliminated (Baltagi, 2008). Ferreira 
(2009) shows that    can be estimated by means of this transformation. Assuming that 
match effects are orthogonal to manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects, the remaining 
parameters can be determined as follows:     and     can be estimated by equation (3.1) – i.e. 
the equation without match effects. The match effects Sij equal the residuum from the 
following equation:  
  ij=   
           
   
   
   
         
 
                                           (3.5) 
In my analysis, models with match effects are considered in addition to the previously 
discussed models based on the AKM and MDV method.
16
 
 
                                                 
 
16
Woodcock (2011) also considers other assumptions regarding the relation between manager fixed 
effects, firm fixed effects and match effects. However, these assumptions are based on random effects and 
therefore not applicable in this context.  
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3.4 Data and descriptive statistics  
3.4.1  Sample selection  
My study is based on a comprehensive data set consisting of all German firms listed at least 
once in “Amtlicher Handel” or “Geregelter Markt” during the sample period 1993-2011. Of 
these 1131 firms, all firm-years associated with a listing on at least one of the eight German 
stock exchanges are considered. Firm-years, where the firm is declared insolvent or 
bankrupt or firm-years with missing information concerning the executive and supervisory 
board composition, are excluded. This results in a sample of 13,059 firm-years and 134,731 
manager-firm-years. Missing observations for firm characteristics further reduces the 
sample to 99,429 manager-firm-years. These manager-firm-years can be subdivided into 
27,782 executive-firm-years and 71,647 director-firm-years and correspond to the 
observations under the spell method (hereafter full sample).
17
 Table 3.1 presents the 
number of firms, managers (executives/directors) and manager-firm-years (executive-firm-
years/director-firm-years) for each year of the sample period.  
The composition of the executive and the supervisory board including the respective 
position of their members and information on the ownership structure were hand collected 
from the Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer.
18
 All other information was gathered from 
Datastream. The choice of manager, board and firm characteristics aims to control for a 
wide array of observable characteristics with a potential impact on firm performance and is 
based on prior literature and the institutional setting for German listed firms (e.g. Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Andres et al., 2013a; Dherment-Ferere et al., 2001; Fauver and Fuerst, 
2006; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Overall, the set of control variables encompasses nine 
board characteristics (average tenure of the executive board, average tenure of the 
supervisory board, size of the supervisory board, ratio of the supervisory to the executive 
board size, codetermination, former CEO as chairman of the board, busy board, board with 
interlocking relations and women representation), five manager characteristics (tenure of a 
director, tenure of an executive, board position, busyness of a director and interlocking 
                                                 
 
17
23,467 (34%) of director-firm-years refer to employee representatives. In a robustness test (see Section 
3.5.3), these observations are excluded.  
 
18
The Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is published on a yearly basis and additionally provides 
information about shareholdings, balance-sheet items and the profit and loss account on German listed firms. 
 92 
relation) and seven firm characteristics (firm size, operating performance, firm age,  
ownership structure, capital structure, cash flow volatility and sales growth). The definition 
of the respective variables is provided in Table B.1 in the appendix of this chapter.  
Table 3.1: Panel data observations 
Year Firms Persons 
 
Manager Executives Directors Manager-
firm-years 
Executive-
firm-years 
Director- 
firm-years 
1993 326 3,718 3,843 1,143 2,700 4,381 1,162 3,219 
1994 388 4,244 4,388 1,283 3,105 5,003 1,310 3,693 
1995 396 4,263 4,411 1,252 3,159 5,011 1,278 3,733 
1996 385 4,078 4,220 1,181 3,039 4,771 1,204 3,567 
1997 432 4,393 4,551 1,272 3,279 5,186 1,319 3,867 
1998 446 4,592 4,762 1,340 3,422 5,397 1,385 4,012 
1999 459 4,705 4,877 1,399 3,478 5,522 1,439 4,083 
2000 460 4,678 4,838 1,395 3,443 5,470 1,444 4,026 
2001 482 4,785 4,960 1,467 3,493 5,544 1,506 4,038 
2002 536 5,052 5,217 1,623 3,594 5,744 1,653 4,091 
2003 596 5,238 5,399 1,707 3,692 5,901 1,729 4,172 
2004 598 5,088 5,237 1,665 3,572 5,728 1,689 4,039 
2005 586 4,982 5,112 1,616 3,496 5,572 1,647 3,925 
2006 574 4,900 5,024 1,589 3,435 5,454 1,611 3,843 
2007 533 4,627 4,727 1,497 3,230 5,111 1,520 3,591 
2008 532 4,640 4,750 1,522 3,228 5,126 1,546 3,580 
2009 537 4,613 4,715 1,482 3,233 5,052 1,496 3,556 
2010 527 4,519 4,618 1,469 3,149 4,939 1,485 3,454 
2011 462 4,147 4,234 1,344 2,889 4,517 1,359 3,158 
1993-2011 
(Full) 
990 18,203 19,666 6,432 13,234 99,429 27,782 71,647 
1993-2011 
(AKM) 
889 17,285 18,684 6,071 12,613 95,477 26,379 69,098 
This table shows the distribution of panel data observations for each year based on the full sample. For each 
year and the entire sample period, the number of firms, persons and managers is provided. Observations of the 
same individual person in the executive and supervisory board are treated as if they belong to two different 
managers. In addition, managers and manager-firm-years are subdivided into executives and directors as well 
as executive-firm-years and director-firm-years. For ease of comparison, this information is also provided for 
the AKM sample.   
Panel A in Table 3.2 reports the distribution of movers and stayers within the full sample. 
2,461 manager (12.51%) can be classified as movers.
19
 Only about one third of all movers 
(33.40%) have worked for more than two firms. Dividing managers into executives and 
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Due to this identification strategy, this data set suffers from the limitation to changes within the sample 
(as every other employee-employer data set). By including almost all listed German firms in the data set, I try 
to keep this limitation as low as possible.   
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directors, it is apparent that the share of movers among directors is considerably larger than 
among executives (14.55% vs. 8.32%). Panel B summarizes the groups which arise from 
the changes of managers between the sample firms, where “group 0” consists of those firms 
that have not employed any mover during the sample period and are thus not connected to 
other firms. Following the exact definition of a group, the 92 firms in “group 0” comprise 
92 separate groups each consisting of just one firm (Cornelissen, 2008). The share of firms 
in “group 0” amounts to 9.29% and the share of the corresponding manager-firm-years to 
only 3.57%. Comprising 889 firms (i.e. 89.80% of all firms) and 96.00% of all manager-
firm-years, group 1 is by far the largest group of the sample. By contrast, the remaining 
four groups with at least one mover account for only 0.90% of all firms and 0.40% of all 
manager-firm-years.
20
 As mentioned in Section 3.3, the sample size decreases when the 
MDV or AKM method is used. Panel C presents the size of the sample for the different 
estimation methods. Using the AKM method, the data set corresponds exactly to group 1. It 
would be possible to also include groups 2 to 5 in the analysis. However, since fixed effects 
across groups can be compared only under restrictive assumptions and group 1 represents a 
very large share of the entire sample (93% of all firm-years and 96% of all manager-firm-
years), I restrict the analysis to the largest group.
21
 Using the MDV method, all manager-
firm-years are also taken from group 1 and the firms are the same as under the AKM 
method. However, only manager-firm-years referring to movers are considered. Thereby, 
the amount of manager-firm-years decreased by 68.96% relative to the AKM method and 
corresponds to 29.80% of the full sample.  
3.4.2  Representativeness and descriptive statistics 
As the sample size decreases when the MDV or AKM method is applied, the 
representativeness of the MDV and AKM sample for the full sample is questionable. 
                                                 
 
20
The share of the largest group relative to all groups with movers is considerable larger than in Graham et 
al. (2012) (65%). Graham et al. (2012) only consider the five highest paid executives per firm covered by 
ExecuComp for the sample period 1992-2006. One reason for the higher share of the largest group in this 
sample is the additional consideration of directors and thereby a larger number of managers per firm. On the 
other hand, my investigation partly falls within the period of the so called “Deutschland AG” that was 
characterized by a high amount of interrelations on a personal level by means of supervisory board seats. 
 
21
See Cornelissen (2008) for a discussion about the comparison of fixed effects across groups. He 
concludes “It is […] preferable to correlate only effects of the same group” (p. 185). 
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Table 3.2: Mobility, groups & samples 
Panel A: Mobility 
No. of firms the 
manager worked for  
 Number (%) of 
managers 
 Number (%) of 
executives 
 Number (%) of 
directors 
Mover/stayer 
1 17,205 (87 .49%) 5,897 (91 .68%) 11,308  (85 .45%) Stayer 
2 1,639 (8 .33%) 456  (7 .09%) 1,183  (8 .94%) Mover 
3 435 (2 .21%) 64  (1 .00%) 371  (2 .80%) Mover 
4 168 (0 .85%) 12 (0 .19%) 156  (1 .18%) Mover 
5 92 (0 .47%) 2  (0 .03%) 90  (0 .68%) Mover 
6-15 127 (0 .65%) 1  (0 .02%) 126  (0 .96%) Mover 
1-15  19,666  6,432  13,234 Mover/stayer 
 
Panel B: Groups
22
 
  Manager 
 
 Manager- 
firm-years 
 Executive- 
firm-years 
 Director- 
firm-years 
 Firms 
“0” 889  (4 .52%) 3,550  (3 .57%) 1,277  (4 .60%) 2,273  (3 .17%) 92  (9 .29%) 
1 18,684 (95 .00%) 95,477 (94 .00%) 26,379 (94 .95%) 69,098 (96 .44%) 889 (89 .80%) 
2 23 (0 .12%) 163 (0 .16%) 55 (0 .20%) 108 (0 .15%) 2 (0 .20%) 
3 25 (0 .13%) 65 (0 .07%) 23 (0 .08%) 42 (0 .16%) 2 (0 .20%) 
4 35 (0 .18%) 114 (0 .11%) 27 (0 .10%) 87 (0 .12%) 3 (0 .30%) 
5 10 (0 .05%) 60 (0 .06%) 21 (0 .08%) 39 (0 .05%) 2 (0 .20%) 
0-5  19,666  99,429  27,782  71,647  990 
 
Panel C: Samples
23
 
 Groups Manager- 
firm-years 
Executives 
 
Directors 
 
Firm-years 
AKM 1 95,477  (96.00%) 6,071 (94.39%) 12,613 (96.65%) 8,592 (92.80) 
MDV 1 29,633  (29.80%) 531   (8.26%) 1,916  (14.47%) 8,592 (92.80) 
Full All 99,429 6,432 13,234 9,259 
This table contains information about movers and stayers, the composition of groups and the AKM, MDV and 
full sample. Movers and stayers are defined as in Table B.1. The definition of a group is based on Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis (1999). Panel A shows the distribution of the number and percentage (in parentheses) 
of sample firms in which managers, executives and directors have been employed during the sample period. 
Based on the number of firms the manager, executive, director has worked for, he/she is categorized as mover 
or stayer. Panel B presents the number and percentage (in parentheses) of manager, manager-firm-years, 
executive-firm-years, director-firm-years, and firms in different groups. Panel C provides information about 
groups, manager-firm-years, executives, directors, and firm-years included in the AKM, MDV, and full 
sample. 
To address this issue, I follow the methodology by Brav et al. (2005), which has also been 
used by Graham et al. (2012). In this approach, the means of the indicator variables and the 
quintiles of the continuous variables in the entire sample are compared with the 
                                                 
 
22
According to the exact definition of a group, the firms in “group 0” can be categorized into 92 single 
groups (cf. Cornelissen, 2008). 
 
23
Using the AKM/MDV method, the fixed effects of all groups apart from “group 0“ can be compared. 
However, comparing the fixed effects between different groups is not without problems. Therefore, only the 
largest group is considered here.  
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corresponding values in the AKM and MDV sample. For the continuous variables, the 
proportion of observations in the AKM and MDV sample within the quintiles of the full 
sample is considered. In case of a perfectly representative AKM and MDV sample, these 
proportions would equal 20%. For the indicator variables, the percentages of the values 0 
and 1 are compared for the different samples.  
Table 3.3 depicts the results of this procedure. The AKM sample is highly representative 
for most of the included board, manager and firm characteristics. This is particularly true 
for the firm characteristics. The proportion of none of the eight characteristics deviates by 
more than five percentage points from 20% within each quintile. As the AKM sample 
covers 96% of the manager-firm-years of the full sample, the deviations regarding the 
board and manager characteristics are also minor. Larger deviations only concern the size 
of the supervisory and executive board, which is higher for the AKM sample on average. In 
general, the deviations between the MDV and the full sample are larger than the deviations 
between the AKM and the full sample. For instance, the average size of the executive and 
the supervisory board is even higher for the MDV sample. The different board sizes follow 
naturally from the construction of the AKM and MDV sample. The larger the board size, 
the more likely a firm is to employ at least one mover ceteris paribus, which is the 
identifying assumption for a firm to be included in the AKM sample. Similarly, movers are 
more likely to acquire a board seat elsewhere, when more board seats are available, i.e. 
when the board size is larger. Furthermore, the average tenure of directors is higher and the 
average tenure of executives is lower for the MDV sample. Other deviations between the 
MDV and the full sample can also be traced back to the restriction to movers in the MDV 
sample. This concerns in particular interlocking relations
24
, i.e. at least one executive and 
one director are joint members of another supervisory board (Hallock, 1997) – and busy 
directors, i.e. directors, who hold three or more directorships in German listed firms. Both 
interlocking relations and busy directors are more frequently found in the MDV sample. 
The proportion of women and employee representatives is also higher for the MDV than for 
the AKM and the entire sample.  
                                                 
 
24
A more direct form of an interlocking relation – namely two persons serve on the supervisory boards on 
two different firms and monitor each other in his/her role as executive is prohibited according to § 100 (2) Nr. 
3 AktG.  
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For the sake of brevity, only descriptive statistics of the AKM sample are presented in the 
following. The average tenure of an executive (a director) amounts to 4.6 (4.7) years. Based 
on the definition of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), 12.2% of all directors can be classified as 
busy directors. An interlocking relation exists for 6.2% of all executives and directors. 
6.3% of all executives and directors are female.  
The former CEO is the chairman of the supervisory board in 11.1% of all firm-years. The 
average (median) women representation equals 6% (3%) in both boards. On average, there 
are 1.00 interlocking relations between the executive and supervisory board. The average 
(median) supervisory board consists of 11.12 (12) members and is thereby substantially 
larger than the (average) median executive board consisting of 3.93 (3) members. The 
different board sizes are also reflected in the size of the supervisory board relative to the 
aggregate size of the executive and the supervisory board. The average (median) for this 
ratio amounts to 0.72 (0.75). The average proportion of employee representatives on the 
supervisory board - i.e. the average degree of codetermination – amounts to 33%. Based on 
the definition of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), only 2.0% of all supervisory boards can be 
classified as busy boards.  
Tobin´s Q as measure for firm performance is on average 0.96.
25
 The average (median) 
operative performance (measured as return on assets (ROA)) equals 4% (5%). The 
concentrated ownership structure of German firms (Franks and Mayer, 2001) is also 
reflected in this sample, as the average (median) share of free float (sum of shareholdings 
lower than 5%) amounts to only 37% (31%).   
 
 
                                                 
 
25
Please note that the descriptive statistics are based on the manager-firm-level. For this reason firms with 
a large executive and/or supervisory board are overrepresented relative to firms with a small executive and/or 
supervisory board (which are smaller in terms of firm size as well). The mean value of Tobin’s Q amounts to 
1.10 when the firm-level is considered. This value is more in line with descriptive statistics of other studies 
for the German market (e.g. Andres et al., 2013c; Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics and sample representativeness of the AKM and MDV sample 
 Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable Sample Mean Med. Stdv. 1st Q 2
nd
 Q 3
rd
 Q 4
th
 Q 5
th
 Q 
Supervisory board size Full 10 .85 11 .00 6.03 6.00 12 .00 18 .00 25 .00 
AKM 11 .12 12 .00 5.98 0.38 0 .29 0 .13 0 .20 
 MDV 11 .83 12 .00 6.18 0.34 0 .27 0 .13 0 .25 
            
Executive board size Full 3 .86 3 .00 2.24 2 .00 3 .00 4 .00 5 .00 16 .00 
 AKM 3 .93 3 .00 2.25 0 .31 0 .21 0 .17 0 .11 0 .20 
 MDV 4 .11 4 .00 2.35 0 .29 0 .19 0 .17 0 .12 0 .23 
          
SB-/(SB+EB)-size- 
ratio 
Full 0 .72 0 .75 0.11 0 .63 0 .71 0 .75 0 .80 0 .95 
AKM 0 .72 0 .75 0.10 0 .18 0 .21 0 .25 0 .16 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .73 0 .75 0.10 0 .16 0 .20 0 .25 0 .18 0 .20 
           
Tenure supervisory board Full 4 .91 4 .63 2.18 3 .00 4 .08 5 .15 6 .50 16 .67 
AKM 4 .89 4 .60 2.16 0 .21 0 .19 0 .21 0 .20 0 .20 
 MDV 4 .86 4 .58 2.13 0 .20 0 .20 0 .21 0 .20 0 .18 
          
Tenure executive board Full 4 .59 4 .00 2.41 2 .60 3 .67 4 .75 6 .29 19 .00 
AKM 4 .56 4 .00 2.37 0 .21 0 .21 0 .19 0 .20 0 .19 
 MDV 4 .46 4 .00 2.28 0 .21 0 .21 0 .20 0 .20 0 .18 
           
Codetermination Full 0 .32 0 .33 0.19 0 .00 0 .33 0 .42 0 .50 0 .71 
 AKM 0 .33 0 .33 0.19 0 .21 0 .30 0 .07 0 .39 0 .02 
 MDV 0 .34 0 .40 0.19 0 .21 0 .26 0 .07 0 .44 0 .02 
            
Interlocking board Full 0 .98 1 .00 1.18 0.00 1 .00 2 .00 8 .00 
 AKM 1 .00 1 .00 1.19 0.43 0 .31 0 .15 0 .11 
 MDV 1 .15 1 .00 1.28 0.38 0 .32 0 .16 0 .14 
           
Women representation Full 0 .06 0 .00 0.08 0.00 0 .06 0 .13 0 .75 
AKM 0 .06 0 .03 0.08 0.49 0 .12 0 .22 0 .17 
 MDV 0 .05 0 .00 0.07 0.51 0 .15 0 .21 0 .13 
            
Tenure director Full 4 .70 4 .00 3.38 2 .00 3 .00 5 .00 7 .00 21 .00 
 AKM 4 .69 4 .00 3.38 0 .31 0 .14 0 .23 0 .14 0 .18 
 MDV 4 .96 4 .00 3.50 0 .28 0 .14 0 .23 0 .15 0 .20 
          
Tenure executive Full 4 .59 4 .00 3.28 2 .00 3 .00 5 .00 7 .00 20 .00 
 AKM 4 .55 4 .00 3.28 0 .33 0 .14 0 .23 0 .13 0 .17 
 MDV 4 .07 3 .00 3.05 0 .39 0 .15 0 .22 0 .12 0 .13 
          
Tobin’s Q Full 0 .97 0 .75 1.06 0 .46 0 .66 0 .86 1 .22 59 .31 
 AKM 0 .96 0 .75 1.03 0 .20 0 .21 0 .20 0 .19 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .93 0 .73 1.14 0 .22 0 .21 0 .21 0 .18 0 .18 
           
Firm size Full 13 .39 13 .01 2.55 11 .24 12 .44 13 .71 15 .53 21 .51 
 AKM 13 .50 13 .13 2.53 0 .18 0 .20 0 .21 0 .21 0 .21 
 MDV 13 .94 13 .65 2.60 0 .14 0 .16 0 .20 0 .22 0 .27 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the full, AKM and MDV sample. All variables are 
defined as in Table B.1. Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. For each variable, 
it shows the mean, median, and standard deviation. The breakpoints of each quintile are reported for the full 
sample, and the percentage of observations that fall into each quintile is reported for the AKM and MDV 
sample. Panel B contains descriptive statistics for the indicator variables. For each variable, it shows the 
mean, median, and standard deviation. 
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Panel A (continued) 
Variable Sample Mean Med. Stdv. 1st Q 2
nd
 Q 3
rd
 Q 4
th
 Q 5
th
 Q 
Free float Full 0 .37 0 .31 0 .29 0 .07 0 .23 0 .41 0 .66 1 .00 
 AKM 0 .39 0 .31 0 .29 0 .20 0 .19 0 .20 0 .20 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .39 0 .34 0 .30 0 .18 0 .19 0 .20 0 .20 0 .23 
          
Capital structure Full 0 .20 0 .15 0 .19 0 .01 0 .09 0 .21 0 .36 1 .00 
 AKM 0 .20 0 .15 0 .19 0 .22 0 .18 0 .20 0 .21 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .19 0 .14 0 .19 0 .21 0 .19 0 .21 0 .20 0 .19 
          
Cash flow volatility Full 0 .11 0 .09 0 .09 0 .06 0 .08 0 .10 0 .14 10 .27 
 AKM 0 .11 0 .09 0 .09 0 .17 0 .20 0 .19 0 .23 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .11 0 .09 0 .09 0 .16 0 .21 0 .20 0 .24 0 .19 
          
ROA  Full 0 .04 0 .05 0 .16 0 .01 0 .04 0 .07 0 .10 0 .98 
 AKM 0 .04 0 .05 0 .15 0 .23 0 .18 0 .23 0 .16 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .05 0 .05 0 .14 0 .21 0 .19 0 .24 0 .16 0 .19 
          
Sales growth Full 0 .26 0 .03 8 .99 -0 .07 0 .00 0 .06 0 .15 1,066 .00 
 AKM 0 .25 0 .03 9 .02 0 .20 0 .18 0 .21 0 .20 0 .20 
 MDV 0 .26 0 .03 8 .35 0 .21 0 .18 0 .21 0 .21 0 .20 
          
Firm age Full 85 .60 86 .00 66 .25 21 .00 70 .00 102 .00 131 .00 703 .00 
 AKM 86 .69 87 .00 64 .93 0 .20 0 .19 0 .21 0 .20 0 .20 
 MDV 91 .47 95 .00 63 .44 0 .17 0 .17 0 .21 0 .23 0 .22 
 
Panel B: Indicator variables 
Variable Sample Mean Med. Stdv. Variable Sample Mean Med. Stdv. 
Chairman is 
former CEO 
Full 0.110 0.000 0.313 CEO/Chairman Full 0.167 0.000 0.373 
AKM 0.111 0.000 0.314  AKM 0.162 0.000 0.368 
 MDV 0.122 0.000 0.327  MDV 0.211 0.000 0.410 
          
Busy board Full 0.019 0.000 0.137 Busy director Full 0.118 0.000 0.323 
 AKM 0.020 0.000 0.139  AKM 0.122 0.000 0.328 
 MDV 0.040 0.000 0.196  MDV 0.332 0.000 0.471 
          
Interlocking 
manager 
Full 0.062 0.000 0.241 Mover Full 0.300 0.000 0.458 
AKM 0.062 0.000 0.242  AKM 0.310 0.000 0.463 
 MDV 0.081 0.000 0.273  MDV 1.000 1.000 0.000 
          
Employee 
representative 
Full 0.239 0.000 0.427 Female Full 0.062 0.000 0.242 
AKM 0.246 0.000 0.430  AKM 0.063 0.000 0.243 
 MDV 0.122 0.000 0.327  MDV 0.029 0.000 0.166 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the full, AKM and MDV sample. All variables are 
defined as in Table B.1. Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. For each variable, 
it shows the mean, median, and standard deviation. The breakpoints of each quintile are reported for the full 
sample, and the percentage of observations that fall into each quintile is reported for the AKM and MDV 
sample. Panel B contains descriptive statistics for the indicator variables. For each variable, it shows the 
mean, median, and standard deviation. 
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3.5 Manager-level-analysis 
The analysis on the manager-firm-year-level proceeds in four steps: First, I examine how 
the explanatory power of regressions model changes when manager fixed effects are 
considered (Section 3.5.1). Section 3.5.2 analyzes to what extent executive and director 
fixed effects contribute in explaining the variance in firm performance relative to other 
components. Subsequently, the robustness of the results with respect to different samples 
and different performance measures is tested (Section 3.5.3). Finally, based on the 
estimated manager fixed effects I analyze the relative importance of different types of 
executives and directors for firm performance in more detail in Section 3.5.4.  
3.5.1 Explanatory power of regression models  
To investigate the importance of executive and director fixed effects in explaining the 
variation in firm performance, equation (3.1) is estimated by using the manager, board and 
firm characteristics as described in Section 3.4.2. Unless otherwise stated, Tobin’s Q is 
used as measure for firm performance in this section and the following sections.  
Table 3.4 presents the results for the AKM sample.
26
 I consider five regression models to 
examine the proportion of the variance in firm performance explained by unobserved 
manager fixed, firm fixed and match effects. The first four regression models are based on 
Graham et al. (2012). Column (1) neither includes firm fixed effects nor manager fixed 
effects. This model is estimated as pooled OLS (OLS model). In column (2), firm fixed 
effects are added to the OLS model (firm fixed model), whereas the model in column (3) 
includes executive and director fixed effects in addition to the OLS model (manager fixed 
model). The AKM method is used in column (4) and allows to separately identify and 
control for manager fixed and firm fixed effects (AKM model). In column (5), match 
effects are added to the AKM model (AKM + match effects model).  
The model R-squared varies considerably depending on the regression model. The adjusted 
R-squared in column (1) amounts to 10.7%. Adding firm fixed effects in column (2) 
                                                 
 
26
The robustness of these results to ROA as another measure of firm performance and the MDV sample is 
tested in Section 3.5.3. 
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increases R-squared by 52 percentage points to 62.7%, whereas including executive and 
director fixed effects leads to an increase in R-squared by 48.9 percentage points to 59.6%. 
When both firm fixed and manager fixed effects are added to the OLS model, the model R-
squared increases by 66.3 percentage points to 77.0%. The finding for the model R-squared 
in column (4) is similar to the result in Coles and Li (2012), who find a model R-squared of 
74%. However, they only consider the five highest paid executives per firm. The 
explanatory power of the firm fixed and manager fixed model in their study is closer to the 
explanatory power of the AKM model (they find values of 70% and 71%, respectively). 
Finally, including match effects in addition to firm and manager fixed effects leads to a 
further increase in the model R-squared by 3.3 percentage points to 80.3%. The different 
values for the adjusted R-squared in the models with firm and/or manager fixed effects 
indicate the importance of firm and manager fixed effects in explaining firm performance. 
On the other hand, the increase in the explanatory power is comparatively low, but not 
negligible, when match effects are considered in addition to firm fixed and manager fixed 
effects.  
Table 3.4 also reports the estimated coefficients and significance levels. However, the 
coefficients for the board and firm characteristics are biased as board and firm 
characteristics of firms with a large supervisory and/or executive board are overrepresented. 
Therefore, I analyze the dependence of coefficients and significance levels on firm fixed, 
manager fixed and match effects on the firm-year-level in Section 3.6.  
3.5.2  Relative importance of executive and director fixed effects  
Based on the results presented so far, the relative economic importance of executive and 
director fixed effects compared to firm fixed effects and other observable manager, board 
and firm characteristics remains unanswered. To explore the relative importance of these 
components, I add match effects to the decomposition of the model R-squared used by 
Graham et al. (2012).  
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Table 3.4: Unobserved managerial heterogeneity and firm performance  
 OLS FE IE FE+IE FE+IE+ME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenure executive board  0 
(1 
.011 
.11) 
0 
(1 
.009 
.24) 
0 
(1 
.007 
.12) 
0 
(1 
.010* 
.67) 
0 
(1 
.008 
.36) 
Tenure supervisory board 0 
(0 
.008 
.63) 
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.70) 
0 
(1 
.008 
.04) 
-0 
(-0 
.004 
.70) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.77) 
Supervisory board size 0 
(0 
.008 
.87) 
-0 
(-1 
.014 
.08) 
0 
(0 
.008 
.92) 
-0 
(-0 
.011 
.79) 
-0 
(-0 
.011 
.69) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio -0 
(-1 
.300 
.33) 
-0 
(-0 
.118 
.53) 
-0 
(-1 
.228 
.58) 
-0 
(-0 
.154 
.88) 
-0 
(-0 
.017 
.10) 
Codetermination -0 
(-2 
.565** 
.22) 
0 
(0 
.247 
.89) 
-0 
(-1 
.228 
.58) 
0 
(0 
.194 
.77) 
0 
(0 
.169 
.64) 
Chairman is former CEO 0 
(0 
.114 
.97) 
0 
(1 
.043 
.32) 
0 
(1 
.054 
.64) 
0 
(0 
.023 
.79) 
0 
(0 
.018 
.59) 
Busy board 0 
(1 
.277 
.55) 
-0 
(-0 
.030 
.40) 
-0 
(-1 
.177 
.54) 
-0 
(-0 
.014 
.26) 
0 
(0 
.007 
.15) 
Interlocking board 0 
(0 
.001 
.05) 
-0 
(-1 
.013 
.20) 
0 
(0 
.003 
.42) 
-0 
(-0 
.008 
.88) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.55) 
Women representation 1 
(3 
.027*** 
.55) 
0 
(0 
.004 
.01) 
0 
(0 
.142 
.69) 
-0 
(-0 
.206 
.90) 
-0 
(-0 
.215 
.85) 
Tenure director 
 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.83) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.19) 
0 
(0 
.001 
.19) 
0 
(1 
.004 
.08) 
0 
(0 
.006 
.71) 
Tenure executive 
 
0 
(0 
.001 
.75) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.55) 
-0 
(-0 
.002 
.27) 
0 
(0 
.003 
.68) 
0 
(0 
.005 
.55) 
CEO/Chairman 0 
(0 
.006 
.41) 
0 
(2 
.011** 
.43) 
0 
(0 
.015 
.67) 
0 
(1 
.029* 
.95) 
0 
(0 
.025 
.97) 
Busy director 
 
0 
(1 
.030 
.48) 
-0 
(-1 
.013* 
.77) 
-0 
(-0 
.016 
.61) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.05) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.03) 
Interlocking manager 
 
-0 
(-0 
.008 
.73) 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.45) 
-0 
(-1 
.030 
.57) 
0 
(0 
.030 
.24) 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.18) 
Firm size 
 
-0 
(-4 
.093*** 
.79) 
-0 
(-6 
.259*** 
.57) 
-0 
(-6 
.162*** 
.39) 
-0 
(-5 
.289*** 
.95) 
-0 
(-6 
.315*** 
.23) 
ROA 0 
(1 
.772* 
.72) 
0 
(3 
.501*** 
.22) 
0 
(1 
.433* 
.81) 
0 
(2 
.424** 
.49) 
0 
(2 
.436*** 
.57) 
Firm age 
 
-0 
(-1 
.053 
.29) 
-0 
(-0 
.076 
.77) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.03) 
-0 
(-0 
.052 
.53) 
-0 
(-0 
.033 
.31) 
Free float 
 
-0 
(-0 
.049 
.74) 
0 
(-2 
.221*** 
.82) 
-0 
(-1 
.106* 
.86) 
-0 
(-3 
.199*** 
.00) 
-0 
(-2 
.203*** 
.88) 
Capital structure 
 
-0 
(-1 
.266** 
.97) 
0 
(4 
.366*** 
.28) 
0 
(1 
.130 
.47) 
0 
(4 
.360*** 
.10) 
0 
(3 
.339*** 
.71) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
0 
(0 
.273 
.66) 
1 
(1 
.267 
.37) 
0 
(1 
.670 
.21) 
1 
(1 
.222* 
.67) 
1 
(1 
.011 
.56) 
Sales growth 
 
0 
(1 
.003 
.53) 
0 
(1 
.000 
.60) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.65) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.69) 
-0 
(-0 
.007 
.73) 
Constant 
 
2 
(9 
.663*** 
.38) 
4 
(6 
.760*** 
.86) 
3 
(10 
.183*** 
.94) 
          5   .077 5       
(6      
.272*** 
.30)         
Adj. R² 0 .107 0 .627 0 .596 0 .770 0 .803 
Observations 95 ,477 95 ,477 95 ,477 95 ,477 95 ,477 
This table shows the results of regressions at the manager-firm-year-level with Tobin´s Q as dependent variable, using 
the AKM sample. Tobin`s Q and all independent variables are defined as in Table B.1. (1) contains neither manager 
nor firm fixed effects and is estimated as pooled OLS, (2) uses firm fixed effects (FE), (3) uses manager fixed effects 
(IE), and (4) uses firm and manager fixed effects (FE+IE). (5) includes firm, manager, and match fixed effects 
(FE+IE+ME). The regression constant in (4) can be interpreted as descriptive statistic for the grand mean; its standard 
error is not computed. All regressions include year dummies. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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The adjusted R-squared can then be written as sum of the following components: 
   
                 
        
 
                                             
        
  
     
                   
        
 
                   
        
  
                
        
 
                 
        
 
                    
                  
        
   
                 
        
                                                                       
 
For models without match effects the fifth component on the right-hand side is equal to 
zero. The decomposition of the model R-squared allows interpreting the normalized 
covariances (i.e. the covariances of each component with Tobin’s Q divided by the variance 
of Tobin’s Q) as fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to the respective 
component (Graham et al., 2012).  
Table 3.5 depicts the results of this decomposition. Column (1) presents the results for the 
decomposition of the model in column (4) of Table 3.4 (AKM model) and column (2) 
presents the results for the AKM + match effects model of column (5). The normalized 
covariances amounts to 0.190 (24.76%) for observable firm characteristics, 0.001 (0.07%) 
for observable board characteristics, 0.175 (22.78%) for manager fixed effects, 0.384 
(49.83%) for firm fixed effects and 0.010 (1.32%) for year fixed effects. F tests indicate 
that manager fixed effects, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and observable firm 
characteristics are significantly different from zero, whereas observable board and manager 
characteristics are not. Coles and Li (2012) report similar results for the normalized 
covariance relative to the explained variance of the model for observable manager 
characteristics (0.36%), and for firm fixed effects (43.74%), but a lower ratio for 
observable manager and board characteristics (altogether 5.22%) and a considerable higher 
ratio for manager fixed effects (48.24%).  
The relative economic importance of executive and director fixed effects is examined by 
splitting the samples used in the AKM and AKM + match effects model into executive- and 
director-firm-years. Note that splitting the sample into executive-firm-years and director-
firm-years reduces both the number of observations and the number of explanatory 
variables (due to a reduced number of manager fixed effects). Therefore the explanatory 
power of the manager fixed effects in the subsample could either increase or decrease 
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relative to the entire sample. This decomposition leads to very similar results for the 
various components. Overall, the comparison between the variance in firm performance 
explained by executive and director fixed effects indicates a very similar impact of these 
two types of managers on firm performance. The proportion of the variance explained is 
only slightly higher for executive (24.36%) than for director fixed effects (22.06%).  
Controlling for match effects, the proportions of the variance explained by each component 
change only marginally. The fraction of the model R-squared attributable to match effects 
amounts to 4.25%. This fraction corresponds approximately to the decrease in the fraction 
of the variance explained by firm fixed effects (2.33%) and by manager fixed effects 
(0.83%). The model without match effects therefore overestimates the explanatory power 
of firm fixed effects and, to a smaller extent, of manager fixed effects. Decomposing the 
sample into executive- and director-firm-years shows that accounting for match effects is 
more important for director- than for executive-firm-years. Match effects account for 
5.67% in explaining the variance in firm performance for director-firm-years, whereas this 
proportion amounts to only 1.01% for executive-firm-years.  
3.5.3  Robustness tests  
The results presented so far are based on Tobin’s Q as a measure for firm performance. 
However, Tobin’s Q is often criticized as measure of firm performance as it could also 
reflect growth opportunities and is based on cash-flow expectations rather than on realized 
operating efficiency (Dybvig and Warachka, 2012). Thus, I test the robustness of the results 
to return on assets (ROA) as an accounting based profitability measure. The results are very 
similar to the base model with Tobin’s Q as performance measure. Using ROA as a 
measure of firm performance, the explanatory power increases considerably relative to 
model (3.1) when firm fixed effects or manager fixed effects are included (from 7.9% to 
45.5% or 43.2%, respectively). In line with the results presented in Table 3.4 the 
explanatory power increases by a far larger extent when both firm fixed and manager fixed 
effects are considered (to 60.6%), whereas the additional inclusion of match effects 
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increases the explanatory power only slightly relative to the model with firm and manager 
fixed effects.
27
   
Table 3.5: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance  
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.010 (1 .24%) 0.008 (1 .02%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .07%) 0.001 (0 .07%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.191 (24 .76%) 0.202 (25 .20%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.384 (49 .84%) 0.382 (47 .51%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.175 (22 .78%) 0.176 (21 .95%) 
Match fixed effects  0.034 (4 .25%) 
Year effects 0.010 (1 .32%) 0.000 (0 .01%) 
Residuals 0.230 (23 .05%) 0.197 (19 .66%) 
Observations 95 ,477  95 ,477  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.009 (1 .17%) 0.008 (0 .96%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .10%) 0.001 (0 .10%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.181 (22 .70%) 0.192 (23 .82%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.403 (50 .35%) 0.401 (49 .67%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.195 (24 .36%) 0.196 (24 .32%) 
Match fixed effects  0.008 (1 .01%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .32%) 0.001 (0 .12%) 
Residuals 0.200 (20 .04%) 0.192 (19 .22%) 
Observations 26 ,379  26 ,379  
 
Panel C: Directors  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.009 (1 .24%) 0.008 (1 .02%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .06%) 0.000 (0 .05%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.194 (25 .62%) 0.206 (25 .72%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.376 (49 .70%) 0.374 (46 .65%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.167 (22 .06%) 0.168 (20 .92%) 
Match fixed effects  0.045 (5 .67%) 
Year effects 0.010 (1 .32%) 0.000 (0 .03%) 
Residuals 0.244 (24 .36%) 0.199 (19 .86%) 
Observations 69 ,098  69 ,098  
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared in Table 3.4. The results in (1) are 
based on Table 3.4 (4) and the results in (2) are based on Table 3.4 (5). These components are observable 
time-variant board characteristics (first block in Table 3.4), observable time-variant manager characteristics 
(second block in Table 3.4) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table 3.4), firm fixed 
effects, manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains 
match effects. For each of these components, the covariance with Tobin’s Q (relative to the variance of 
Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of the explained variance of Tobin´s Q (in parentheses) is computed. Panel A 
is based on all observations in Table 3.4 (4) and (5). Panel B is based on the subsample of executive-firm-
years and Panel C is based on the subsample of director-firm-years. 
                                                 
 
27
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.2 in the appendix of this chapter. 
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The decomposition of the model R-squared leads to similar results with respect to the 
explanatory power of manager fixed effects. The proportion of the variance in ROA 
explained by manager fixed effects amounts to 24% and is also slightly higher for the 
subsample of executive-firm-years (28% compared to 22-23% for the subsample of 
director-firm-years).
28
 
The previous results are based on the AKM sample. The following robustness checks alter 
the number and types of managers included. In general, these robustness checks reduce the 
number of manager-firm-years and potentially affect the relative explanatory power of each 
of the observable and unobservable components.  
Using the AKM sample, the information for the identification of the fixed effects of non-
movers is ultimately based upon the changes of movers between the sample firms. This 
could produce a biased estimation regarding the correlation between firm fixed effects and 
manager fixed effects – the so-called limited mobility bias (Abowd et al., 2004; Andrews et 
al., 2008). In a robustness check, I restrict the analysis to movers only and consider the 
MDV sample. In accordance with the results reported in Table 3.4, the explanatory power 
increases considerably relative to model (3.1) when firm fixed effects or manager fixed 
effects are included (from 11.0% to 55.0% or 38.8%, respectively). Confirming the results 
for the AKM sample, the explanatory power increases by a far larger extent when both firm 
fixed and manager fixed effects are considered (by 57.6 percentage points to 68.6%). 
However, in contrast to the AKM sample, the explanatory power increases significantly 
more relative to model (4) when match effects are included (by 8.9 percentage points).
29
  
The greater importance of match effects for the MDV relative to the AKM sample can be 
attributed to the fact that every manager in the MDV sample has been employed in at least 
two sample firms. The higher importance of match effects is also reflected in the values for 
the normalized covariances (relative to the explained variance of the model). These values 
amount to 0.133 (11.60%) for managers, 0.088 (7.97%) for the subsamples of executives 
and 0.138 (12.02%) for the subsample of directors. Including match effects is accompanied 
by a decrease in the proportion of the variance explained by firm fixed effects (by 6.2 
                                                 
 
28
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.4 in the appendix of this chapter.  
 
29
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.3 in the appendix of this chapter. 
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percentage points) and – to a lesser extent – by manager fixed effects (2.7 percentage 
points). The comparison between the AKM and MDV sample shows that director fixed 
effects account for a far higher proportion of the variance explained in firm performance 
than executive fixed effects. Whereas the proportion of variance explained is slightly higher 
for executive fixed effects in the AKM sample, the proportion of the variance explained by 
director fixed effects is considerably higher in the MDV sample (24-27% compared with 7-
8% for executive fixed effects). As the AKM method might exaggerate the explanatory 
power of manager fixed effects (Graham et al., 2012), the high explanatory power of 
director fixed effects even in the MDV sample clearly indicates the importance of 
accounting for director fixed effects.
30
  
Furthermore, the results could depend on the number of years a manager has worked for a 
firm. Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003), I assume that a manager has to have worked 
for at least three years for a firm to possibly affect firm performance and include only those 
managers in a further robustness test. This procedure results in a decrease of manager-firm-
years to 87,122 and in an increase of the proportion of the variance explained by manager 
fixed effects to 25-26%. The decomposition in executive-firm-years and director-firm-years 
continues to indicate the importance of director fixed effects. Whereas the proportion of the 
variance explained by executive fixed effects amounts to 26%, director fixed effects 
accounts for an only slightly lower proportion (24%).
31
  
Previous studies (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Graham et al., 2012) only consider the 
five highest paid executives per firm. In order to facilitate the comparison with these 
studies, I only include the five most important executives within a firm in a further 
robustness check. The classification of the importance of executives based on their 
compensation is not applicable in the German context as the law only requires the 
individualized disclosure of the compensation of the members of the executive board from 
2006 onward. Initially, the following five executives are considered as most important 
executives: the CEO, his deputy and the three other executives with the longest tenure. In 
case of two or more executives with the same tenure, I consider the executive with the 
highest number of supervisory board seats in the respective year as most important. When 
both the tenure and the number of supervisory board seats of two or more executives are 
                                                 
 
30
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.5 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
31
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.6 in the appendix of this chapter. 
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identical, their importance is assigned randomly. Considering only the five most important 
executives per firm, the number of manager-firm-years decreases considerably to 24,515, 
whereas the proportion of the variance explained by executive fixed effects increases 
considerably to 58%.
32
  
Alternatively, with respect to the importance of the supervisory board for the German 
corporate governance system, I include the CEO, his deputy, the chairman of the 
supervisory board as well as one additional executive and director based on the criteria 
above as the five most important managers per firm. Using this classification of the most 
important managers, the number of observations decreases to 37,647. The proportion of the 
variance explained by manager fixed effects increases and amounts to 38-39%; the higher 
proportion for the subsample of director-firm-years (40%) again corroborates the 
importance of including director fixed effects.
33
  
As already mentioned in Section 3.2, the chairman of the supervisory board is attributed a 
double-voting right in firms subject to parity codetermination.  For this reason employee 
representatives might have a limited impact on supervisory board decisions even in the case 
of a one-half codetermination. Therefore, I test the robustness of the results to the exclusion 
of employee representatives from the AKM sample. Excluding employee representatives 
from the sample reduces the sample size to 72,010 manager-firm-years. In accordance with 
the results in Table 3.6 and a limited impact of employee representatives on supervisory 
board decisions and thus on firm performance, the proportion of variance explained by 
manager (executive/director) fixed effects increases to 26-27% (26%/27-28%). This 
suggests that measuring the impact of manager fixed effects on firm performance by 
including all members of the executive and supervisory board underestimates the impact of 
shareholder representatives on the supervisory board.
34,35
  
                                                 
 
32
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.7 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
33
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.8 in the appendix of this chapter. 
34
The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.9 in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
35
For the robustness tests that vary the number and type of managers included, the relative increase in the 
explanatory power in models with firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects and match effects is very similar 
to the results in Table 3.4.  
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3.5.4  The importance of different types of executives & directors 
for firm performance 
The results presented so far imply a high importance of executive and director fixed effects 
in explaining the variance in firm performance. These fixed effects have been modeled as 
unobservable and time-invariant characteristics. However, it remains unclear which 
characteristics are reflected in manager fixed effects. For instance, executive fixed effects 
could represent leadership style, assertiveness or reputation and director fixed effects could 
reflect intrinsic motivation, time management or expertise. However, according to the most 
prevalent interpretation, manager fixed effects proxy for skills (e.g. Abowd et al., 2002; 
Abowd et al., 2003; Ferreira, 2009; Graham et al., 2012; Iranzo et al., 2008). I follow the 
previous literature in interpreting the manager fixed effects as proxy for the skills of an 
individual executive or director, respectively.
36,37
 
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the manager fixed effects estimated in Table 3.4 (5) 
(AKM + match model) as well as the distribution of the subsamples of executive and 
director fixed effects. Since fixed effects can only be estimated relative to a benchmark, the 
mean of the manager fixed effects is normalized to zero. The respective graphs indicate that 
manager as well as executive and director fixed effects are approximately normally 
distributed, but slightly skewed to the right. 
Panel A in Table 3.6 depicts descriptive statistics based on Figure 3.1. The standard 
deviation of manager fixed effects equals 0.706. This implies a considerable variation in the 
impact of managers on firm performance. Executive fixed effects are on average slightly 
higher than director fixed effects (0.006 vs. -0.003) and have a slightly higher standard 
deviation (0.805 vs. 0.654).  
                                                 
 
36
Studies that analyze if manager fixed effects can be explained by observable personal characteristics 
such as education, gender or age usually find that these characteristics only explain a very small proportion of 
the model R-squared. However, Graham et al. (2012) also find that education which is commonly interpreted 
as proxy for skills is significantly and positively related to manager fixed effects in executive compensation. 
Due to sparse information regarding the educational background of executives and directors of German firms, 
I did not gather data on their educational background. 
 
37
Note that even if manager fixed effects do not represent skills they are still correlated with firm 
performance and therefore at least proxy for unobservable and time-invariant characteristics of managers with 
an impact on firm performance.  
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of manager fixed effects 
Panel A: Manager fixed effects 
 
 
Panel B: Executive fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
D
e
n
s
it
y
-2 -1 0 1 2
Manager fixed effects
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
D
e
n
si
ty
-2 -1 0 1 2
Executive fixed effects
 110 
Panel C: Director fixed effects 
 
This figure shows the distribution of manager, executive and director fixed effects. Manager, executive and 
director fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5) and are thus net of match 
effects. Manager, executive and director fixed effects are estimated relative to the benchmark of the average 
manager fixed effect of all managers included in the AKM sample, respectively. Panel A presents manager 
fixed effects, Panel B presents executive fixed effects and Panel C presents director fixed effects. 
As stated before, the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board are expected to have a 
larger impact on firm performance than ordinary executive or supervisory board members. 
Moreover, the double-voting right of the chairman of the supervisory board in firms with 
one-half codetermination suggests a limited influence of employee representatives on 
supervisory board decisions. Therefore, the standard deviations of the fixed effects of the 
CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board should be higher than the standard 
deviations of the fixed effects of the respective ordinary board members. Given their 
limited impact on supervisory board decisions, the standard deviation of the fixed effects of 
employee representatives should be closer to zero than the standard deviation of the fixed 
effects of shareholder representatives.  
Panel B and C in Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for the individual fixed effects of 
different types of managers based on the estimation results in Table 3.4 (5) (AKM and 
AKM + match model). Since the position of an individual manager could change over time 
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(e.g. an ordinary member of the executive board is promoted to the CEO of the firm) these 
results are restricted to managers with only one type of position (chairpersons, CEO, 
chairman of the supervisory board (Panel B) and ordinary board members, executive board 
member, shareholder representative, employee representative (Panel C)) over time. In 
general, the results suggest a considerable larger impact of chairpersons than of ordinary 
board members. The respective standard deviation of the manager fixed effects of 
chairpersons (either the CEO or chairman of the supervisory board) is almost twice as high 
as the standard deviation of the manager fixed effects for ordinary board members (either 
an ordinary executive board member, shareholder representative or employee 
representative) (1.217 vs. 0.644). A closer analysis of the different positions on the 
executive and supervisory board reveals a higher impact of the CEO and the chairman of 
the supervisory board relative to ordinary executive and supervisory board members. 
Whereas the standard deviation of CEO fixed effects is almost twice as high as the standard 
deviation of ordinary executive board members, the standard deviation of the chairman of 
the supervisory board fixed effects is only slightly higher than the standard deviations of 
shareholder representative fixed effects (0.920 vs. 0.771). In accordance with a limited 
impact of employee representatives on board decisions, the standard deviation of the fixed 
effects of employee representatives is far lower (0.358) than for the other types of board 
positions. Even though the CEO seems to matter the most for firm performance, the 
standard deviation of shareholder representatives’ fixed effects exceeds the standard 
deviations of ordinary executive board members fixed effects and corroborates the 
importance of director fixed effects.
38
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
38
Additional summary statistics based on the manager fixed effects estimated in the regression model in 
Table B.2 (4) and (5) with ROA as dependent variable are given in Table B.10 in the appendix of this chapter 
and lead to qualitatively similar results. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics on manager fixed effects 
Panel A: Manager, executive and director fixed effects 
                                                                                                Manager fixed effects Executive fixed effects Director fixed effects 
  Mean 0 .000 0 .006 -0 .003 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .198 -0 .217 -0 .187 
  Median -0 .043 -0 .047 -0 .041 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .124 0 .124 0 .125 
  Std. dev. 0 .706 0 .805 0 .654 
  Observations    18 ,684      6 ,071    12 ,613 
 
Panel B: Manager fixed effects for chairpersons 
                                                                                                Chairperson fixed effects CEO fixed effects Chairman fixed effects 
  Mean -0 .014 0 .027 -0 .016 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .287 -0 .253 -0 .311 
  Median -0 .050 -0 .058 -0 .055 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .158 0 .143 0 .174 
  Std. dev. 1 .217 1 .291 0 .920 
  Observations    1 ,504      1 ,004      659 
 
Panel C: Manager fixed effects for ordinary board members 
                                                                                                Ordinary board
member fixed 
effects 
Ordinary executive 
board member fixed 
effects 
Ordinary 
shareholder 
representatives 
Ordinary employee 
representatives 
  Mean -0 .002 -0 .001 0 .017 -0 .028 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .194 -0 .208 -0 .210 -0 .166 
  Median -0 .038 -0 .042 -0 .033 -0 .048 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .127 0 .131 0 .157 0 .088 
  Std. dev. 0 .644 0 .659 0 .771 0 .358 
  Observations      13       ,841     4 ,302   6 ,070      4 ,223 
This table presents descriptive statistics for manager fixed effects estimated in Table 3.4 (5). All variables are 
defined as in Table B.1. For each variable, it shows the number of observations, the mean, 25
th
 percentile, 
median, 75
th
 percentile, standard deviation and the number of observations. Panel A shows descriptive 
statistics on manager fixed effects, executive fixed effects and director fixed effects. Panel B describes 
manager fixed effects for chairpersons (CEO or chairman), CEOs and chairmen, and Panel C contains 
information about manager fixed effects for managers with ordinary board positions (ordinary executive 
board members, shareholder representatives, employee representatives). For Panel B and C, only individuals 
with the same type of board position (CEO, ordinary executive board member, chairman of the supervisory 
board, shareholder representative, employee representative) (not necessarily in the same firm) during the 
sample period are considered.  
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the empirical analysis allows manager fixed effects to vary 
within one person across her/his executive and supervisory board positions. Focusing on 
those persons serving only on the executive and supervisory board within one firm allows 
the reinvestigation of changes from executives to the supervisory board of the same firm 
upon retirement. The costs and benefits of such transitions in terms of firm performance 
have been discussed controversially (Andres et al., 2013c; Bermig and Frick, 2010; 
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Grigoleit et al., 2011). The study by Andres et al. (2013c) indicates that the stock market 
considers the announcement of a CEO transition as good news.
39
  In addition to that, 
Andres et al. (2013c) find largely insignificant effects on operating performance
40
  and 
Grigoleit et al. (2011) find no significant relation between former executives on the 
supervisory board and different measures of firm performance. In contrast to this, the study 
by Bermig and Frick (2010) partially supports a negative effect. All these studies compare 
the performance of firms with and without former executives (or CEOs) on the supervisory 
board. However, they do not consider the characteristics of the corresponding executives in 
more detail. Interpreting the manager fixed effects as proxy for the skills of an individual 
former executive allows the investigation of this issue on a person-specific level.  
To analyze the performance implications of transitions of former executives to the 
supervisory board, I compare the skills of former executives as supervisory board members 
with those of other supervisory board members. Panel A in Table 3.7 reports descriptive 
statistics for the director fixed effects of former executives, former CEOs and other board 
members. In order to distinguish the fixed effects of former executives from the fixed 
effects of executives serving on the supervisory board of at least one additional firm, only 
former executives serving on the supervisory board of the same, but of no other firm in the 
sample are considered. Since the position of an executive on the executive board could 
change over time, former executives are classified as former CEOs if they served as CEO 
for the last during their tenure on the executive board.
41
  
In line with Andres et al. (2013c) the results suggest that former CEOs as monitors are not a 
cause of concern for shareholders. Their estimated average director fixed effect amounts to 
0.129 (76
th
 percentile). The difference between the average director fixed effects of former 
CEOs and other board member is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
which indicates above average skills of former CEOs as monitors. On a more general level, 
                                                 
 
39
See Table 2.2. 
 
40
See Table 2.4. 
 
41
In additional analyses, former executives are classified as former CEOs if they served for the majority of 
years on the executive board as CEO or if they served for all years on the executive board as CEO. 
Furthermore, I re-estimate Table 3.7 based on the manager fixed effects estimated in the regression model in 
Table B.2 (4) and (5) with ROA as dependent variable. These robustness checks lead to qualitatively similar 
results. If former CEOs are defined as executives serving as CEO for all years on the executive board the 
difference to the executive fixed effects of other executives is less evident. The results of these robustness 
checks are given in Table B.11, B.12 and B.13 in the appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
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the average director fixed effect of former executives (including former CEOs) is 
significantly higher compared to the average director fixed effect of other supervisory 
board members. The estimated value of 0.071 corresponds to the 68
th
 percentile meaning 
that more than two thirds of other supervisory board members have a lower director fixed 
effect. In addition to that, Panel A in Table 3.7 also includes the executive fixed effects of 
former executives (CEOs) and of all other executives. The results indicate that the 
executive fixed effects of former executives are significantly higher (70
th
 percentile) 
compared to other executive board members. This also holds true for the subgroup of 
former CEOs for which the estimated average executive fixed effect (75
th
 percentile) and 
the difference to the executive fixed effects of other executives are even more pronounced. 
Overall, the results in Panel A in Table 3.7 indicate that only executives who performed 
well during their tenure are offered a seat on the supervisory board and that these 
executives perform well in their role as monitor, too. 
However, the control group in Panel A in Table 3.7 includes all remaining executives and 
directors. Thereby the control group also consists of executives and directors without the 
dual experience as executive and director. In order to compare the monitoring skills of 
former executives of the same firm with executives serving on the supervisory board(s) of 
(a) different firm(s), the control group in Panel B in Table 3.7 includes director and 
executive fixed effects of executives serving on at least one supervisory board of another, 
but not the same firm. On a general level, the director fixed effects of directors with 
experience as executive at another firm are still above average, but not as high as the 
director fixed effects of former executives of the same firm. Furthermore their estimated 
average executive fixed effect is lower compared to the executive fixed effects of former 
executives of the same firm. This also holds true for the subgroup of CEOs.  
In sum, the comparison of executive and director fixed effects of former executives with 
other managers with experience as executive and director and other executive and 
supervisory board members suggests that former executives of the same firm as monitors 
are not a cause of concern for shareholders. Their estimated skills as executive as well as 
director are on average higher compared to executives as monitors at other firms and other 
executives or directors. This corroborates the earlier finding that only executives who 
performed well during their tenure are offered a seat on the supervisory board and that 
these executives perform well in their role as monitor, too. 
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Table 3.7: Manager fixed effects of managers on the executive and supervisory board of the 
same and of different firms: Difference-in-differences 
Panel A: Within firms 
     Executives     CEOs     Other board members 
Executive fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .093* 0 .130* 0 .001 
  Median -0 .032 -0 .052 -0 .047 
  Std. dev. 1 .004 1 .069 0 .794 
  Observations   287   127 5 ,784 
    
Director fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .071* 0 .129** -0 .004 
  Median -0 .034 -0 .000 -0 .037 
  Std. dev. 0 .724 0 .814 0 .756 
  Observations   287     127 12 ,326 
 
Panel B: Within vs. between firms 
     Within firms      Between firms      Difference 
Executives on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .093 -0 .017 0 .110* 
  Director fixed effects 0 .071 0 .031 0 .039 
  Difference -0 .022 0 .048 0 .071 
  Observations   287   866     1 ,153 
    
 CEOs on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .130 0 .059 0 .070 
  Director fixed effects 0 .129 0 .094 0 .035 
  Difference -0 .007 0 .035 -0 .035 
  Observations   127     329   456 
This table presents the levels and changes of manager fixed effects for those persons serving on the executive 
and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) or different firms, but not the same firm (between 
firms). Manager fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). Panel A contains 
descriptive statistics for the executive and director fixed effects measured for those executives serving on the 
executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) and for a control group of other executive 
(supervisory) board members. CEOs refer to persons serving as CEO during the last year of their tenure on 
the executive board. For each group, it shows, the mean, median, standard deviation and the number of 
observations. The superscripts * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Panel B 
shows the levels and changes of executive and director fixed effects for persons serving on (the) executive 
and supervisory board(s) using the difference-in-differences methodology. All executives (CEOs) serving on 
the executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) are defined as the treatment group, 
whereas executives (CEOs) serving on the executive and the supervisory board of different firms, but not of 
the same firm (between firms) are defined as the control group. The third row shows the difference in the 
director and executive fixed effect. The third column gives the differences between the treatment and control 
groups for the director and executive fixed effect and the difference between the differences in the director 
and executive fixed effect for the treatment and control groups. The mean is reported for each table cell. For 
the third row and third column, t-tests are used to test if the mean difference is significantly different from 
zero. The superscript * denote significance in differences at the 10% level. 
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3.6  Firm-level-analysis 
In this section, the estimation results for executive and director fixed effects in Section 3.5 
are used to construct measures for board quality and skill dispersion within and between the 
two boards (Section 3.6.1). Subsequently, I investigate the impact of these measures on 
firm performance (Section 3.6.2). Finally, Section 3.6.3 discusses the causal relation 
between manager fixed effects and firm performance.  
3.6.1  Measures of board quality & skill dispersion 
Apart from their aggregate amount, the dispersion of executive and director fixed effects 
within the firm could also have an impact on firm performance. One could assume that an 
executive board consisting of managers with low skills (e.g. caused by entrenchment) needs 
to be monitored more closely, which is likely to be performed by a supervisory board 
consisting of directors with relatively high skills. At the same time, monitoring by the 
supervisory board should be less important, if the executive board mainly consists of 
executives with high skills. A close monitoring of the executive board, especially an 
executive board consisting of executives with high skills, might even have a negative 
impact on firm performance as the monitoring imposes constraints on the executives’ 
freedom to generate shareholder value (Brennan, 2006). Therefore, it may be expected that 
a higher dispersion between the quality of the executive and the supervisory board leads to 
a higher firm performance for a given aggregate quality of both boards. I measure the 
aggregate quality of the two boards and the quality of each board as the average fixed effect 
of their respective members. The dispersion between the qualities of the two boards is then 
calculated as the standard deviation between these estimated qualities.  
The effectiveness of the executive and supervisory board could also depend on the 
distribution of skills within these boards. To the best of my knowledge, the relation 
between the distribution of the skills within these two boards and firm performance has not 
been previously tested. However, papers in the field of labor economics investigate a 
comparable issue, namely the relation between the skill mix of employees and firm 
performance (Iranzo et al., 2008). Depending on the business model of the firm, either high 
skills of a few workers (“dispersed skill distribution”) or equally distributed skills of the 
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majority of workers (“concentrated skill distribution”) are favorable (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990). Another strand of the literature related to the distribution of skills within the 
executive and supervisory board refers to the performance of teams. There is no consensus 
whether heterogeneous or homogeneous teams lead to higher firm performance. For 
instance, positive effects of heterogeneous teams could be attributed to workers with higher 
skills, who instruct lower skilled workers leading to higher productivity (Hamilton et al., 
2003). However, Dess (1987) argues that homogeneous teams agree upon a common 
strategy more easily.
42
 I measure the heterogeneity, i.e. skill dispersion, of the executive 
(supervisory) board as standard deviation of the corresponding executive (director) fixed 
effects estimated in Table 3.4 (AKM and AKM + match model).  
Panel A in Table 3.8 contains descriptive statistics on the board quality, the quality of the 
executive and the supervisory board and the dispersion of skills within the executive and 
the supervisory board and between the two boards. As before, the mean of the individual 
manager fixed effects is normalized to zero. For the measures that do not control for match 
effects the quality of the executive and the supervisory board exhibit a positive mean (0.022 
and 0.019, respectively) and a negative median (-0.024 and -0.023, respectively) indicating 
a positive skewness. The measures for the dispersion of skills within each board and 
between the two boards are also positively skewed. The dispersion of skills between is 
higher than within the executive and the supervisory board. The descriptive statistics are 
very similar for the measures based on estimation results controlling for match effects.  
Panel B in Table 3.8 reports the correlation between the measures for the quality of the 
boards and the dispersion of skills within and between the executive and the supervisory 
board. As some of the measures are interrelated with each other, some of these correlations 
are quite high. The correlations between the average quality of all members in both boards 
and the quality of the executive and supervisory board are considerably high (between 0.88 
and 0.97). Furthermore, the dispersion between the qualities of all managers in both boards 
is highly positively correlated with the dispersion of the quality between the executive and 
the supervisory board and the dispersion of skills within the supervisory board (0.89 and 
0.92, respectively). All other measures are also, albeit to a lesser extent, positively 
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For a comprehensive overview on studies about work group diversity, see Jackson et al. (2003). For a 
recent study that incorporates several dimensions of work group diversity and tests its impact on the 
performance for a large sample from the U.S. mutual fund industry, see Bär et al. (2007).   
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correlated (0.11-0.71). The correlations for the measures based on estimations controlling 
for match effects are very similar.
43
  
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics on board quality and skill dispersion 
Panel A: Board quality and skill dispersion variables 
 Board 
quality 
EB 
quality 
SB 
quality 
Disp.  
EB-SB 
quality 
Disp. 
manager 
skills 
Disp. 
executive 
skills 
Disp. 
director 
skills 
No match effects 
  Mean 0 .021 0 .022 0 .019 0 .059 0 .163 0 .101 0 .156 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .173 -0 .182 -0 .165 0 .010 0 .059 0 .018 0 .056 
  Median -0 .024 -0 .024 -0 .023 0 .025 0 .094 0 .052 0 .091 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .135 0 .141 0 .130 0 .056 0 .167 0 .108 0 .163 
  Std. dev. 0 .731 0 .806 0 .703 0 .183 0 .303 0 ..206 0 .281 
  Observations 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 
 
Match effects 
  Mean 0 .022 0 .024 0 .021 0 .059 0 .162 0 .101 0 .156 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .173 -0 .185 -0 .165 0 .010 0 .059 0 .017 0 .056 
  Median -0 .024 -0 .022 -0 .022 0 .024 0 .094 0 .051 0 .091 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .136 0 .139 0 .130 0 .058 0 .165 0 .109 0 .162 
  Std. dev. 0 .735 0 .811 0 .706 0 .185 0 .304 0 .208 0 .282 
  Observations 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 
 
Panel B: Correlation between measures of board quality and skill dispersion 
 Board 
quality 
EB quality SB quality Disp.  
EB-SB 
quality 
Disp. 
manager 
skills 
Disp. 
executive 
skills 
Disp. 
director 
skills 
Board quality 1.00/1.00       
EB quality 0.97/0.97 1.00/1.00      
SB quality 0.96/0.96 0.88/0.88 1.00/1.00     
Disp. EB-SB quality 0.49/0.50 0.52/0.53 0.42/0.43 1.00/1.00    
Disp. manager skills 0.51/0.51 0.50/0.50 0.49/0.49 0.89/0.89 1.00/1.00   
Disp. executive skills 0.13/0.13 0.11/0.12 0.14/0.14 0.25/0.25 0.44/0.44 1.00/1.00  
Disp. director skills 0.48/0.48 0.43/0.43 0.51/0.51 0.71/0.70 0.92/0.92 0.31/0.31 1.00/1.00 
This table presents descriptive statistics for several measures of board quality and skill dispersion. All 
variables are defined as in Table B.1. For each variable, it shows the number of observations, the mean, 25
th
 
percentile, median, 75
th
 percentile, standard deviation and the number of observations. The variables in Panel 
A are based on the estimation of manager fixed effects estimated in Table 3.4 (4) and (5). Panel B shows the 
correlation between the variables of Panel A. 
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Additional summary statistics based on the manager fixed effects estimated in the regression model in 
Table B.2 (4) and (5) with ROA as dependent variable are given in Table B.14 in the appendix of this chapter 
and lead to qualitatively similar results. 
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3.6.2  Determinants of firm performance 
The impact of the distribution of skills within the executive and the supervisory board and 
between the two boards on firm performance is analyzed using regression models on the 
firm-level. In addition to the board and firm characteristics described in Section 3.4.2, the 
dispersion of skills between and the dispersion within the executive and the supervisory 
board are included in three models. Moreover, these three models control for the aggregate 
quality of the executive and the supervisory board.
44
 The coefficient estimates and the 
explanatory power are compared for overall five models. Model (1) does not include firm 
fixed effects or measures based on manager fixed effects (OLS model). In model (2), firm 
fixed effects (firm fixed model) and in model (3) measures based on manager fixed effects 
are added to the OLS model (manager fixed model). Models (4) and (5) include firm fixed 
effects and measures based on manager fixed effects. In contrast to model (4) (manager 
fixed + firm fixed model), model (5) controls for match effects (manager fixed + firm fixed 
+ match model).  
The results depicted in Table 3.9 show again that including firm fixed effects or measures 
based on manager fixed effects increases the explanatory power by more than 30 
percentage points (in (2) by 42.4 and in (3) by 32.5 percentage points). However, the 
explanatory power increases significantly more when both firm fixed effects and measures 
based on manager fixed effects are included. In this case, the explanatory power increases 
by more than 70 percentage points (to 82.2%). The results regarding the dispersion of 
quality within the executive and supervisory board and between the two boards differ 
considerably depending on whether firm fixed effects are included. The results in (3) 
indicate a significantly positive impact of the dispersion within and between the executive 
and supervisory board on firm performance. However, these coefficient estimates are 
biased as the executive and director fixed effects in Table 3.4 (4) and (5) are estimated 
controlling for firm fixed effects. The results in models (4) and (5) suggest that the 
aggregate quality of both boards is the key factor in explaining the impact of manager fixed 
effects on firm performance. This effect is positive and significant on the 1% level, whereas 
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The choice of these variables is driven by the high correlations between some of the measures of Panel B 
in Table 3.8.  
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the coefficients for the dispersion of skills within and between the two boards are 
insignificant in models (4) and (5).  
The results regarding the board and firm characteristics also depend on whether executive 
and director fixed effects are included. For the sake of brevity, I only compare model (2) – 
the most commonly used model in the literature – with models (4) and (5). The coefficient 
estimates of the board characteristics in the models (2) and (4) are very similar. However, 
the significance levels differ for the average tenure of the executive, the size of the 
supervisory board, the dummy variable for a former CEO as chairman of the supervisory 
board and for women representation. The coefficients for the average tenure of the 
executive, the size of the supervisory board and women representation are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels for model (2) and significant on the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level for model (4), respectively. The coefficient estimate for the dummy variable for a 
former CEO as chairman of the supervisory board changes from significance on the 10% 
level in model (2) to insignificant in model (4). Concerning the firm characteristics, only 
the coefficient for the cash flow volatility turns from insignificant to significant (on the 1% 
level). For free float, the size of the coefficient changes by 37%. The differences and the 
directions in the changes of the coefficients suggest that highly skilled managers are more 
likely to work in firms with a more concentrated ownership structure.
45
 Similar conclusions 
can be drawn for the comparison of models (2) and (5) (manager fixed + firm fixed + match 
model). In sum, the comparison between the results in model (2) and models (4) and (5) 
suggests an omitted variable bias in model (2) – the model that does not control for 
executive or director fixed effects.
46
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
45
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) also find a positive relation between manager fixed effects in performance 
and the fraction of shares held by large shareholders. They interpret this finding as evidence that firms with 
better corporate governance are more likely to select managers with performance-enhancing styles. 
 
46
As a robustness test, I re-estimate Table 3.9 based on the manager fixed effects estimated in the 
regression model in Table B.2 (4) and (5) with ROA as dependent variable. The results of this robustness 
check are given in Table B.15 in the appendix of this chapter. This robustness check leads to qualitatively 
similar results and lends further support to the notion of an omitted variable bias in model (2). 
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Table 3.9: Board quality, skill dispersion, and firm performance  
 OLS FE IE’ FE+IE’ FE+IE’+ME’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Board quality 
 
  0 
(1 
.340* 
.67) 
1 
(8 
.736*** 
.20) 
1 
(8 
.720*** 
.76) 
Dispersion EB-SB quality 
 
  1 
(4 
.877*** 
.08) 
-0 
(-0 
.951 
.99) 
-0 
(-0 
.908 
.98) 
Dispersion executive skills    0 
(5 
.978*** 
.09) 
0 
(1 
.360 
.41) 
0 
(1 
.406 
.48) 
Dispersion director skills 
 
  0 
(2 
.872*** 
.81) 
-0 
(-0 
.209 
.58) 
-0 
(-0 
.200 
.54) 
Tenure executive board 0 
(0 
.009 
.66) 
0 
(0 
.013 
.99) 
0 
(2 
.024*** 
.63) 
0 
(3 
.014*** 
.02) 
0 
(2 
.013*** 
.80) 
Tenure supervisory board 0 
(0 
.005 
.32) 
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.59) 
0 
(1 
.018 
.43) 
-0 
(-0 
.002 
.43) 
-0 
(-0 
.002 
.35) 
Supervisory board size 0 
(1 
.023* 
.72) 
-0 
(-1 
.018 
.15) 
0 
(2 
.021** 
.23) 
-0 
(-2 
.016** 
.06) 
-0 
(-1 
.015** 
.98) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio -0 
(-1 
.440* 
.75) 
-0 
(-0 
.097 
.33) 
-0 
(-0 
.196 
.99) 
0 
(0 
.115 
.67) 
0 
(1 
.229 
.23) 
Codetermination -0 
(-3 
.920*** 
.35) 
0 
(0 
.099 
.40) 
-0 
(-3 
.516*** 
.00) 
0 
(0 
.103 
.78) 
0 
(0 
.092 
.70) 
Chairman is former CEO 0 
(1 
.124 
.11) 
0 
(1 
.093* 
.67) 
0 
(1 
.088 
.28) 
0 
(1 
.018 
.22) 
0 
(0 
.010 
.67) 
Busy board 0 
(1 
.277* 
.68) 
-0 
(-0 
.020 
.21) 
0 
(1 
.170 
.29) 
0 
(0 
.016 
.37) 
0 
(0 
.027 
.65) 
Interlocking board -0 
(-0 
.002 
.15) 
-0 
(-1 
.024 
.08) 
0 
(0 
.004 
.26) 
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.78) 
-0 
(-0 
.005 
.65) 
Women representation 0 
(2 
.778*** 
.89) 
-0 
(-0 
.088 
.29) 
0 
(1 
.421* 
.89) 
-0 
(-1 
.259* 
.66) 
-0 
(-1 
.254* 
.65) 
Firm size 
 
-0 
(-4 
.126*** 
.13) 
-0 
(-5 
.325*** 
.17) 
-0 
(-4 
.099*** 
.29) 
-0 
(-11 
.344*** 
.67) 
-0 
(-11 
.352*** 
.94) 
ROA 0 
(1 
.380 
.12) 
0 
(1 
.273 
.31) 
0 
(1 
.354 
.20) 
0 
(1 
.189 
.19) 
0 
(1 
.187 
.17) 
Firm age 
 
0 
(0 
.010 
.26) 
0 
(0 
.064 
.38) 
-0 
(-1 
.036 
.25) 
0 
(0 
.039 
.58) 
0 
(0 
.062 
.90) 
Free float 
 
-0 
(-2 
.254*** 
.57) 
-0 
(-2 
.263** 
.36) 
-0 
(-3 
.262*** 
.21) 
-0 
(-4 
.166*** 
.05) 
-0 
(-4 
.166*** 
.02) 
Capital structure 
 
-0 
(-3 
.451*** 
.19) 
0 
(2 
.283** 
.40) 
-0 
(-0 
.096 
.96) 
0 
(4 
.294*** 
.14) 
0 
(3 
.272*** 
.81) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
0 
(0 
.280 
.66) 
1 
(1 
.950 
.27) 
-0 
(-0 
.047 
.29) 
1 
(2 
.684*** 
.60) 
1 
(2 
.509** 
.42) 
Sales growth 
 
0 
(1 
.003 
.39) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.40) 
-0 
(-1 
.012 
.63) 
-0 
(-1 
.012 
.20) 
-0 
(-1 
.013 
.28) 
Constant 
 
3 
(8 
.072*** 
.13) 
4 
(4 
.918*** 
.57) 
2 
(7 
.232*** 
.16) 
5 
(9 
.047*** 
.62) 
4 
(9 
.992*** 
.30) 
Adj. R² 0 .086 0 .510 0 .411 0 .822 0 .822 
Observations 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 8 ,591 
This table shows the results of regressions at the firm-level with Tobin´s Q as dependent variable, using the 
AKM sample. Tobin`s Q and all independent variables are defined as in Table B.1. (1) contains neither 
manager nor firm fixed effects and is estimated as pooled OLS, (2) uses firm fixed effects (FE), (3) includes 
variables which are based on the manager fixed effects estimated in Table 3.4 (4) (IE’), (4) includes firm 
fixed effects and variables which are based on the manager fixed effects estimated in Table 3.4 (4) (FE+IE’) 
and (5) uses firm fixed effects and variables which are based on the manager fixed effects (adjusted for match 
effects) estimated in Table 3.4 (5) (FE+IE’+ME’). All regressions include year dummies. Each cell shows the 
estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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3.6.3  Causality 
The regression models presented in the previous sections are very useful in addressing one 
source of endogeneity – the omitted variable bias, that is the main endogeneity issue 
considered in this study. In this section, I examine the causality between manager fixed 
effects and firm performance to address a potential other source of endogeneity – reversed 
causality. The causality between manager fixed effects (as proxy for skills) and firm 
performance may go either way. On the one hand, highly-skilled managers could have an 
active and positive impact on firm performance. According to another interpretation, 
managers with high manager fixed effects sort into companies with high performance. The 
estimated high manager fixed effects could then be the result of a better human capital 
development of managers in firms with higher firm performance (Graham et al., 2009).  
To investigate the causality between manager fixed effects and firm performance, I split the 
sample into the periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2011. Manager fixed effects are estimated for 
the period 1993-2002 as well as for the entire sample period. For the period 2003-2011 all 
firm-years are considered for which at least one manager fixed effect estimated over the 
period 1993-2002 can be assigned to a manager, who was newly appointed during the 
period 2003-2011. As the results of the regression models on the firm-year-level have 
shown, it is important to control for the aggregate quality of the executive and supervisory 
board. However, as this measure contains managers with the manager fixed effects 
estimated over the period 1993-2002, I exclude these managers for the calculation of a 
variable, which I refer to as net board quality. Net board quality is defined as the average 
fixed effects of all managers net of the manager fixed effects of newly appointed managers 
during the period 2003-2011 (with information about manager fixed effects estimated over 
the period 1993-2002). The variable net board quality is included in the regression models 
of Table 3.10 in order to adequately control for the aggregate board quality of the executive 
and supervisory board.
47
  
Under the hypothesis of an active impact of managers on firm performance, one would 
expect a positive and significant impact of the manager fixed effects estimated over the 
period 1993-2002 on firm performance for the subsequent period (2003-2011). The impact 
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All measures based on manager fixed effects in Table 3.10 are measured net of match effects.  
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of manager fixed effects on firm performance is captured in three different ways (resulting 
in the three models displayed in Table 3.10). The three regression models include the same 
set of observable board and firm characteristics as the regression models in the previous 
section and controls for net board quality and firm fixed effects. Model (1) includes the sum 
of manager fixed effects of newly appointed managers during the period 2003-2011 with 
information about manager fixed effects estimated over the period 1993-2002. In models 
(2) and (3) the respective manager fixed effects estimated over the period 1993-2002 are 
interacted with dummies variables for the board positions of the corresponding managers in 
the respective firm-year. Model (2) includes interactions with dummy variables for 
positions as chairperson (either CEO or chairman of the supervisory board) and ordinary 
board member (executive or supervisory board member), whereas model (3) includes 
interactions with dummy variables for any position on the executive or supervisory board. 
The coefficient for manager fixed effects is positive and significant (at the 5% level) in 
model (1). The results in models (2) and (3) indicate that the coefficient estimates are also 
significantly positive for the different types of positions on the executive or supervisory 
board in the respective firm-year. Overall, the results provide strong evidence in favor of an 
active impact of managers (executives and directors) on firm performance.
 48
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As a robustness test, manager fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table B.2 (4) 
and (5) with ROA as dependent variable. The results of this robustness check are given in Table B.16 in the 
appendix of this chapter. In line with the results presented in Table 3.10 the coefficient of manager fixed 
effects has a positive sign in four out of five cases. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant for 
positions on the supervisory board in model (3). This corroborates the evidence in favor of the importance of 
director fixed effects. 
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Table 3.10: Causality between manager fixed effects and firm performance  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Manager fixed effects (1993-2002) 0 
(2 
.047** 
.33) 
  
Chairpersons fixed effects (1993-2002)  0 
(1 
.088* 
.92) 
 
Board member fixed effects (1993-2002)  0 
(2 
.047** 
.29) 
 
Executive fixed effects (1993-2002)   0 
(2 
.088*** 
.67) 
Director fixed effects (1993-2002)   0 
(2 
.028** 
.10) 
Net board quality 
 
0 
(4 
.134*** 
.24) 
0 
(4 
.133*** 
.17) 
0 
(3 
.145*** 
.86) 
Tenure executive board 0 
(2 
.018** 
.30) 
0 
(2 
.018** 
.33) 
0 
(2 
.018** 
.34) 
Tenure supervisory board -0 
(-0 
.001 
.05) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.00) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.12) 
Supervisory board size 0 
(2 
.027** 
.31) 
0 
(2 
.027** 
.31) 
0 
(2 
.026** 
.27) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio -0 
(-1 
.453* 
.79) 
-0 
(-1 
.465* 
.81) 
-0 
(-1 
.411* 
.66) 
Codetermination -0 
(-1 
.168 
.08) 
-0 
(-1 
.172 
.10) 
-0 
(-1 
.177 
.14) 
Chairman is former CEO 0 
(0 
.027 
.67) 
0 
(0 
.031 
.65) 
0 
(0 
.031 
.65) 
Busy board -0 
(-1 
.230 
.29) 
-0 
(-1 
.230 
.28) 
-0 
(-1 
.226 
.28) 
Interlocking board -0 
(-1 
.016 
.16) 
-0 
(-1 
.016 
.15) 
-0 
(-1 
.017 
.23) 
Women representation -0 
(-0 
.110 
.53) 
-0 
(-0 
.124 
.60) 
-0 
(-0 
.101 
.48) 
Firm size 
 
-0 
(-3 
.546*** 
.66) 
-0 
(-3 
.546*** 
.67) 
-0 
(-3 
.546*** 
.68) 
ROA 0 
(0 
.040 
.12) 
0 
(0 
.044 
.13) 
0 
(0 
.028 
.08) 
Firm age 
 
-0 
(-1 
.166 
.03) 
-0 
(-1 
.166 
.03) 
-0 
(-1 
.160 
.00) 
Free float 
 
-0 
(-3 
.243*** 
.17) 
-0 
(-3 
.244*** 
.21) 
-0 
(-3 
.239*** 
.16) 
Capital structure 
 
0 
(3 
.599*** 
.03) 
0 
(3 
.602*** 
.04) 
0 
(3 
.597*** 
.00) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
0 
(0 
.262 
.38) 
0 
(0 
.262 
.38) 
0 
(0 
.286 
.42) 
Sales growth 
 
-0 
(-0 
.010 
.53) 
-0 
(-0 
.010 
.53) 
-0 
(-0 
.010 
.52) 
Constant 
 
8 
(4 
.690*** 
.02) 
8 
(4 
.683*** 
.04) 
8 
(4 
.642*** 
.04) 
Adj. R² 0 .815 0 .815 0 .815 
Observations 3 ,179 3 ,179 3 ,179 
This table shows the results of regressions at the firm-level with Tobin´s Q as dependent variable for the period 2003-2011 
with non-missing data about manager fixed effects (1993-2002). All variables are defined as in Table B.1. Manager fixed 
effects (1993-2002) are estimated for the period 1993-2002 and are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). In models 
(2) and (3) manager fixed effects (1993-2002) are interacted with the position of the respective manager on the two boards. 
All regressions include year dummies. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The 
superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The impact of individual executives on firm performance has been investigated in many 
studies in the recent past and continues to gain in importance as research topic. Apart from 
individual executives, many studies also investigate the impact of the board of directors on 
firm performance. Previous studies related to the impact of the board of directors rely on 
observable board characteristics and do not consider director fixed effects.  
By using a data set of German firms, the impact of individual managers with different tasks 
on firm performance can be distinguished. The two-tiered board in Germany allows the 
unambiguous assignment of the tasks of running and monitoring the firm to the members of 
the executive and the supervisory board. This study analyzes the absolute and relative 
importance of executive and director fixed effects compared to observable board, manager 
and firm characteristics as well as year and firm fixed effects. Using the AKM method 
allows to take into account a considerable larger number of managers as under the MDV 
method and to separately identify the manager and firm fixed effects as opposed to the spell 
method. In addition to that, I also include match effects allowing a more precise estimation 
of manager fixed effects.  
I find that executive and director fixed effects are almost equally important in explaining 
the variance in firm performance. The proportion of the variance in firm performance 
explained amounts to 24% for executive fixed effects and 21-22% for director fixed effects, 
which is less than the corresponding proportion for firm fixed effects, but comparable to the 
proportion jointly explained by observable board, manager and firm characteristics (24-
27%) when the AKM method is used. This proportion is even higher for director fixed 
effects under the MDV method. The results further suggest, that changes of former CEOs to 
the supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement do not seem to be a concern for 
shareholders as only executives who performed well during their tenure are offered a seat 
on the supervisory board and as these executives perform well in their role as monitor, too. 
Comparing the coefficient estimates of models with and without manager fixed effects 
suggests that models without manager fixed effects suffer from an omitted variables bias. 
The results also provide strong evidence in favor of an active impact of managers 
(executives and directors) on firm performance. 
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Using fixed effects in order to control for unobserved managerial heterogeneities does not 
answer the question of the source of these heterogeneities. When one follows the most 
common interpretation of manager fixed effects as a proxy for the skills of an individual 
manager, the analysis on the firm-level shows that the impact of manager fixed effects on 
firm performance can be attributed to the aggregate quality of the executive and the 
supervisory board, but not to the dispersion of skills within or between the two boards.  
The high explanatory power of director fixed effects in explaining firm performance 
suggests at least two interesting areas for future research.  Future research could focus more 
closely on the impact of specific types of directors such as former executives, bank 
representatives or employee representatives on firm performance. Prior studies have 
investigated these issues on the firm-level.
49
 In contrast to this, the manager fixed dummy 
variable approach allows to reinvestigate these topics on the level of individual persons. As 
studies about the relation between board characteristics and firm performance implicitly 
assume a link between board characteristics and board actions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003), the investigation of the absolute and relative importance of director fixed effects in 
explaining certain board actions such as executive compensation and CEO turnover is 
another interesting field for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
49
For studies about the impact of codetermination on firm performance, see among others, Fauver and 
Fuerst (2006) and Gorton and Schmid (2004). For a study about the impact of bank representatives on firm 
performance, see among others, Dittmann et al. (2010). 
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B  Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table B.1: Variable definitions to Chapter 3 
This table presents the definitions of the variables used in Chapter 3. Board, manager characteristics and 
ownership structure are obtained or derived from the Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. All other firm 
characteristics are obtained from Datastream. 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Board characteristics 
 
Board quality 
 
Average fixed effects of all executive and supervisory board members. 
Busy board A dummy variable that equals one if at least 50% of the supervisory 
board members hold three or more directorships in German listed 
firms. 
 
Chairman is former CEO A dummy variable that equals one if the chairman of the supervisory 
board in the respective year was the CEO of the same company in at 
least one of the previous years. 
 
Codetermination Ratio of the number of employee representatives to supervisory board 
size. 
 
Dispersion director skills 
 
Standard deviation of the fixed effects of all supervisory board 
members. 
 
Dispersion EB-SB quality 
 
Standard deviation of EB quality and SB quality. 
Dispersion executive skills 
 
Standard deviation of the fixed effects of all executive board members. 
 
Dispersion manager skills 
 
Standard deviation of the fixed effects of all executive and supervisory 
board members. 
 
EB quality Average fixed effects of the executive board members. 
 
Executive board size Number of executive board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Interlocking board A dummy variable that equals one if at least one executive and 
supervisory board are joint members of another supervisory board. 
 
Net board quality (Sum of the fixed effects of executive and supervisory board members 
– the sum of manager fixed effects (1993-2002))/(number of members 
on the executive and supervisory board – number of managers with 
non-missing manager fixed effects (1993-2002)) 
 
SB quality Average fixed effects of the supervisory board members. 
 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio Ratio of supervisory board size to the sum of supervisory board size 
and executive board size. 
 
Supervisory board size Number of supervisory board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
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Board characteristics (continued) 
 
Tenure supervisory (executive) 
board 
Average tenure of all supervisory (executive) board members. For an 
individual director (executive), tenure equals one plus the difference 
between the current year and the first year of the individual on the 
supervisory (executive) board during the listing period. 
 
Women representation Ratio of the number of women to (supervisory board size + executive 
board size). 
 
Manager characteristics  
 
Busy director A dummy variable that equals one if a director is classified as “busy”, 
i.e. holds three or more directorships in German listed firms. 
 
CEO/Chairman A dummy variable that equals one if the individual is the CEO or the 
chairman of the supervisory board at the end of the fiscal year.  
 
Chairman is former CEO A dummy variable that equals one if the individual is the chairman of 
the supervisory board in the current year and was the CEO of the 
company in at least one of the previous years. 
 
Employee representative A dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a supervisory 
board member and employee representative at the end of the fiscal 
year.  
 
Female A dummy variable that equals one if a manager is female. 
 
Interlocking manager A dummy variable that equals one if an executive and a director are 
joint members of another supervisory board. 
 
Mover A dummy variable that equals one if a manager has worked for at least 
two firms of the sample during the sample period. 
 
Stayer A dummy variable that equals one if a manager has worked for only 
one firm of the sample during the sample period. 
 
Tenure director  One plus the difference between the current year and the first year of 
the director on the supervisory board during the listing period. 
 
Tenure executive 
 
One plus the difference between the current year and the first year of 
the executive on the executive board during the listing period. 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
Capital structure Ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
 
Cash flow volatility Standard deviation of share price returns in the previous 36 months. 
 
Firm age Natural logarithm of the difference between the current year and the 
year of the incorporation. 
 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
 
Free float Fraction of voting equity held by shareholders with less than 5% of the 
voting equity. 
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Firm characteristics (continued) 
  
ROA 
 
Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
Sales growth Nominal growth rate of revenues over the last fiscal year. 
 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of total 
assets.  
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Table B.2: Unobserved managerial heterogeneity and firm performance – ROA 
This table shows the results of regressions at the manager-firm-year-level with ROA as dependent variable, 
using the AKM sample. ROA and all independent variables are defined as in Table B.1. (1) contains neither 
manager nor firm fixed effects and is estimated as pooled OLS, (2) uses firm fixed effects (FE), (3) uses 
manager fixed effects (IE), and (4) uses firm and manager fixed effects (FE+IE). (5) includes firm, manager, 
and match fixed effects (FE+IE+ME). The regression constant in (4) can be interpreted as descriptive statistic 
for the grand mean; its standard error is not computed. All regressions include year dummies. Each cell 
shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 OLS FE IE FE+IE FE+IE+ME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenure executive board 0 
(2 
.004** 
.53) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.89) 
 0 
(2 
.002*** 
.81) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.92) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.90) 
Tenure supervisory board  0 
(4 
.006*** 
.83) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.12) 
 0 
(1 
.002* 
.80) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.10) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.11) 
Supervisory board size  -0 
(-4 
.007*** 
.47) 
 -0 
(-3 
.004*** 
.01) 
 -0 
(-4 
.004*** 
.70) 
 -0 
(-2 
.003*** 
.92) 
 -0 
(-2 
.003*** 
.77) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio  0 
(2 
.098*** 
.82) 
 0 
(2 
.075** 
.10) 
 0 
(2 
.007*** 
.67) 
 0 
(2 
.075** 
.34) 
 0 
(2 
.073** 
.10) 
Codetermination  0 
(2 
.048** 
.31) 
 -0 
(-0 
.020 
.99) 
 0 
(0 
.002 
.12) 
 -0 
(-0 
.016 
.85) 
 -0 
(-0 
.099 
.51) 
Chairman is former CEO  -0 
(-0 
.002 
.33) 
 -0 
(-1 
.009* 
.85) 
 -0 
(-0 
.002 
.42) 
 -0 
(-1 
.005 
.00) 
 -0 
(-0 
.004 
.72) 
Busy board  0 
(0 
.011 
.93) 
 0 
(0 
.006 
.57) 
 0 
(1 
.009 
.02) 
 0 
(0 
.007 
.74) 
 0 
(0 
.002 
.21) 
Interlocking board  -0 
(-2 
.006*** 
.77) 
 -0 
(-1 
.003** 
.99) 
 -0 
(-3 
.004*** 
.26) 
 -0 
(-2 
.003** 
.25) 
 -0 
(-2 
.003** 
.13) 
Women representation  0 
(1 
.055 
.63) 
 0 
(0 
.006 
.18) 
 0 
(0 
.022 
.84) 
 0 
(0 
.002 
.06) 
 -0 
(-0 
.002 
.07) 
Tenure director 
 
 0 
(0 
.000 
.57) 
 0 
(0 
.000 
.66) 
 0 
(1 
.000 
.40) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.73) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.49) 
Tenure executive 
 
 0 
(2 
.000*** 
.77) 
 -0 
(-0 
.001 
.09) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.24) 
 -0 
(-1 
.001* 
.83) 
 0 
(0 
.000 
.21) 
CEO/Chairman  -0 
(-0 
.001 
.96) 
 0 
(1 
.002** 
.99) 
 -0 
(-0 
.002 
.42) 
 -0 
(-1 
.005 
.00) 
 0 
(0 
.000 
.08) 
Busy director 
 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.10) 
 -0 
(-1 
.002 
.23) 
 0 
(1 
.009 
.02) 
 -0 
(-1 
.005 
.18) 
 -0 
(-0 
.004 
.76) 
Interlocking manager 
 
-0  
(-1 
.002 
.06) 
 -0 
(-1 
.001 
.43) 
 -0 
(-3 
.004*** 
.26) 
 -0 
(-1 
.003 
.25) 
 -0 
(-0 
.003 
.84) 
Firm size 
 
 0 
(5 
.017*** 
.03) 
 0 
(4 
.029*** 
.13) 
 0 
(4 
.015*** 
.96) 
 0 
(3 
.035*** 
.75) 
 0 
(3 
.036*** 
.41) 
Firm age 
 
 0 
(0 
.002 
.81) 
 0 
(2 
.075*** 
.96) 
 0 
(3 
.010*** 
.39) 
 0 
(2 
.062*** 
.59) 
 0 
(2 
.065** 
.47) 
Free float 
 
 -0 
(-0 
.003 
.31) 
 0 
(0 
.009 
.77) 
 0 
(0 
.003 
.34) 
0 
(0 
.004 
.43) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.11) 
Capital structure 
 
 -0 
(-4 
.085*** 
.51) 
 -0 
(-7 
.193*** 
.59) 
 -0 
(-7 
.154*** 
.57) 
 -0 
(-7 
.222*** 
.50) 
 -0 
(-7 
.218*** 
.03) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.140 
.49) 
 -0 
(-1 
.058 
.13) 
 -0 
(-1 
.050 
.38) 
 0 
(0 
.011 
.22) 
 0 
(0 
.042 
.72) 
Sales growth 
 
 0 
(1 
.000 
.41) 
0  
(3 
.000*** 
.59) 
 0 
(2 
.000*** 
.27) 
 0 
(2 
.000*** 
.38) 
 0 
(2 
.000** 
.43) 
Constant 
 
-0  
(-3 
.188*** 
.76) 
-0  
(-4 
.611*** 
.44) 
 -0 
(-3 
.165*** 
.88) 
 -0 
 
.637 
 
 -0 
(-3 
.657*** 
.61) 
Adj. R² 0 .079 0 .455 0 .432 0 .606 0 .626 
Observations 95 ,554 95 ,554 95 ,554 95 ,554 95 ,554 
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Table B.3: Unobserved managerial heterogeneity and firm performance – MDV 
This table shows the results of regressions at the manager-firm-year-level with Tobin´s Q as dependent variable, using 
the MDV sample. Tobin`s Q and all independent variables are defined as in Table B.1. (1) contains neither manager 
nor firm fixed effects and is estimated as pooled OLS, (2) uses firm fixed effects (FE), (3) uses manager fixed effects 
(IE), and (4) uses firm and manager fixed effects (FE+IE). (5) includes firm, manager, and match fixed effects 
(FE+IE+ME). The regression constant in (4) can be interpreted as descriptive statistic for the grand mean; its standard 
error is not computed. All regressions include year dummies. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 OLS FE IE FE+IE FE+IE+ME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenure executive board  0 
(0 
.003 
.19) 
 0 
(1 
.015 
.04) 
 0 
(0 
.049 
.47) 
 0 
(1 
.013 
.26) 
 0 
(1 
.008 
.36) 
Tenure supervisory board  0 
(1 
.027 
.42) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.03) 
 0 
(1 
.021 
.70) 
 -0 
(-0 
.007 
.84) 
 -0 
(-0 
.005 
.77) 
Supervisory board size  0 
(1 
.017* 
.65) 
 -0 
(-0 
.013 
.89) 
0 
(1 
.014* 
.83) 
 -0 
(-0 
.008 
.66) 
 -0 
(-0 
.011 
.69) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio  -0 
(-0 
.189 
.72) 
 -0 
(-1 
.423 
.32) 
-0  
(-1 
.356** 
.99) 
 -0 
(-2 
.467** 
.00) 
 -0 
(-0 
.017 
.10) 
Codetermination  -0 
(-2 
.721*** 
.72) 
 0 
(1 
.264 
.02) 
 -0 
(-2 
.500*** 
.67) 
 0 
(0 
.172 
.76) 
 0 
(0 
.169 
.64) 
Chairman is former CEO 0 
(1 
.114 
.07) 
 0 
(1 
.057 
.24) 
 0 
(1 
.083* 
.85) 
 0 
(0 
.032 
.95) 
 0 
(0 
.018 
.59) 
Busy board  0 
(1 
.327* 
.65) 
 0 
(0 
.010 
.12) 
0 
(1 
.245 
.64) 
0  
(0 
.001 
.01) 
 0 
(0 
.007 
.15) 
Interlocking board 0 
(0 
.011 
.74) 
 -0 
(-1 
.026 
.63) 
 0 
(0 
.007 
.73) 
 -0 
(-1 
.018* 
.84) 
 -0 
(-0 
.006 
.55) 
Women representation  0 
(2 
.707*** 
.30) 
 0 
(0 
.058 
.22) 
 0 
(1 
.495** 
.99) 
 -0 
(-0 
.085 
.41) 
 -0 
(-0 
.215 
.85) 
Tenure director 
 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.21) 
 0 
(1 
.002 
.37) 
 0 
(1 
.005 
.16) 
 0 
(2 
.008** 
.21) 
 0 
(0 
.006 
.71) 
Tenure executive 
 
-0  
(-1 
.011* 
.72) 
 -0 
(-1 
.005 
.43) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.09) 
 0 
(0 
.001 
.10) 
 0 
(0 
.005 
.55) 
CEO/Chairman  0 
(0 
.002 
.11) 
 0 
(0 
.009 
.83) 
 0 
(0 
.027 
.92) 
 0 
(2 
.041** 
.56) 
0 
(0 
.025 
.97) 
Busy director 
 
0  
(0 
.016 
.74) 
 -0 
(-1 
.019 
.38) 
 -0 
(-0 
.009 
.35) 
 0 
(0 
.002 
.10) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.03) 
Interlocking manager 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.030 
.25) 
 -0 
(-0 
.005 
.22) 
 -0 
(-1 
.048* 
.70) 
 0 
(0 
.006 
.38) 
 -0 
(-0 
.002 
.18) 
Firm size 
 
 -0 
(-4 
.124*** 
.85) 
 -0 
(-5 
.288*** 
.00) 
 -0 
(-6 
.154*** 
.13) 
 -0 
(-3 
.278*** 
.88) 
 -0 
(-6 
.314*** 
.23) 
ROA  0 
(1 
.618 
.22) 
 0 
(0 
.280 
.91) 
 0 
(0 
.330 
.80) 
0  
(0 
.224 
.81) 
 0 
(2 
.436*** 
.57) 
Firm age 
 
 -0 
(-0 
.008 
.18) 
 -0 
(-0 
.071 
.56) 
 0 
(0 
.008 
.29) 
 -0 
(-0 
.068 
.62) 
 -0 
(-0 
.033 
.31) 
Free float 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.083 
.05) 
 -0 
(-2 
.232** 
.21) 
 -0 
(-0 
.057 
.09) 
 -0 
(-2 
.192*** 
.66) 
 -0 
(-2 
.203*** 
.88) 
Capital structure 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.224 
.47) 
 0 
(2 
.315** 
.38) 
 -0 
(-0 
.036 
.33) 
 0 
(2 
.261** 
.00) 
 0 
(3 
.334*** 
.71) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
 0 
(0 
.861 
.85) 
 3 
(1 
.036 
.42) 
0  
(1 
.715 
.08) 
 2 
(1 
.366* 
.76) 
 1 
(1 
.011 
.56) 
Sales growth 
 
 0 
(1 
.005 
.55) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.39) 
 -0 
(-0 
.006 
.64) 
 -0 
(-0 
.007 
.79) 
 -0 
(-0 
.007 
.73) 
Constant 
 
 2 
(7 
.674*** 
.69) 
 5 
(5 
.261*** 
.00) 
 3 
(10 
.130*** 
.45) 
 5 
 
.195 
 
 5 
(6 
.271*** 
.30) 
Adj. R² 0 .110 0 .551 0 .388 0 .686 0 .769 
Observations 29 ,633 29 ,633 29 ,633 29 ,633 29 ,633 
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Table B.4: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – 
ROA 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared in Table B.2. The results in (1) 
are based on Table B.2 (4) and the results in (2) are based on Table B.2 (5). These components are observable 
time-variant board characteristics (first block in Table B.2), observable time-variant manager characteristics 
(second block in Table B.2) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table B.2), firm fixed 
effects, manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains 
match effects. For each of these components, the covariance with ROA (relative to the variance of ROA) and 
the percentage of the explained variance of ROA (in parentheses) is computed. Panel A is based on all 
observations in Table B.2 (4) and (5). Panel B is based on the subsample of executive-firm-years and Panel C 
is based on the subsample of director-firm-years. 
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics -0.005 (-0 .86%) -0.004 (-0 .71%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics -0.001 (-0 .14%) 0.001 (0 .17%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.132 (21 .68%) 0.133 (21 .16%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.325 (53 .72%) 0.322 (51 .35%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.148 (24 .44%) 0.148 (23 .58%) 
Match fixed effects  0.021 (3 .34%) 
Year effects 0.007 (1 .16%) 0.007 (1 .12%) 
Residuals 0.394 (39 .44%) 0.374 (37 .36%) 
Observations 95 ,554  95 ,554  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics -0.005 (-0 .85%) -0.005 (0 .71%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics -0.001 (-0 .22%) 0.001 (0 .10%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.134 (21 .35%) 0.135 (21 .29%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.315 (50 .44%) 0.311 (49 .08%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.175 (28 .10%) 0.175 (27 .63%) 
Match fixed effects  0.009 (1 .41%) 
Year effects 0.007 (1 .18%) 0.008 (1 .22%) 
Residuals 0.376 (37 .57%) 0.367 (36 .69%) 
Observations 26 ,393  26 ,393  
 
Panel C: Directors  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics -0.005 (-0 .86%) -0.004 (-0 .70%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics -0.001 (-0 .09%) 0.001 (0 .19%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.131 (21 .80%) 0.131 (21 .04%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.331 (55 .50%) 0.327 (52 .56%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.134 (22 .51%) 0.134 (21 .51%) 
Match fixed effects  0.027 (4 .33%) 
Year effects 0.007 (1 .14%) 0.007 (1 .06%) 
Residuals 0.404 (40 .39%) 0.377 (37 .70%) 
Observations 69 ,161  69 ,161  
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Table B.5: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – 
MDV 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared in Table B.3. The results in (1) 
are based on Table B.3 (4) and the results in (2) are based on Table B.3 (5). These components are observable 
time-variant board characteristics (first block in Table B.3), observable time-variant manager characteristics 
(second block in Table B.3) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table B.3), firm fixed 
effects, manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains 
match effects. For each of these components, the covariance with Tobin’s Q (relative to the variance of 
Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of the explained variance of Tobin´s Q (in parentheses) is computed. Panel A 
is based on all observations in Table B.3 (4) and (5). Panel B is based on the subsample of executive-firm-
years and Panel C is based on the subsample of director-firm-years. 
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.009 (1 .28%) 0.007 (0 .86%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .17%) 0.002 (0 .20%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.193 (28 .13%) 0.233 (30 .11%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.303 (44 .20%) 0.298 (38 .49%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.171 (24 .88%) 0.174 (22 .42%) 
Match fixed effects  0.091 (11 .73%) 
Year effects 0.009 (1 .33%) -0.030 (-3 .82%) 
Residuals 0.314 (31 .44%) 0.225 (22 .54%) 
Observations 29 ,633  29 ,633  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.010 (1 .39%) 0.008 (1 .04%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .13%) 0.002 (0 .20%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.280 (38 .07%) 0.345 (43 .30%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.374 (50 .90%) 0.361 (45 .29%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.057 (7 .79%) 0.059 (7 .39%) 
Match fixed effects  0.065 (8 .12%) 
Year effects 0.013 (1 .71%) -0.042 (-5 .33%) 
Residuals 0.265 (26 .50%) 0.203 (20 .32%) 
Observations 4 ,284  4 ,284  
 
Panel C: Directors 
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.009 (1 .29%) 0.007 (0 .85%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .15%) 0.001 (0 .18%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.184 (27 .01%) 0.221 (28 .67%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.295 (43 .34%) 0.291 (37 .67%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.183 (26 .92%) 0.186 (24 .13%) 
Match fixed effects  0.094 (12 .15%) 
Year effects 0.009 (1 .29%) -0.028 (-3 .65%) 
Residuals 0.320 (31 .98%) 0.228 (22 .78%) 
Observations 25 ,349  25 ,349  
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Table B.6: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – 
at least three years 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared based on the regression model in 
Table 3.4. In contrast to the results presented in Table 3.4, this table does not include manager-firm-years of 
managers who have worked less than three years for a firm. The results in (1) are based on the regression 
model in Table 3.4 (4) and the results in (2) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). These 
components are observable time-variant board characteristics (first block in Table 3.4), observable time-
variant manager characteristics (second block in Table 3.4) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third 
block in Table 3.4), firm fixed effects, manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. 
Additionally, (2) also contains match effects. For each of these components, the covariance with Tobin’s Q 
(relative to the variance of Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of the explained variance of Tobin´s Q (in 
parentheses) is computed. Panel A is based on all remaining observations in Table 3.4 (4) and (5). Panel B is 
based on the remaining subsample of executive-firm-years and Panel C is based on the remaining subsample 
of director-firm-years. 
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.011 (1 .46%) 0.012 (1 .51%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .06%) 0.001 (0 .08%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.203 (26 .28%) 0.205 (26 .24%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.355 (45 .99%) 0.355 (45 .57%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.191 (24 .79%) 0.192 (24 .57%) 
Match fixed effects  0.008 (1 .04%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .42%) 0.008 (1 .00%) 
Residuals 0.228 (22 .82%) 0.220 (22 .01%) 
Observations 87 ,122  87 ,122  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.010 (1 .32%) 0.011 (1 .37%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .06%) 0.001 (0 .08%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.188 (23 .81%) 0.189 (23 .92%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.375 (47 .48%) 0.376 (47 .59%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.205 (25 .90%) 0.205 (25 .93%) 
Match fixed effects  0.001 (0 .08%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .43%) 0.008 (1 .03%) 
Residuals 0.210 (21 .00%) 0.209 (20 .94%) 
Observations 23 ,702  23 ,702  
 
Panel C: Directors  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.011 (1 .50%) 0.012 (1 .55%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .07%) 0.001 (0 .08%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.209 (27 .32%) 0.211 (27 .21%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.347 (45 .38%) 0.347 (44 .71%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.186 (24 .32%) 0.186 (24 .00%) 
Match fixed effects  0.011 (1 .47%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .41%) 0.008 (0 .98%) 
Residuals 0.236 (23 .64%) 0.225 (22 .50%) 
Observations 63 ,420  63 ,420  
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Table B.7: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – 
five most important executives 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared based on the regression model in 
Table 3.4. In contrast to the results presented in Table 3.4, this table only includes manager-firm-years of the 
five most important executives: the CEO, his deputy and the three other executives with the longest tenure. In 
case of two or more executives with the same tenure, the executive with the highest number of supervisory 
board seats in the respective year is considered as most important. When both the tenure and the number of 
supervisory board seats of two or more executives are identical, their importance is assigned randomly. The 
results in (1) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (4) and the results in (2) are based on the 
regression model in Table 3.4 (5). These components are observable time-variant board characteristics (first 
block in Table 3.4), observable time-variant manager characteristics (second block in Table 3.4) observable 
time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table 3.4), firm fixed effects, executive fixed effects, year 
effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains match effects. For each of these components, the 
covariance with Tobin’s Q (relative to the variance of Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of the explained 
variance of Tobin´s Q (in parentheses) is computed.  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.006 (0 .76%) 0.006 (0 .81%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .04%) 0.000 (0 .05%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.146 (18 .18%) 0.144 (17 .83%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.173 (21 .47%) 0.174 (21 .51%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.468 (58 .18%) 0.470 (58 .20%) 
Match fixed effects  0.002 (0 .28%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .37%) 0.011 (1 .33%) 
Residuals 0.195 (19 .52%) 0.193 (19 .30%) 
Observations 24 ,515  24 ,515  
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Table B.8: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – five 
most important managers 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared based on the regression model in Table 
3.4. In contrast to the results presented in Table 3.4, this table only includes manager-firm-years of the five most 
important managers: the CEO, his deputy, the chairman of the supervisory board as well as one additional executive 
and director with the longest tenure. In case of two or more executives or directors with the same tenure, the 
executive/director with the highest number of supervisory board seats in the respective year is considered as most 
important. When both the tenure and the number of supervisory board seats of two or more executives or directors are 
identical, their importance is assigned randomly. The results in (1) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (4) 
and the results in (2) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). These components are observable time-
variant board characteristics (first block in Table 3.4), observable time-variant manager characteristics (second block 
in Table 3.4) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table 3.4), firm fixed effects, 
manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains match effects. For 
each of these components, the covariance with Tobin’s Q (relative to the variance of Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of 
the explained variance of Tobin´s Q (in parentheses) is computed.  Panel A is based on all remaining observations in 
Table 3.4 (4) and (5). Panel B is based on the remaining subsample of executive-firm-years and Panel C is based on 
the remaining subsample of director-firm-years. 
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.005 (0 .59%) 0.004 (0 .47%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .01%) 0.000 (0 .02%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.161 (19 .10%) 0.146 (18 .85%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.307 (40 .03%) 0.308 (39 .66%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.298 (38 .93%) 0.299 (38 .48%) 
Match fixed effects  0.010 (1 .30%) 
Year effects 0.010 (1 .36%) 0.010 (1 .27%) 
Residuals 0.234 (23 .43%) 0.224 (22 .43%) 
Observations 37 ,647  37 ,647  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.005 (0 .64%) 0.004 (0 .48%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .03%) 0.000 (0 .01%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.170 (19 .31%) 0.153 (19 .04%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.328 (41 .24%) 0.329 (41 .07%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.297 (37 .35%) 0.297 (37 .08%) 
Match fixed effects  0.008 (0 .95%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .44%) 0.011 (1 .38%) 
Residuals 0.206 (20 .56%) 0.198 (19 .80%) 
Observations 20 ,440  20 ,440  
 
Panel C: Directors 
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.004 (0 .54%) 0.003 (0 .44%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .03%) 0.000 (0 .01%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.151 (18 .60%) 0.138 (18 .36%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.290 (39 .14%) 0.290 (38 .57%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.300 (40 .49%) 0.300 (39 .84%) 
Match fixed effects  0.012 (1 .63%) 
Year effects 0.009 (1 .27%) 0.009 (1 .16%) 
Residuals 0.260 (26 .00%) 0.248 (24 .79%) 
Observations 17 ,207  17 ,207  
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Table B.9: Relative importance of manager fixed effects in determining firm performance – 
excluding employee representatives 
This table presents the results of the decomposition of the model R-squared based on the regression model in 
Table 3.4. In contrast to the results presented in Table 3.4, this table does not include manager-firm-years of 
employee representatives. The results in (1) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (4) and the results 
in (2) are based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). These components are observable time-variant board 
characteristics (first block in Table 3.4), observable time-variant manager characteristics (second block in 
Table 3.4) observable time-variant firm characteristics (third block in Table 3.4), firm fixed effects, 
manager/executive/director fixed effects, year effects and residuals. Additionally, (2) also contains match 
effects. For each of these components, the covariance with Tobin’s Q (relative to the variance of Tobin’s Q) 
and the percentage of the explained variance of Tobin´s Q (in parentheses) is computed. Panel A is based on 
all remaining observations in Table 3.4 (4) and (5). Panel B is based on the subsample of executive-firm-years 
and Panel C is based on the remaining subsample of director-firm-years. 
Panel A: Manager  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.009 (1 .17%) 0.008 (0 .95%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .06%) 0.000 (0 .05%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.204 (23 .83%) 0.197 (24 .66%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.357 (46 .30%) 0.351 (43 .90%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.210 (27 .30%) 0.210 (26 .31%) 
Match fixed effects  0.029 (3 .67%) 
Year effects 0.010 (1 .35%) 0.004 (0 .46%) 
Residuals 0.229 (22 .91%) 0.200 (20 .00%) 
Observations 72 ,010  72 ,010  
 
Panel B: Executives  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.010 (1 .25%) 0.008 (1 .01%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.001 (0 .07%) 0.000 (0 .03%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.210 (23 .53%) 0.201 (24 .83%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.383 (47 .83%) 0.379 (46 .79%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.207 (25 .90%) 0.207 (25 .62%) 
Match fixed effects  0.009 (1 .09%) 
Year effects 0.011 (1 .43%) 0.005 (0 .62%) 
Residuals 0.200 (19 .96%) 0.191 (19 .09%) 
Observations 26 ,379  26 ,379  
 
Panel C: Directors  
     (1)     (2) 
            No match effects              Match effects 
Observable time-variant board characteristics 0.008 (1 .12%) 0.007 (0 .92%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics 0.000 (0 .06%) 0.000 (0 .05%) 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics 0.200 (23 .99%) 0.195 (24 .55%) 
Firm fixed effects 0.343 (45 .43%) 0.337 (42 .33%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.212 (28 .10%) 0.212 (26 .68%) 
Match fixed effects  0.040 (5 .09%) 
Year effects 0.010 (1 .30%) 0.003 (0 .36%) 
Residuals 0.245 (24 .51%) 0.205 (20 .48%) 
Observations 45 ,631  45 ,631  
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Table B.10: Descriptive statistics on manager fixed effects – ROA 
This table presents descriptive statistics for manager fixed effects estimated in Table B.2 (5). All variables are 
defined as in Table B.1. For each variable, it shows the number of observations, the mean, 25
th
 percentile, 
median, 75
th
 percentile, standard deviation and the number of observations. Panel A shows descriptive 
statistics on the manager fixed effects, executive fixed effects and director fixed effects. Panel B describes 
manager fixed effects for chairpersons (CEO or chairman), CEOs and chairmen, and Panel C contains 
information about manager fixed effects for managers with ordinary board positions (ordinary executive 
board members, shareholder representatives, employee representatives). For Panel B and C, only individuals 
with the same type of board position (CEO, ordinary executive board member, chairman of the supervisory 
board, shareholder representative, employee representative) (not necessarily in the same firm) during the 
sample period are considered.  
Panel A: Manager, executive and director fixed effects 
                                                                                                Manager fixed effects Executive fixed effects Director fixed effects 
  Mean -0 .003 -0 .004 -0 .003 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .025 -0 .027 -0 .025 
  Median -0 .002 -0 .001 -0 .003 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .026 0 .028 0 .025 
  Std. dev. 0 .124 0 .137 0 .116 
  Observations  18  ,691      6  ,073      12 ,618 
 
Panel B: Manager fixed effects for chairpersons 
                                                                                                Chairperson fixed effects CEO fixed effects Chairman fixed effects 
  Mean -0 .023 -0 .003 -0 .000 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .037 -0 .035 -0 .038 
  Median 0 .003 0 .001 0 .001 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .047 0 .037 0 .051 
  Std. dev. 0 .185 0 .168 0 .192 
  Observations    1 ,504 1  ,002          659   
 
Panel C: Manager fixed effects for ordinary board members 
                                                                                                Ordinary board
member fixed 
effects 
Ordinary executive 
board member fixed 
effects 
Ordinary 
shareholder 
representatives 
Ordinary employee 
representatives 
  Mean -0 .004 -0 .006 -0 .005 -0 .004 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .025 -0 .027 -0 .031 -0 .022 
  Median -0 .002 -0 .001 -0 .002 -0 .003 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .025 0 .025 0 .031 0 .016 
  Std. dev. 0 .121 0 .135 0 .138 0 .067 
  Observations      13  ,848     4  ,304     6  ,074           4 ,225 
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Table B.11: Manager fixed effects of managers on the executive and supervisory board of 
the same and of different firms: Difference-in-differences – CEO for majority of years 
This table presents the levels and changes of manager fixed effects for those persons serving on the executive 
and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) or different firms, but not the same firm (between 
firms). Manager fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). Panel A contains 
descriptive statistics for the executive and director fixed effects measured for those executives serving on the 
executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) and for a control group of other executive 
(supervisory) board members. CEOs refer to persons serving as CEO during more than half of the years of 
their tenure on the executive board. For each group, it shows, the mean, median, standard deviation and the 
number of observations. The superscripts * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel B shows the levels and changes of executive and director fixed effects for persons serving on (the) 
executive and supervisory board(s) using the difference-in-differences methodology. All executives (CEOs) 
serving on the executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) are defined as the 
treatment group, whereas executives (CEOs) serving on the executive and the supervisory board of different 
firms, but not of the same firm (between firms) are defined as the control group. The third row shows the 
difference in the director and executive fixed effect. The third column gives the differences between the 
treatment and control groups for the director and executive fixed effect and the difference between the 
differences in the director and executive fixed effect for the treatment and control groups. The mean is 
reported for each table cell. For the third row and third column, t-tests are used to test if the mean difference is 
significantly different from zero. The superscript * denote significance in differences at the 10% level. 
Panel A: Within firms 
     Executives     CEOs     Other board members 
Executive fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .093* 0 .130* 0 .001 
  Median -0 .032 -0 .051 -0 .047 
  Std. dev. 1 .004 1 .069 0 .794 
  Observations   287   125     5 ,784 
    
Director fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .071* 0 .127** -0 .004 
  Median -0 .034 -0 .000 -0 .037 
  Std. dev. 0 .724 0 .819 0 .756 
  Observations   287   125 12 ,326 
 
Panel B: Within vs. between firms 
     Within firms      Between firms      Difference 
Executives on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .093 -0 .017 0 .110* 
  Director fixed effects 0 .071 0 .031 0 .039 
  Difference -0 .022 0 .048 -0 .071 
  Observations    287   866     1 ,153 
    
 CEOs on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .130 0 .110 0 .020 
  Director fixed effects 0 .127 0 .126 0 .002 
  Difference -0 .003 0 .016 0 .018 
  Observations    125   235   360 
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Table B.12: Manager fixed effects of managers on the executive and supervisory board of 
the same and of different firms: Difference-in-differences – CEO for all years 
This table presents the levels and changes of manager fixed effects for those persons serving on the executive 
and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) or different firms, but not the same firm (between 
firms). Manager fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table 3.4 (5). Panel A contains 
descriptive statistics for the executive and director fixed effects measured for those executives serving on the 
executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) and for a control group of other executive 
(supervisory) board members. CEOs refer to persons serving as CEO during all years of their tenure on the 
executive board. For each group, it shows, the mean, median, standard deviation and the number of 
observations. The superscript * denote significance at the 10% level. Panel B shows the levels and changes of 
executive and director fixed effects for persons serving on (the) executive and supervisory board(s) using the 
difference-in-differences methodology. All executives (CEOs) serving on the executive and the supervisory 
board of only one firm (within firms) are defined as the treatment group, whereas executives (CEOs) serving 
on the executive and the supervisory board of different firms, but not of the same firm (between firms) are 
defined as the control group. The third row shows the difference in the director and executive fixed effect. 
The third column gives the differences between the treatment and control groups for the director and 
executive fixed effect and the difference between the differences in the director and executive fixed effect for 
the treatment and control groups. The mean is reported for each table cell. For the third row and third column, 
t-tests are used to test if the mean difference is significantly different from zero. The superscript * denote 
significance in differences at the 10% level.  
Panel A: Within firms 
     Executives     CEOs     Other board members 
Executive fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .093* 0 .034 0 .001 
  Median -0 .032 -0 .070 -0 .047 
  Std. dev. 1 .004 0 .816 0 .794 
  Observations   287     99     5 ,784 
    
Director fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .071* 0 .022 -0 .004 
  Median -0 .034 -0 .006 -0 .037 
  Std. dev. 0 .724 0 .433 0 .756 
  Observations   287     99    12 ,326 
 
Panel B: Within vs. between firms 
     Within firms      Between firms      Difference 
Executives on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .093 -0 .017 0 .110* 
  Director fixed effects 0 .071 0 .031 0 .039 
  Difference -0 .022 0 .048 0 .071 
  Observations   287   866     1 ,153 
    
 CEOs on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .034 0 .156 -0 .122 
  Director fixed effects 0 .022 0 .224 -0 .203 
  Difference -0 .013 0 .068 -0 .081 
  Observations     99   159   258 
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Table B.13: Manager fixed effects of managers on the executive and supervisory board of 
the same and of different firms: Difference-in-differences – ROA 
This table presents the levels and changes of manager fixed effects for those persons serving on the executive 
and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) or different firms, but not the same firm (between 
firms). Manager fixed effects are estimated based on the regression model in Table B.2 (5). Panel A contains 
descriptive statistics for the executive and director fixed effects measured for those executives serving on the 
executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) and for a control group of other executive 
(supervisory) board members. CEOs refer to persons serving as CEO during the last year of their tenure on 
the executive board. For each group, it shows, the mean, median, standard deviation and the number of 
observations. The superscript * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Panel B 
shows the levels and changes of executive and director fixed effects for persons serving on (the) executive 
and supervisory board(s) using the difference-in-differences methodology. All executives (CEOs) serving on 
the executive and the supervisory board of only one firm (within firms) are defined as the treatment group, 
whereas executives (CEOs) serving on the executive and the supervisory board of different firms, but not of 
the same firm (between firms) are defined as the control group. The third row shows the difference in the 
director and executive fixed effect. The third column gives the differences between the treatment and control 
groups for the director and executive fixed effect and the difference between the differences in the director 
and executive fixed effect for the treatment and control groups. The mean is reported for each table cell. For 
the third row and third column, t-tests are used to test if the mean difference is significantly different from 
zero. The superscript * denote significance in differences at the 10% level.  
Panel A: Within firms 
     Executives     CEOs     Other board members 
Executive fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0. 110* 0 .149* 0 .019 
  Median -0 .017 -0 .032 -0 .026 
  Std. dev. 1 .003 1 .068 0 .794 
  Observations   287   127 5 ,780 
    
Director fixed effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Mean 0 .087* 0 .146** 0 .015 
  Median -0 .010 0 .024** -0 .019 
  Std. dev. 0 .725 0 .815 0 .652 
  Observations   287   127 12  ,319    
 
Panel B: Within vs. between firms 
     Within firms      Between firms      Difference 
Executives on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .110 0 .004 0 .106* 
  Director fixed effects 0 .087 0 .053 0 .035 
  Difference -0 .023 0 .048 -0 .071 
  Observations   287   865 1  ,152     
    
 CEOs on the supervisory board  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Executive fixed effects 0 .149 0 .083 0 .065 
  Director fixed effects 0 .146 0 .114 0 .032 
  Difference -0 .003 0 .031 -0 .034 
  Observations   127   329     456 
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Table B.14: Descriptive statistics on board quality and skill dispersion – ROA 
This table presents descriptive statistics for several measures of board quality and skill dispersion. All 
variables are defined as in Table B.1. For each variable, it shows the number of observations, the mean, 25
th
 
percentile, median, 75
th
 percentile, standard deviation and the number of observations. The variables in Panel 
A are based on the estimation of manager fixed effects estimated in Table B.2 (4) and (5). Panel B shows the 
correlation between the variables of Panel A. 
Panel A: Board quality and skill dispersion variables 
 Board 
quality 
EB quality SB quality Disp.  
EB-SB 
Quality 
Disp. 
manager 
skills 
Disp. 
executive 
skills 
Disp. 
director 
skills 
No match effects 
  Mean 0 .004 0 .005 0 .003 0 .011 0 .030 0 .021 0 .028 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .021 -0 .022 -0 .020 0 .002 0 .010 0 .002 0 .009 
  Median -0 .000 0 .002 -0 .001 0 .005 0 .018 0 .009 0 .016 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .025 0 .030 0 .024 0 .012 0 .033 0 .022 0 .032 
  Std. dev. 0 .113 0 .120 0 .112 0 .022 0 .042 0 .043 0 .043 
  Observations 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 
 
Match effects 
  Mean 0 .004 0 .005 0 .003 0 .011 0 .030 0 .020 0 .028 
  25
th
 percentile -0 .021 -0 .022 -0 .021 0 .002 0 .010 0 .002 0 .009 
  Median -0 .000 0 .001 -0 .002 0 .005 0 .018 0 .009 0 .017 
  75
th
 percentile 0 .026 0 .031 0 .025 0 .011 0 .033 0 .022 0 .031 
  Std. dev. 0 .114 0 .120 0 .112 0 .022 0 .042 0 .043 0 .042 
  Observations 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 
 
Panel B: Correlation between measures of board quality and skill dispersion 
 Board 
quality 
EB quality SB quality Disp.  
EB-SB 
quality 
Disp. 
manager 
skills 
Disp. 
executive 
skills 
Disp. 
director 
skills 
Board quality 1.00/1.00       
EB quality 0.98/0.98 1.00/1.00      
SB quality 0.98/0.98 0.91/0.92 1.00/1.00     
Disp. EB-SB quality -0.09/-0.08 -0.11/-0.10 -0.07/-0.06 1.00/1.00    
Disp. manager skills -0.11/-0.10 -0.13/-0.12 -0.09/-0.08 0.78/0.78 1.00/1.00   
Disp. executive skills -0.10/-0.09 -0.12/-0.11 -0.07/-0.06 0.39/0.39 0.72/0.72 1.00/1.00  
Disp. director skills -0.09/-0.08 -0.09/-0.08 -0.09/-0.08 0.58/0.58 0.92/0.92 0.56/0.56 1.00/1.00 
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Table B.15: Board quality, skill dispersion, and firm performance – ROA 
This table shows the results of regressions at the firm-level with ROA as dependent variable, using the AKM 
sample. ROA and all independent variables are defined as in Table B.1. (1) contains neither manager nor firm 
fixed effects and is estimated as pooled OLS, (2) uses firm fixed effects (FE), (3) includes variables which are 
based on the manager fixed effects estimated in Table B.2 (4) (IE’), (4) includes firm fixed effects and 
variables which are based on the manager fixed effects estimated in Table B.2 (4) (FE+IE’) and (5) uses firm 
fixed effects and variables which are based on the manager fixed effects (adjusted for match effects) 
estimated in Table B.2 (5) (FE+IE’+ME’). All regressions include year dummies. Each cell shows the 
estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 OLS FE IE’ FE+IE’ FE+IE’+ME’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Board quality 
 
  0 
(4 
.413*** 
.97) 
1 
(13 
.653*** 
.43) 
1 
(13 
.662*** 
.68) 
Dispersion EB-SB quality 
 
  -1 
(-4 
.128*** 
.39) 
-0 
(-0 
.056 
.20) 
-0 
(-0 
.030 
.11) 
Dispersion executive skills    -0 
(-0 
.219 
.89) 
0 
(0 
.239 
.76) 
0 
(0 
.246 
.79) 
Dispersion director skills 
 
  -1 
(-4 
.111*** 
.38) 
-0 
(-1 
.343 
.48) 
-0 
(-1 
.318 
.36) 
Tenure executive board 0 
(3 
.005*** 
.74) 
0 
(0 
.000 
.27) 
0 
(2 
.003** 
.05) 
0 
(1 
.001 
.17) 
0 
(2 
.002*** 
.61) 
Tenure supervisory board 0 
(4 
.007*** 
.88) 
0 
(0 
.001 
.43) 
0 
(2 
.040*** 
.72) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.08) 
0 
(0 
.001 
.62) 
Supervisory board size -0 
(-6 
.010*** 
.17) 
-0 
(-3 
.006*** 
.51) 
-0 
(-5 
.008*** 
.36) 
-0 
(-3 
.004*** 
.95) 
-0 
(-3 
.004*** 
.80) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio 0 
(2 
.102*** 
.67) 
0 
(1 
.091* 
.93) 
0 
(1 
.063* 
.75) 
0 
(2 
.128*** 
.92) 
0. 
(2 
127*** 
.89) 
Codetermination 0 
(2 
.043** 
.06) 
-0 
(-1 
.038 
.50) 
0 
(0 
.017 
.81) 
-0 
(-0 
.007 
.52) 
-0 
(-0 
.003 
.19) 
Chairman is former CEO -0 
(-0 
.005 
.61) 
-0 
(-1 
.014* 
.78) 
-0 
(-0 
.006 
.72) 
0 
(0 
.000 
.00) 
0 
(0 
.000 
.09) 
Busy board -0 
(-0 
.001 
.05) 
0 
(0 
.002 
.07) 
0 
(0 
.016 
.92) 
0 
(0 
.002 
.11) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.05) 
Interlocking board -0 
(-2 
.010*** 
.98) 
-0 
(-1 
.004* 
.95) 
-0 
(-2 
.009*** 
.76) 
-0 
(-2 
.004** 
.34) 
-0 
(-2 
.004** 
.30) 
Women representation 0 
(2 
.085** 
.48) 
0 
(0 
.029 
.62) 
0 
(3 
.103*** 
.18) 
0 
(0 
.005 
.24) 
0 
(0 
.002 
.10) 
Firm size 
 
0 
(7 
.027*** 
.14) 
0 
(4 
.045*** 
.01) 
0 
(5 
.018*** 
.47) 
0 
(6 
.042*** 
.44) 
0 
(6 
.043*** 
.51) 
Firm age 
 
0 
(2 
.008** 
.49) 
0 
(3 
.120*** 
.46) 
0 
(1 
.004 
.39) 
0 
(3 
.056*** 
.59) 
0 
(3 
.058*** 
.74) 
Free float 
 
-0 
(-2 
.025** 
.04) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.01) 
-0 
(-1 
.022* 
.93) 
-0 
(-0 
.002 
.02) 
-0 
(-0 
.004 
.40) 
Capital structure 
 
-0 
(-5 
.098*** 
.52) 
-0 
(-5 
.217*** 
.93) 
-0 
(-6 
.100*** 
.43) 
-0 
(-8 
.232*** 
.20) 
-0 
(-8 
.232*** 
.18) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
-0 
(-1 
.076 
.12) 
-0 
(-0 
.000 
.00) 
-0 
(-0 
.023 
.95) 
0 
(1 
.106** 
.96) 
0 
(2 
.122** 
.22) 
Sales growth 
 
0 
(1 
.000 
.14) 
0 
(2 
.000*** 
.75) 
0 
(0 
.000 
.95) 
0 
(1 
.000* 
.90) 
0 
(1 
.000* 
.91) 
Constant 
 
 -0 
(-5 
.304*** 
.54) 
-0 
(-4 
.925*** 
.71) 
-0 
(-2 
.112** 
.38) 
-0 
(-5 
.700*** 
.50) 
-0 
(-5 
.712*** 
.60) 
Adj. R² 0 .091 0 .327 0 .275 0 .626 0 .626 
Observations 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 8 ,596 
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Table B.16: Causality between manager fixed effects and firm performance – ROA 
This table shows the results of regressions at the firm-level with ROA as dependent variable for the period 
2003-2011 with non-missing data about manager fixed effects (1993-2002). All variables are defined as in 
Table B.1. Manager fixed effects (1993-2002) are estimated for the period 1993-2002 and are based on the 
regression model in Table B.2 (5). In models (2) and (3) manager fixed effects (1993-2002) are interacted 
with the position of the respective manager on the two boards. All regressions include year dummies. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Manager fixed effects (1993-2002)  0 
(1 
.010 
.33) 
 
 
 
 
Chairpersons fixed effects (1993-2002)  - 0 
(-0 
.011 
.75) 
 
Board member fixed effects (1993-2002)   0 
(1 
.010 
.37) 
 
Executive fixed effects (1993-2002)    0 
(1 
.005* 
.91) 
Director fixed effects (1993-2002)    0 
(1 
.034 
.50) 
Net board quality 
 
 0 
(1 
.007* 
.76) 
0 
(1 
.008* 
.81) 
 0 
(2 
.018** 
.00) 
Tenure executive board  0 
(1 
.003 
.20) 
0 
(1 
.029 
.20) 
 0 
(1 
.003 
.25) 
Tenure supervisory board  0 
(1 
.004 
.45) 
0 
(1 
.004 
.36) 
 0 
(1 
.004 
.35) 
Supervisory board size  0 
(0 
.000 
.05) 
-0 
(-0 
.056 
.74) 
 -0 
(-0 
.000 
.02) 
SB-/(SB+EB)-size-ratio  -0 
(-0 
.061 
.81) 
-0 
(-0 
.056 
.74) 
 -0 
(-0 
.049 
.68) 
Codetermination  -0 
(-0 
.009 
.28) 
-0 
(-0 
.007 
.20) 
 -0 
(-0 
.014 
.39) 
Chairman is former CEO  0 
(0 
.005 
.50) 
0 
(0 
.006 
.55) 
 0 
(0 
.005 
.52) 
Busy board  -0 
(-0 
.053 
.74) 
-0 
(-0 
.053 
.74) 
 -0 
(-0 
.051 
.71) 
Interlocking board  -0 
(-0 
.002 
.26) 
-0 
(-0 
.001 
.26) 
 -0 
(-0 
.001 
.28) 
Women representation  0 
(0 
.016 
.23) 
0 
(0 
.024 
.35) 
 0 
(0 
.016 
.24) 
Firm size 
 
 0 
(1 
.059* 
.72) 
0 
(1 
.059* 
.70) 
 0 
(1 
.059* 
.70) 
Firm age 
 
 0 
(1 
.056 
.28) 
0 
(1 
.056 
.27) 
 0 
(1 
.058 
.32) 
Free float 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.042 
.64) 
-0 
(-1 
.041 
.64) 
 -0 
(-1 
.049* 
.68) 
Capital structure 
 
 -0 
(-3 
.218*** 
.99) 
-0 
(-4 
.220*** 
.02) 
 -0 
(-3 
.216*** 
.93) 
Cash flow volatility 
 
 0 
(1 
.303* 
.71) 
0 
(1 
.302* 
.71) 
 0 
(1 
.305* 
.73) 
Sales growth 
 
 0 
(1 
.003 
.06) 
0 
(1 
.003 
.05) 
 0 
(1 
.003 
.06) 
Constant 
 
 -0 
(-1 
.988* 
.74) 
-0 
(-1 
.981* 
.73) 
 -0 
(-1 
.990* 
.74) 
Adj. R² 0 .399 0 .400 0 .403 
Observations 3, 179 3, 179 3, 179 
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Chapter 4 
Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and the 
Lintner Model: A Dynamic Panel Data 
Analysis of German Firms 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The question of how firms decide on the amount of cash to be disbursed to shareholders has 
attracted the attention of financial economists for decades. Lintner's (1956) partial 
adjustment model still is the workhorse of empirical investigations of corporate payout 
decisions.
1
 He developed his model in a period when dividends were the dominant form of 
payouts. More recently, however, the volume of stock repurchases has caught up, and there 
have been years in which the volume of stock repurchases by listed U.S. firms has 
surpassed the volume of dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Skinner (2008, p. 608) 
concludes that his empirical evidence "suggests that repurchases have become the dominant 
form of payout".  
In spite of this, however, in most empirical applications Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment 
model of payout policy is applied to dividend payouts rather than to total payouts. There are 
                                                 
 
1
For recent applications see, among others, Andres et al. (2009), Chemmanur et al. (2010), and Skinner 
(2008). For a recent theoretical paper that builds on Lintner's model see Lambrecht and Myers (2012). There 
are also critical voices, though. DeAngelo et al. (2008) argue that the model has lost some of its descriptive 
ability, mostly because the number of firms that have a well-defined target payout ratio has decreased.  
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only very few exceptions in the literature. Grullon and Michaely (2002) estimate a 
traditional dividend-based Lintner model and then relate the resulting dividend errors (the 
difference between actual and predicted dividends) to the repurchase volume. The only 
paper we are aware of that estimates a Lintner model based on total payouts is Skinner 
(2008). He uses two restricted samples, one consisting of firms that repurchase and pay 
dividends in most years, and one consisting of firms that repurchase and never pay 
dividends. So far no paper estimates a Lintner model on full payouts for a comprehensive 
sample that permits to draw general conclusions on the choice between dividends and 
repurchases.  
The correct specification depends on the economic reasons that drive the choice between 
dividends and stock repurchases. When both are good substitutes for each other (as argued 
by Miller and Modigliani, 1961, and as would be the case in a world of perfect capital 
markets) the model should be better at explaining total payouts rather than dividends. Tax-
based explanations predict that firms choose the payout method that receives the more 
favorable tax treatment. In this case the correct model specification may depend on the tax 
regime. The financial flexibility hypothesis brought forward by Jagannathan et al. (2000) 
states that dividends are used to pay out permanent earnings while stock repurchases are 
used to pay out transitory earnings. In this case the estimation of a Lintner-type model 
requires the decomposition of earnings into a permanent and a transitory component.  
In this paper we put the cart before the horse. We estimate different versions of Lintner-
type partial adjustment models. The results then allow us to draw inferences on the motives 
underlying the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Our sample is a large panel 
of German firms covering the period 1988-2008. This sample has two distinct advantages. 
First, stock repurchases were essentially prohibited until 1998. Therefore, we can analyze 
how the introduction of an alternative to dividends affects corporate payout decisions. 
Second, a major change in the tax system in 2001 affected the relative attractiveness of 
dividends and stock repurchases. This allows us to investigate the importance of tax 
considerations for corporate payout decisions in general, and the choice between dividends 
and stock repurchases in particular.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. The introduction of repurchases in 1998 has 
materially affected the payout policy of German firms. This is inconsistent with the 
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substitutes hypothesis. We find no evidence that German firms have altered their payout 
policy in response to the 2001 tax reform. Our results imply that dividends are more sticky 
than total payouts. This is consistent with the prediction of the flexibility hypothesis that 
dividends are predominantly paid out of permanent earnings. We further document that, 
after the introduction of repurchases, the responsiveness of dividends to changes in 
transitory earnings is reduced substantially. This corroborates the evidence in favor of the 
flexibility hypothesis.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first paper that uses a 
partial adjustment model to analyze how the introduction of stock repurchases affects the 
magnitude and determinants of dividend payouts. Second, we test whether a Lintner-type 
partial adjustment model is better suited to model dividend payouts or total payouts. 
Different from Skinner (2008), we do not restrict our sample to firms with a particular 
history of payout decisions. Third, we decompose earnings into a permanent and a 
temporary component. We then integrate both components in a partial adjustment model in 
order to test the hypothesis (brought forward by Jagannathan et al., 2000) that dividends are 
used to disburse permanent earnings while stock repurchases are used to pay out temporary 
earnings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that tests the flexibility 
hypothesis within a Lintner-type partial adjustment model. In our empirical analysis we use 
GMM-in-systems estimations, and we explicitly consider the role of special dividends 
(which, prior to the introduction of stock repurchases, might have been used to disburse 
temporary earnings).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the institutional 
setting in Germany. Section 4.3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4.4 presents the sample 
and descriptive statistics. In Section 4.5 we describe the econometric methodology and the 
results, Section 4.6 concludes.  
4.2 Institutional setting 
As pointed out above, the institutional framework in Germany provides an ideal 
environment to analyze our research questions. During the first half of our sample period 
(1988-1997) stock repurchases were effectively prohibited. In 1998 a new law came into 
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force which allowed stock repurchases. Besides this change in regulation there was also a 
major change in the taxation system. Until 2001 Germany operated a full imputation system 
that favored dividend payouts over repurchases for most investor types. After the 2001 tax 
reform the tax preference of most investors shifted towards repurchases.  
In the following, we describe several aspects of the institutional environment of German 
firms as well as relevant changes over the sample period. These issues are dividends 
(Section 4.2.1), stock repurchases (4.2.2) and the tax treatment of dividends and stock 
repurchases (4.2.3). 
4.2.1  Dividends  
German firms pay annual (rather than quarterly) dividends. The payout decisions of 
German Stock Corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) are governed by § 58 of the Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG).
2
 The executive and the supervisory board can decide 
to retain up to 50% of the profits. The decision on whether to retain or to pay out the 
remaining amount is taken by the shareholders' meeting by simple majority vote. In 
practice it is almost always the case that the shareholders' meeting votes in favor of the 
proposal made by the executive board. The payment date is usually the business day 
following the day of the annual shareholders' meeting.
3
  
Firms may pay special designated dividends (Sonderdividenden). They are of particular 
interest for our study because special designated dividends may be close substitutes for 
stock repurchases (DeAngelo et al., 2000).
4
 This, in turn, is of particular importance 
because repurchases were essentially prohibited until 1998.  
                                                 
 
2
The following description relates to the standard case. The articles of incorporation may allow for 
deviations from this standard procedure. In addition, § 150 AktG prescribes that a firm has to retain at least 
5% of its earnings as long as the total amount of retained earnings amounts to less than 10% of the dedicated 
capital (Grundkapital).  
 
3
Some firms have issued both common shares and non-voting preferred shares. The preferred shareholders 
are entitled to a cumulative minimum dividend (§ 139 AktG). These claims have priority over dividend 
payments to common shareholders. If the minimum preferred dividend is not paid in a given year, it is 
cumulated and has to be paid out in later years. If the dividend is not paid for two consecutive years, owners 
of preferred shares are entitled to a temporary voting right (§ 140 AktG), until the cumulated minimum 
dividend has been paid. In addition, non-voting shares are often entitled to an excess dividend, i.e. a dividend 
that is larger by a specified amount than the dividend paid to common shareholders.  
 
4
This view is supported by empirical results in Brickley (1983). For a sample of U.S. firms he finds higher 
dividend payouts in the year following a dividend increase than in the year following a special designated 
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4.2.2  Stock repurchases 
Until 1998, stock repurchases were essentially prohibited in Germany.
5
 In 1998, a new law 
came into force that allowed stock repurchases. Under this law firms are allowed to buy 
back up to 10% of their shares.
6
 A firm wishing to buy back shares has to follow a 
standardized procedure. As a first step the shareholders' meeting (with simple majority) has 
to grant the managerial board the permission to buy back shares. This permission has to 
specify the maximum number of shares to be bought back (not more than 10% of shares 
outstanding), the minimum and maximum price to be paid per share, and the time of 
validity of the permission (initially not longer than 18 months; increased to 5 years in 
2008).  
This permission gives the managerial board the right, but not the obligation, to buy back 
shares.
7
 Once the board decides to actually initiate a repurchase program the firm has to 
communicate this fact to the public. This is mandated by the German securities trading act 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) which requires that listed firms immediately disclose 
information that is likely to materially affect security prices ("ad-hoc disclosure"). 
Empirical studies analyzing the impact of stock repurchase announcements on share prices 
typically use the date of the ad-hoc disclosure as the event date (e.g. Gerke et al., 2002; 
Schremper, 2003; Seifert and Stehle, 2003; Hackethal and Zdantchouk, 2006; Bessler et al., 
2013).  
Firms are required to treat all shareholders equally. This precludes negotiated repurchases 
from large shareholders. Open market repurchases, repurchase tender offers and 
transferrable put rights are admissible, though. Open market repurchases are the dominating 
form.  
                                                                                                                                                    
dividend. This indicates that special designated dividends are weaker signals of higher future payouts than 
increases of regular dividends.  
 
5
Firms could acquire their own shares only under restrictive conditions (e.g. to prevent damage). Although 
there is some disagreement in the literature as to the actual number of repurchases in Germany prior to 1998 
(see Seifert, 2006, for a discussion) it is safe to conclude that stock repurchases were not used as a means of 
disbursing cash to shareholders prior to 1998.  
 
6
The 10% threshold applies to an individual repurchase program, not to the total amount of repurchases 
during the life of the firm.  
 
7
Given permission through the annual meeting, the decision to initiate a repurchase program is taken by 
the executive board and approved by the supervisory board. 
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As is the case in the U.S., the announcement of a stock repurchase still does not require the 
managerial board to actually repurchase shares. The actual amount of repurchases is 
published in the firm's financial statement. This information thus allows us to identify the 
repurchase volume in a fiscal year.  
Since 2004 new regulation adopted by the European Union imposes additional restrictions 
on stock repurchases. Individual transactions made as part of a repurchase program now 
have to be reported within seven trading days. Further, there are restrictions on the prices at 
which open market repurchases can be made (not higher than the price of the previous 
transaction) and on the maximum daily repurchase volume (not more than 25% of the 
average daily volume on the market on which the trade is made).  
Finally, there are two ways in which the firm can handle the repurchased shares. First, it 
can treat them as an asset on the asset side of the balance sheet. They can then be used to 
cover outstanding convertible bonds or executive stock options. The maximum number of 
shares a firm can hold on its balance sheet is 10% of the shares outstanding. Alternatively, 
the firm can reduce the number of shares outstanding. In this case the firm's book equity is 
reduced by the repurchase volume.  
4.2.3  Taxation of dividends and repurchases 
The tax treatment of dividends and repurchases underwent a major change in 2001. Until 
2001 Germany operated a full imputation system. Dividends paid to domestic investors 
were essentially taxed at the investor's personal tax rate.
8
 Retained earnings were taxed at a 
corporate tax rate. Capital gains were tax exempt when the shares were held for more than 
six months (twelve months from 1999 onwards). Consequently, investors with a personal 
tax rate below the corporate rate on retained earnings favored dividends over repurchases 
while investors with a tax rate above the corporate rate favored repurchases. The latter 
group was usually small as the corporate tax rate on retained earnings was very close to the 
highest marginal tax rate on personal income. Corporate shareholders had a preference for 
dividends, as they received dividends tax free while capital gains were taxed at the 
                                                 
 
8
Dividends were first taxed at the firm level. Domestic investors received the gross dividend plus a tax 
credit equal to the tax paid by the firm. The gross dividend was taxed at the investor's personal tax rate. The 
resulting tax liability was then offset against the tax credit.  
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corporate tax rate. Foreign investors did not receive the tax credit and may therefore have 
had a preference for repurchases. 
Since 2001 dividends and retained earnings are taxed at the same rate at the corporate level. 
At the personal investor level, half of the net dividend is taxed at the investor's personal tax 
rate. Capital gains are not taxed when the shares are held for more than one year. When this 
condition is met individual investors should thus have a clear preference for repurchases 
over dividends. For corporate investors, dividend payments were essentially tax-free.
9
 At 
the same time, capital gains from the sale of shares held in another company were also tax-
exempt. Corporate investors were thus largely indifferent between dividends and 
repurchases.  
In summary, while the preference for dividends versus repurchases depended on the status 
(domestic versus foreign) and the personal tax rate of the investor prior to 2001, there 
should be a clear preference for repurchases after 2001. We thus expect a shift from 
dividends to repurchases after the 2001 tax reform.  
4.3 Hypotheses 
Lintner's (1956) model is based on the presumption that firms have a target payout ratio. 
Therefore, changes in earnings translate into payout changes. The adjustment is not 
immediate, though. Rather, firms adjust their payout only partially towards the new target 
level. In its simplest form the model thus yields the adjustment process  
                                      (4.1) 
                                                                                             (4.2) 
where Di,t denotes the dividend of firm i in period t, Pi,t denotes profits, Di,t
* 
are the desired 
dividend payments, ri is the target payout ratio for firm i and ci is the speed-of-adjustment 
coefficient.  
                                                 
 
9
Since 2004 5% of the received dividend had to be declared as revenue and was therefore subject to the 
corporate tax rate.  
 *i,t i i i,t i,t 1 i,tD c D D u    
*
i,t i i,tD r P
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The model was developed at a time when stock repurchases were very rare. Therefore, it 
only considered dividend payouts. Despite the growing importance of repurchases most 
researchers have continued to use Lintner's framework to model dividend payouts only. 
Two notable exceptions are Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008). Whether it is 
appropriate to model total payouts rather than dividend payouts is an open question, 
though. It hinges on the motives why firms choose dividends or repurchases.  
In a world without differential tax treatment of dividends and repurchases or other frictions, 
the two payout methods would be perfect substitutes.
10
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) report 
empirical evidence that US firms increasingly use repurchases as substitutes for dividends. 
If indeed dividends and repurchases were close substitutes for each other it would be 
appropriate to apply the Lintner model to total payouts rather than to dividends only.  
An implication of perfect substitutability is that a firm's total payout does not depend on the 
available menu of payout methods. Consequently, under perfect substitutability the 
introduction of repurchases should not affect the payout policy. This leads to our first 
hypothesis.  
H4.1 (substitutes): The introduction of repurchases in 1998 does not affect the 
parameters of a Lintner model of total payout.  
When the tax system treats dividends and repurchases differently, firms have an obvious 
reason to prefer one payout method over the other. As explained in Section 4.2, the German 
tax reform in 2001 has made repurchases more attractive. We thus have 
H4.2 (taxes): The 2001 tax reform results in a reduction of the (target) dividend 
payout ratio and a corresponding increase in the amount of repurchases.  
So far we have assumed that (absent differential tax treatment) dividends and repurchases 
are good substitutes. This need not be the case, though. The earnings of a firm may consist 
of a permanent component and a transitory component. Managers may be reluctant to 
increase dividends in response to high transitory earnings because the higher dividend level 
                                                 
 
10
The assumption of a frictionless world is not a necessary condition for the substitute hypothesis to hold. 
The principal-agent models of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) imply that managers pay dividends in 
order to disburse free cash flow and thus to reduce agency costs. A similar argument can be made in favor of 
repurchases. In signaling models of payout decisions (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) managers 
use dividends to signal information about future profitability. In a similar way, repurchases could be used as 
signals. Thus, both the principal-agent models and the signaling models are consistent with the substitute 
hypothesis.  
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may not be sustainable, and managers typically try to avoid dividend cuts.
11
 Against this 
background, Jagannathan et al. (2000) have argued that firms use dividends to disburse 
permanent earnings but use repurchases to pay out transitory earnings. This is referred to as 
the flexibility hypothesis. The survey results reported in Brav et al. (2005) as well as the 
empirical evidence in Guay and Hartford (2000) support the flexibility hypothesis.  
H4.3 (flexibility / payout): Changes in dividend payouts are caused by changes in 
permanent earnings but unrelated to changes in transitory earnings.  
The flexibility hypothesis implies that repurchases track the more volatile transitory 
component of earnings. Consequently, we should expect that repurchases are adjusted 
quickly to changes in (transitory) earnings. This implies the following hypothesis.  
H4.4 (flexibility / speed of adjustment): The speed of adjustment coefficient will be 
larger in a Lintner model of total payout than in a Lintner model of dividends.  
As noted in Section 4.2, firms can use special designated dividends to disburse transitory 
cash flows. The flexibility hypothesis implies that firms used special dividends for that 
purpose prior to 1998 when repurchases were essentially prohibited. With the introduction 
of repurchases the importance of special dividends should decline. This should hold in 
particular after the 2001 tax reform which puts dividends at a disadvantage relative to 
repurchases.  
H4.5 (special dividends): Special designated dividends lose importance after 1998.  
We note that DeAngelo et al. (2000) reject the hypothesis that special dividends were 
displaced by repurchases. We believe, though, that the German setting, where repurchases 
were prohibited prior to 1998 warrants a reconsideration of this hypothesis.  
Young firms tend to have volatile earnings and may therefore be reluctant to initiate 
dividend payments (Fama and French, 2001). They may, however, be willing to repurchase 
shares.
12
 We therefore expect that the fraction of firms that do not distribute cash to 
shareholders (using either dividends or repurchases) decreases after 1998.  
                                                 
 
11
Michaely et al. (1995) show that the negative market reaction after dividend cuts is stronger than the 
positive market reaction after dividend increases.  
 
12
Typically, special dividends are declared in addition to regular dividends. Therefore, special designated 
dividends are not an alternative for these firms.  
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H4.6 (fraction of non-payers): The fraction of firms that do not pay out cash to 
shareholders decreases after 1998.  
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section, we describe the construction of our sample and present summary statistics. 
The descriptive analysis will already provide a first indication of the validity of some of our 
hypotheses.  
4.4.1  Sample selection 
Our sample covers all non-financial firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange that were 
among the largest 200 non-financial firms in Germany (as measured by total assets
13
) at any 
time during the 21-year period 1988-2008. This results in an initial sample of 424 firms. 
Our sample on average covers 67.2% of the aggregate market capitalization of all listed 
firms in Germany.  
We drop firms-years in which a control agreement was in place.
14
 The reason is that firms 
that are subject to a control agreement do not decide independently on their payout. We 
further restrict our sample to firms with at least two consecutive firm-year observations. 
The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel with 4,363 firm-year observations.  
Until 1998 domestic firms had to prepare their accounts according to German accounting 
standards. Between 1998 and 2004 they were allowed (but not required) to apply 
international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) instead. Since 2005 
application of IAS/IFRS is mandatory. A change in the accounting standards can affect 
reported earnings significantly. We therefore use dummy variables to control for the 
                                                 
 
13
We measure total assets at year-end. If the fiscal year of a firm is not the calendar year, we estimate the 
year-end value of total assets as a time-weighted average of the total assets in the previous and following 
fiscal year.  
 
14
A control agreement implies that the firm is effectively controlled by a parent company. For a more 
detailed discussion see Andres et al. (2009).  
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accounting standards that were applied. In a robustness check, we exclude the first firm-
year after a change in accounting standards.
15
 The results are similar and are thus omitted.  
Information on balance sheet items, items from the income statement and dividends were 
collected from Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. This is a yearly publication that provides 
detailed information (e.g., ownership structure, board composition, financial report 
information) on German listed firms. Values denominated in Deutsche Mark were 
converted to Euros at the official conversion rate.
16
 
The dividend information we collect contains the nominal value and the tax credit (under 
the imputation system in effect until 2001) as well as any special designated dividend. We 
further obtain information on the number of shares outstanding. If a firm has several classes 
of shares (typically common shares and non-voting preferred shares) we calculate the total 
dividend payout. All values are adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends and changes in the 
dedicated capital (e.g. due to seasoned equity issues).  
We further collect data on stock repurchases for the period 1998-2008. As outlined in 
Section 4.2, the initiation of a repurchase has to be publicly announced. Subsequently, the 
actual amount of repurchases has to be published in the annual report. We use this 
information to infer the amount of repurchases in each fiscal year.  
German firms typically pay the annual dividend in the second quarter of the fiscal year. 
These dividends, however, are paid out of earnings of the previous year. Therefore, we link 
each dividend payment to the fiscal year preceding the year in which the dividend was paid. 
Thus, as an example, we link the dividend paid in 2004 to earnings in 2003.  
Matters are more complicated for repurchases. For example, repurchases occurring early in 
2004 are likely to be related to 2003 earnings, while repurchases later in the year may well 
be made in response to interim earnings figures for 2004. In our baseline specification we 
treat repurchases like dividends, i.e. repurchases made in 2004 are linked to earnings for 
2003. As a robustness check, we implement an alternative specification. We link 
                                                 
 
15
In the first year after a change in accounting standards, first-differenced earnings figures are calculated 
from two financial reports prepared according to different rules. The results of the robustness checks to Table 
4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. They are given in Table C.1, C.6, C.11, 
C.15 and C.21 in the appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
 
16
The official conversion rate of 1998 is 1.95583 Deutsche Mark per Euro. 
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repurchases to the earnings of the year in which the repurchase occurs (i.e. repurchases 
made in 2004 are linked to 2004 earnings).
17
  
4.4.2  Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for per-share earnings, total payouts and regular 
dividends. Total payout is the sum of regular dividends (including the tax credit until 
2001), special dividends (also including the tax credit when applicable) and repurchases 
(from 1998 onwards).  
On average, firms pay out about two thirds of their earnings. Regular dividends on average 
account for 51.8% of earnings. Total payouts are almost as volatile as earnings (coefficient 
of variation 4.86 as compared to 5.43). Regular dividends, on the other hand, are much less 
volatile. Their coefficient of variation is 2.77, about half the corresponding value for 
earnings. These results are consistent with the stylized fact that "regular dividends are what 
is smoothed, and not total payouts" (DeAngelo et al., 2008, p. 158). The finding that total 
payouts are much more volatile than dividends is inconsistent with the substitutes 
hypothesis. If dividends and repurchases were indeed close substitutes there would be no 
reason to smooth dividends but not total payouts.  
Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
 
 Earnings Total payout Dividends 
Mean 15 .35 10 .13 7 .95 
Standard deviation 83 .34 43 .08 21 .98 
Coefficient of variation 5 .43 4 .86 2 .77 
Median 5 .03 3 .99 3 .91 
Maximum 2,278 .00 1,566 .00 399 .42 
Minimum -1,078 .43 0 .00 0 .00 
Observations 4,363 4,342 4,363 
This table provides summary statistics for dividends, total payout and earnings in Euros per share. Total 
payout is defined as the sum of regular (gross) dividends, special dividends, and stock repurchases. The 
sample consists of 4,363 firm-year observations over the sample period from 1988 to 2008. Since we do not 
have information on special dividends for 21 firm-year observations, the number of observations for total 
payout is reduced accordingly. 
                                                 
 
17
The results of the robustness checks to Table 4.4, 4.5 and 4.8 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
They are given in Table C.2, C.7 and C.22 in the appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
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Table 4.2 shows the evolution of dividend payout ratios, special dividend payout ratios, 
repurchase ratios, and total payout ratios over time. The payout ratios are also displayed in 
Figure 4.1. Dividend ratios appear to decrease over time. In particular, the average ratio for 
the pre-repurchase period 1988-1997 is 56.4% while the corresponding value for the 
repurchase period 1998-2008 is only 44.2%. It is also noteworthy that (contrary to 
hypothesis H4.2) dividend payout ratios do not decrease after the 2001 tax reform.  
The total payout ratios, on the other hand, change only slightly, from 57.7% to 53.7%. 
These shifts are consistent with dividends being substituted by repurchases. Interestingly, 
though, the special dividend ratio does not decrease but rather increases, from 1.3% to 
1.5%. This is consistent with DeAngelo et al. (2000) but clearly inconsistent with our 
hypothesis H4.5.  
Figure 4.1: Composition of total payout  
 
 Total payout ratio   Repurchase payout ratio 
 Dividend payout ratio   Special dividends payout ratio 
This figure depicts the composition of total payout over the sample period from 1988-2008. All ratios are 
based on gross payouts relative to earnings. 
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Table 4.2: Aggregate payout ratios  
 
 Year Observations 
 
∑iDIV/ 
∑iEARN 
∑iSPECIAL/ 
∑iEARN 
∑iREP/ 
∑iEARN 
∑iTP/ 
∑iEARN 
 
 1988   147 70.34% 1.73% - 72.07%  
 1989   158 65.42% 0.36% - 65.78%  
 1990   164 51.16% 1.15% - 52.31%  
 1991   170 68.97% 1.11% - 70.08%  
 1992   136 35.08% 0.12% - 35.20%  
 1993   149 73.89% 0.87% - 74.76%  
 1994   151 70.89% 3.66% - 74.55%  
 1995   170 61.22% 1.57% - 62.79%  
 1996   164 55.33% 0.51% - 55.84%  
 1997   155 55.48% 3.16% - 58.64%  
 1998   181 62.44% 0.50% 0. 02% 62.96%  
 1999   193 58.91% 1.04% 2. 51% 62.46%  
 2000   227 39.95% 0.63% 17. 15% 57.73%  
 2001   224 39.09% 4.24% 9. 05% 52.39%  
 2002   179 39.90% 1.69% 1. 64% 43.24%  
 2003   169 45.04% 1.98% 2. 43% 49.44%  
 2004   157 47.47% 0.26% 6. 81% 54.53%  
 2005   182 46.21% 0.55% 4. 62% 51.38%  
 2006   184 49.27% 0.41% 5. 06% 54.74%  
 2007   192 43.06% 1.15% 6. 71% 50.92%  
 2008   179 36.90% 2.33% 16. 56% 55.79%  
 1988-1997 1 ,417 56.43% 1.31% - 57.74%  
 1998-2008 2 ,067 44.24% 1.53% 7. 90% 53.67%  
 1988-2008 3 ,484 47.12% 1.49% 6. 16% 54.77%  
This table provides annual information on payout ratios. The data consist of all firm-year observations with 
positive earnings (therefore, the number of observations is lower than in Table 4.1). Yearly payout ratios are 
obtained by relating aggregate payouts (dividends and/or repurchases) to aggregate earnings ∑iEARN. ∑iDIV 
is the aggregate dividend payout per year expressed in millions of Euros. Accordingly, ∑iSPECIAL is defined 
as the aggregate payout of special dividends, ∑iREP is the aggregate repurchase volume, and ∑iTP is the sum 
of the three aforementioned items. We dropped two special dividends from the sample. Heidelberg 
Druckmaschinen AG paid a special dividend of 27.71 € in 1997. Altana AG paid a special dividend of 33.50 € 
in 2007. This corresponds to a special payout volume of 2,833 Mio. € and 4,732 Mio. €, corresponding to 
77.54% and 61.98% of the pre-dividend market value of equity, respectively. We additionally report average 
payout ratios for the overall sample period (1988-2008), the period before the introduction of stock 
repurchases (1998-1997), and the period thereafter (1998-2008). 
Stock repurchases are much less important in Germany than they are in the U.S. The 
highest repurchase ratio is 17.2%, observed in 2000. Repurchase ratios are much lower than 
dividend ratios in each single year. The low repurchase ratios might be explained by the 
fact that repurchases were prohibited before 1998 and firms only slowly adopted this 
additional method of payout. Note, though, that the fact that the largest repurchase ratio in 
our sample is observed already in 2000 casts doubt on that explanation. An alternative 
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explanation of the low repurchase ratios rests on the restrictive regulation which requires 
advance approval by the shareholders meeting and limits each individual repurchase 
program to no more than 10% of the shares outstanding.  
Table 4.3 shows the fraction of firms that increased, decreased, or held constant their 
dividend and total payout, respectively. As the figures for dividends and total payouts are 
almost identical we concentrate on the former. Dividends are unchanged in more than 35% 
of the cases. We observe much more increases (about 40%) than decreases and omissions 
(together 28.3%). This pattern is consistent with managers being reluctant to cut dividends 
(and total payouts). A similar asymmetry between increases and decreases has also been 
reported for the U.S. (e.g. Jagannathan et al., 2000; Skinner, 2008) and for Germany 
(Andres et al., 2009).  
As argued above, we expect the fraction of firms that do not distribute earnings to 
shareholders to decrease after the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We therefore 
divide our sample firms into two groups, those that pay dividends in a particular year and 
those that do not. The latter group is further decomposed into two subgroups, firms that pay 
no dividend in a particular year but have paid a dividend in earlier years, and firms that 
never paid a dividend. The fraction of sample firms in these four groups is depicted in 
Figure 4.2.  
The fraction of dividend-paying firms decreased steadily until about 2003 and then started 
to rebound. It is noteworthy that the fraction of dividend-paying firms did not decrease in 
1998 when repurchases were introduced; if anything, it increased. The fraction of non-
paying firms is the complement of the fraction of paying firms and is thus not interesting in 
itself. What is interesting, though, is the decomposition into former payers and firms that 
never paid out dividends to shareholders. The fraction of the latter group has been close to 
zero until 1997. It started to increase in 1998 and then reached a plateau in 2001 where it 
stayed for several years. Since 2005 we observe a slight decline.  
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Table 4.3: Type of payout change 
 
 Dividends Total payout 
Year Increase Maintain  Decrease Omit Increase Maintain Decrease Omit 
1988 45 77 24 4 38 65 22 4 
1989 65 72 19 3 67 70 19 3 
1990 76 65 19 3 76 65 19 3 
1991 72 58 40 10 76 58 36 10 
1992 53 53 48 19 53 52 49 19 
1993 40 71 39 11 42 70 38 11 
1994 67 32 83 15 67 31 84 15 
1995 87 63 35 5 83 62 40 5 
1996 80 58 47 19 74 58 53 19 
1997 72 61 52 16 73 60 52 14 
1998 97 62 28 6 94 63 30 6 
1999 82 82 39 6 81 79 43 6 
2000 86 54 66 8 92 50 64 7 
2001 130 48 61 8 124 47 68 7 
2002 67 58 108 25 66 56 111 25 
2003 61 113 55 23 62 108 59 23 
2004 115 70 36 17 109 66 46 19 
2005 86 73 58 8 90 67 60 9 
2006 107 97 16 6 102 92 26 8 
2007 100 98 23 11 106 82 33 10 
2008 108 91 19 11 115 73 30 12 
1988-1997 657 
(39.3%) 
610 
(36.5%) 
406 
(24.3%) 
105 
(6.3%) 
649 
(39.3%) 
591 
(35.8%) 
412 
(24.9%) 
103 
(6.2%) 
1998-2008 1,039 
(43.4%) 
  846 
(35.3%) 
509 
(21.3%) 
129 
(5.4%) 
1,041 
(43.5%) 
783 
(32.7%) 
570 
(23.8%) 
132 
(5.5%) 
1988-2008 1,696 
(41.7%) 
1,456 
(35.8%) 
915 
(22.5%) 
234 
(5.8%) 
1,690 
(41.8%) 
1,374 
(34.0%) 
982 
(24.3%) 
235 
(5.8%) 
This table shows the type and number of payout changes for each year of our sample. A firm can increase, 
decrease or maintain its payout relative to the previous year. In case of a decrease, a firm can either reduce or 
omit payouts. Total payout is defined as the sum of regular (gross) dividends, special dividends, and stock 
repurchases. 
The increase in the fraction of firms that never paid out dividends coincides with the 
introduction of repurchases in 1998 and with the hot IPO market at the end of the 1990s. 
Thus, the newly listed firms either use repurchases to disburse cash to their shareholders, or 
they do not disburse cash at all. We find that the latter is the dominant case. Most of the 
firms that never paid dividends (287 firm-year observations in the 1998-2008 period) do 
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not repurchase shares either. Our data set only contains 35 firm-year observations (12.2%) 
in which a firm that never paid a dividend repurchases shares.  
Figure 4.2: Percentage of sample firms in different dividend groups 
 
 
 Payers  Non-payers  Former payers  Never paid 
This figure depicts the distribution of the different dividend groups. A firm-year observation is defined as 
‘payer’ if a firm pays a regular dividend in the relevant year. Otherwise, the observation is defined as ‘non-
payer’. For each non-payer we additionally track the whole history of dividend payments. If a company has 
never paid a regular dividend since its IPO, we define this firm-year observation as ‘never paid’. A ‘former 
payer’ is defined as a firm that is currently not paying a regular dividend, but did so in at least one firm-year 
after going public. 
4.5 Methodology and results 
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section already give some indication 
about the validity of our hypotheses. To draw further conclusions, we run a set of 
multivariate regressions that are derived from Lintner’s (1956) model of dividend payouts. 
In the following, we explain in detail how the original model is adapted to test changes in 
the payout policy of our sample firms. 
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4.5.1  Model specifications 
The starting point of our analysis is the Lintner (1956) model in its simplest form
18
  
                                      (4.1) 
                                                                                             (4.2) 
where  is a constant, ci is the speed of adjustment coefficient, Pi,t are after-tax earnings, 
Di,t are dividend payments, ΔDi,t is the change in dividend payments, Di,t
* 
are the desired 
dividend payments and
 
ri is the target payout ratio for firm i. Equation (4.1) models partial 
adjustment towards the desired level of dividends Di,t
*, provided that 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1. The two 
polar cases correspond to complete adjustment (ci=1) and no adjustment (ci=0) towards the 
desired payout level.  
Substitution of (4.2) into (4.1) yields 
                                            (4.3) 
where  and . It is common to assume that the target payout ratio and the 
speed of adjustment coefficient are constant across firms (Andres et al., 2009; Fama, 1974; 
Skinner, 2008). Adding year-fixed effects (YEARt)
19
 and firm-fixed effects (i, to capture 
firm-specific heterogeneity) yields the baseline specification  
                                    (4.4) 
This specification considers (regular) dividends only. Denoting special dividends by Si,t and 
repurchases by Ri,t we obtain a model based on total payouts  
           (4.5) 
Under the substitute hypothesis model (4.5) is a reasonable specification.  
                                                 
 
18
We also estimate a model in which we additionally include lagged earnings as suggested by Fama and 
Babiak (1968). The results remain qualitatively unchanged. The results of the robustness checks to Table 4.4, 
4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are given in Table C.3, C.8, C.13, C.16 and C.23 in the appendix of this chapter, 
respectively. 
 
19
We re-estimated all models without the year-fixed effects. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
The results of the robustness checks to Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are given in Table C.4, C.9, C.12, C.17 
and C.24 in the appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 4.1 states that the introduction of repurchases in 1998 does not affect the 
parameters of a Lintner model of total payouts. To test this hypothesis we define a dummy 
variable which is set to 0 before 1998 and set to 1 from 1998 onwards. This dummy 
variable is interacted with the independent variables of the total payout model (4.5). The 
coefficient estimates allow us to test whether the target total payout ratio and/or the speed 
of adjustment changed after the introduction of repurchases in 1998.  
Hypothesis 4.2 states that the 2001 tax reform should result in a reduction of dividend 
payout ratios. To test this hypothesis we augment our baseline model (the dividends-only 
model (4.4)) with a dummy variable which is set to 0 before the tax reform and set to 1 
thereafter. The dummy variable is interacted with the independent variables. The 
coefficient estimates allow us to test whether the target dividend payout ratio and/or the 
speed of adjustment changed after the tax reform.  
The flexibility hypothesis (our hypothesis 4.3) states that dividends are paid out of 
permanent earnings while repurchases (and special dividends) are paid out of transitory 
earnings. Model (4.5) is then an inappropriate specification because it does not differentiate 
between the two components of earnings.  
Testing the flexibility hypothesis requires decomposing earnings into a permanent and a 
transitory component. We use the following simple procedure. We define permanent 
earnings  to be the three-year moving average of earnings.
20
 Transitory earnings
 is defined to be the deviation between total and permanent earnings.  
As a robustness check we implement two alternative specifications. First, we use a five-
year moving average instead of a three-year moving average.
21
 Second, we estimate an 
AR(1)-model for each firm. The predicted values are then interpreted as the permanent 
                                                 
 
20
Our choice of three-year moving averages is inspired by the definition of cash flow shocks in Guay and 
Hartford (2000). They consider shocks in cash-flows as the average of cash-flows in years t=0 and t=-1 and 
measure the permanence in cash flow shocks as the difference between a three-year post-shock cash-flows 
period (t=1, t=2 and t=3) and a three-year pre-shock cash-flows period (t=-4, t=-3 and t=-2). 
 
21
The results of the robustness checks to Table 4.7 and 4.8 are given in Table C.18 and C.25 in the 
appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
 
i,tPermP
i,tTransP
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component of earnings while the residual is interpreted as the transitory component.
22
 The 
results for these alternative specifications are similar to those shown in Table 4.7 and 4.8.  
We estimate the following model  
                      (4.6) 
If dividend changes reflect changes in permanent earnings the coefficient k in equation 
(4.6) should, according to hypothesis 4.3, be zero. Moreover, firms could not use 
repurchases to disburse temporary earnings prior to 1998. Consequently, there may be a 
structural break in 1998. We address this issue by including a shift variable (and 
corresponding interaction terms) that measure differences between the period prior to 1998 
and the period from 1998 onwards.  
Under the flexibility hypothesis positive transitory earnings are expected to result in 
repurchases or special dividends. To test this hypothesis we define the variable  
which equals the transitory earnings as defined above when they are positive, and which 
equals zero when the transitory earnings are negative. We then estimate the following 
model based on repurchases and special dividends  
          (4.7) 
We expect k to be positive and b to be zero.  
4.5.2  Estimation methods 
The models we estimate are dynamic panel data models with a relatively short time series 
(T=21) and a relatively large number of firms (N=424).
23
 It is well known that in this case 
the OLS estimator yields upward-biased estimates of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. The within-group estimator (WG) (which is obtained by subtracting the 
firm-specific mean from all observations), on the other hand, yields downward-biased 
                                                 
 
22
The results of the robustness checks to Table 4.7 and 4.8 are given in Table C.19 and C.26 in the 
appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
 
23
T=21 is the maximum number of firm-years for an individual firm. As our dataset is an unbalanced 
panel, the average number of firm-years is much smaller and amounts to 11 years. Similarly, the average 
number of firm observations per year amounts to 208 and is thus smaller than the number of different firms in 
our sample.  
i,t i,t i,t i,t 1 t i i,tD bPermP kTransP dD YEAR     
i,tTransP

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estimates (e.g. Bond, 2002; Nickel, 1981). Consistent estimates can be obtained by GMM. 
We therefore implement the GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) estimator (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). It simultaneously estimates the equation in first differences with lagged levels 
as instruments and the equation in levels with lagged first differences as instruments.  
When implementing the GMM (SYS) estimator we apply Roodman's (2009) rule of thumb. 
It states that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of cross-sectional 
units (firms in our case). We impose this restriction and then choose the instrument matrix 
with the highest p-value for the Hansen-test of overidentifying restrictions.  
Besides the GMM estimator we also report the OLS and WG estimators. The coefficient on 
lagged payout obtained when using the GMM (SYS) estimator should lie in between the 
estimators obtained from the OLS and the WG estimators.  
4.5.3  Results 
For all model specifications, we report estimates based on OLS, alongside with within-
group (WG) and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) estimators. We start the analysis by 
estimating Lintner's (1956) original specification as a benchmark model. Columns (1) to (3) 
of Table 4.4 contain the coefficient estimates of this baseline specification (equation 4.4). 
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable vary between 0.67 (WG) and 0.80 
(OLS), with a GMM (SYS) coefficient estimate (0.68) that is much closer to the within-
groups estimator. These results confirm the prediction of an upward bias in OLS. The 
parameter estimates result in a speed of adjustment in the range of [0.20, 0.34], which is 
roughly in line with other studies on German data (Andres et al., 2009; Behm and 
Zimmermann, 1993). The estimated target payout ratio (b/(1-d)) varies between 0.23 (WG) 
and 0.48 (GMM (SYS)). Accordingly, estimates obtained via OLS and GMM (SYS) are 
very close to the average dividend payout ratio over the full sample period (46.6%, as 
documented in Table 4.2).  
Not surprisingly, the estimates of the target payout ratio are higher for the full payout 
model (columns (4) – (6)). These estimates are based on model specification (4.5), where 
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(regular) dividends, special dividends and repurchases are added up to total payout. Again, 
the results of the GMM (SYS) estimation (52.5%) are very close to the average total payout 
ratio (55.8%). Compared to the estimates in columns (1) – (3), the target payout ratio is 
only slightly higher, though. This points to the importance of dividends as the main form of 
payout for German firms. When comparing the speed of adjustment, the total payout model 
yields substantially higher estimates than the dividends-only model. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis 4.4 and indicates that (regular) dividends are indeed more sticky 
than total payouts.  
Table 4.4: Classical Lintner model & total payout model 
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.111 1.675 * -0.168 * 2.937 *** 1.955  7.404 
 (1.41) (1.82) (-0.17) (2.54) (1.05)  (1.60) 
Di,t-1 0.802 *** 0.666 *** 0.681 ***       
 (6.89) (6.16) (5.95)       
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1       0.252 0.139  0.183 
    (1.33) (0.96)  (1.32) 
Pi,t 0.083 ** 0.078 ** 0.154 *** 0.339 *** 0.320 ** 0.429 *** 
 (2.14) (2.11) (2.79) (2.68) (2.40) (4.10) 
m1     -2.59     -1.98 
m2     -1.08     -1.30 
Hansen (d.f)     334.22     339.90 
   (316)   (313) 
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio 0.419 0.234 0.483 0.453 0.372 0.525 
Speed of adjustment 0.198 0.334 0.319 0.748 0.861 0.817 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of 
adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target 
ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment.  
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The models discussed thus far implicitly assume that the target payout ratios and the speed 
of adjustment are constant throughout the sample period. However, with the introduction of 
stock repurchases, (regular) dividends may have lost in importance. Our descriptive results 
in Table 4.2 indeed show a decrease in the average dividend payout ratio from 56.4% to 
44.1%.  
Therefore we now turn to a model specification that allows for a structural break in 1998. 
The results are shown in Table 4.5. We first consider the dividends-only model (columns 
(1) – (3) in Table 4.5). As expected, we find a negative and highly significant (at the 5% 
level or better) change in the target dividend payout ratio. Before 1998, the estimated target 
payout ratio varies between 0.48 and 0.70 and drops significantly once stock repurchases 
became legal (range between [0.19, 0.47]). Estimates for the speed of adjustment are also 
lower for the period after 1997. This implies that dividend payouts became even more 
sticky once repurchases were allowed. A possible explanation for this finding is that firms, 
to a certain extent, used dividends to disburse transitory earnings prior to 1998 but ceased 
to do so once repurchases were allowed.  
Columns (4) – (6) of Table 4.5 report the estimates for the total-payout model.24 The results 
show a substantial decrease in the estimated target total payout ratio (from 0.79 to 0.49) and 
a strong increase in the speed of adjustment (from 0.51 to 0.89, all figures relate to the 
GMM (SYS) estimation) after 1997. These results are inconsistent with the substitutes 
hypothesis (H4.1). They rather imply that dividends and repurchases are not perfect 
substitutes. Stock repurchases (and potentially also special dividends) allow for a faster 
adjustment to temporary changes in earnings, which is reflected in the faster speed of 
adjustment during the second half of the sample period.  
                                                 
 
24
There are 53 cases in which a firm announces that it repurchases shares in order to use the shares as a 
means of payment in future acquisitions ("acquisition currency"). When we eliminate the corresponding 53 
firm-year observations we obtain results that are similar to those presented in Table 4.4-4.8. The results of the 
robustness checks to Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are given in Table C.5, C.10, C.14, C.20 and C.27 in the 
appendix of this chapter, respectively. 
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Table 4.5: The introduction of stock repurchases 
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.102 1.048 0.423 1.276 -0.075 8.807 *** 
 (1.50) (0.96) (0.42) (1.02) (-0.04) (2.13) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.669 *** 0.613 *** 0.608 ***       
 
(16.77) (27.30) (47.44)       
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.886 ***,
++
 0.735 *** 0.768 ***       
 (2.26) (0.91) (1.14)     
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97)       0.577 *** 0.476 *** 0.494 *** 
      (15.10)  (4.49) (9.11) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08)       0.179 
++ 
0.080 
++ 
0.117 
+++ 
    (-2.30) (-2.25) (-3.07) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.188 *** 0.274 *** 0.284 *** 0.274 *** 0.397 *** 
 (3.23) (2.93) (25.65) (3.24) (3.05) (43.90) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.054 **,
++
 0.051 **,
++
 0.107 ***,
+++
 0.346 ** 0.329 ** 0.431 *** 
 (-2.56) (-2.26) (-4.04) (0.38) (0.33) (0.28) 
m1     -2.74                     -1.98 
m2     -0.37                     -1.23 
Hansen (d.f)     330.67                     339.87 
   (307)     (313) 
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.592  0.486  0.699  0.671  0.523  0.785  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.474  0.192  0.461  0.421  0.358  0.488  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.331  0.387  0.392  0.423  0.524  0.506  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.114  0.265  0.232  0.821  0.920  0.883  
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with 
dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with total 
payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower for 
models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to 
the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per 
share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient 
for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated 
coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We 
report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) 
parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period parameter and the shift term is statistically 
different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; 
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic 
is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). 
The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are 
tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. 
The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in 
the respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the 
respective period.  
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When comparing the dividends-only model (columns (1)-(3)) to the total payout model 
(columns (4)-(6)), we find that (as in Table 4.4) the total payout model yields higher 
estimates of the speed of adjustment as compared to the dividends-only model. This adds to 
the evidence in support of hypothesis 4.4. In sum, the findings in Table 4.5 indicate that 
dividends and repurchases are not considered as (perfect) substitutes by German firms.  
As pointed out in Section 4.2 a change in taxation in 2001 made repurchases relatively 
more desirable for the vast majority of investors. We therefore expect that target dividend 
payout ratios decrease after 2001 (hypothesis 4.2). To test this hypothesis we extend the 
dividends-only model of Table 4.5 to allow for a tax-induced structural break in 2002 in 
addition to the structural break in 1998. The results are shown in Table 4.6. The coefficient 
estimates show substantial variation across sub-periods. We find payouts in later years to be 
much more rigid, as evidenced by a significantly lower speed of adjustment after 2001. The 
estimates of the target payout ratio are not within an economically meaningful range. The 
GMM-in-systems estimator implies a target payout ratio above 100%. Because the model 
specification with two structural breaks yields implausible results (possibly because the 
second sub-period is very short) we abstain from modeling two structural breaks in our 
further analysis and rather focus on the main structural break in 1998.  
To gain further insight into the impact of the tax reform on payout decisions we re-estimate 
the model for the first sub-period (1988-97) and the last sub-period (2002-08) separately. 
The results are also shown in Table 4.6 (specification (4.4) and (4.5)). The target dividend 
payout ratio is 0.62 in 1988-97 and 0.72 in 2002-08. Thus both the joint estimation and the 
separate estimations for the sub-periods yield results which are inconsistent with H4.2. This 
hypothesis predicts lower target dividend payout ratios after the tax reform. Our results thus 
imply that tax considerations do not seem to be a (first order) determinant of the payout 
policy of German firms. This corroborates evidence reported in Andres et al. (2012).  
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Table 4.6: The tax reform 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.092 1.129 -0.550 0.221 -2.830 *** 
 (1.49) (1.03) (-0.63) (0.55) (-2.60) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.671 *** 0.580 *** 0.582 *** 0.538 ***   
 
(16.52) (28.81) (43.20)  (30.20)    
Di,t-1 (98-01) 0.484 *** 0.299 **,
+
 0.322 ***,
+ 
    
 (-1.35) (-1.90) (-1.80)     
Di,t-1 (02-08) 1.008 ***,
+++
 0.859 ***,
++
 0.941 **,
+++ 
  0.880 *** 
 (3.73) (2.88) (3.43)   (7.78)  
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.180 *** 0.280 *** 0.288 ***   
 (3.23) (2.85) (31.47) (44.30)   
Pi,t (98-01) 0.041 
++ 
0.033 
+++ 
0.250 ***  
 
 
 
 (-2.49) (-2.34) (-0.37)   
Pi,t (02-08) 0.048 **,
++ 
0.044 **,
++
 0.078 **,
+++ 
  0.086 ** 
 (-2.35) (-2.01) (-6.00)  (2.30) 
m1     -2.77 -1.67  -1.47  
m2     -1.02 -1.04  -0.93  
Hansen (d.f)     308.57 105.87  118.73  
   (232) (90)  (77)  
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 1,648 1,494 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.596  0.429  0.607  0.623    
Target ratio (98-01) 0.079  0.047  0.381      
Target ratio (02-08) -6.000  0.312  1.322    0.717  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.329  0.420  0.418  0.462    
Speed of adj. (98-01) 0.516  0.701  0.678      
Speed of adj. (02-08) -0.008  0.141  0.059    0.120  
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 
represents dividends per share paid out in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the 
fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** 
denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for 
the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the 
period from 1998 to 2001 and the period from 2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-
1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the 
shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the 
t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift 
parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is 
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null 
of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies 
and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one 
minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided 
by the speed of adjustment in the respective period.  
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The analysis thus far showed that the speed of adjustment is generally higher in a total 
payout model than in a dividends-only model. This is consistent with the flexibility 
hypothesis of Jagannathan et al. (2000). It predicts that changes in dividends are related to 
changes in permanent earnings but are unrelated to changes in temporary earnings. We now 
turn to a direct test of this hypothesis (our H4.3). As described above, we decompose 
earnings into a permanent and a transitory component (see model (4.6) above). The model 
is estimated for dividends only and allows for a structural break in 1998.  
The results are shown in Table 4.7. During the first half of the sample period, the 
coefficients of both permanent and transitory earnings are positive and highly statistically 
significant. The estimated target payout ratios are only slightly lower for transitory earnings 
than for permanent earnings. This implies that, prior to the introduction of repurchases, 
firms used regular dividends to disburse transitory earnings.  
With the introduction of stock repurchases this picture changes. We observe a statistically 
significant structural break for both earnings components. While the target payout ratio for 
permanent earnings decreases moderately and insignificantly (from 0.68 to 0.51 for the 
GMM (SYS) estimation), we observe a substantial and significant (at the1% level) decrease 
for temporary earnings, from 0.66 to 0.26 (GMM (SYS)). Thus, in the period after 1997, 
the reaction of dividend payouts to changes in transitory earnings is much weaker than in 
the pre-1998 period. In addition, the speed of adjustment decreases after 1997. Both results 
are consistent with the flexibility hypothesis (H4.3). Since the introduction of stock 
repurchases in 1998 firms are equipped with a more flexible method to disburse transitory 
earnings and thus do no longer use regular dividends for this purpose.  
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Table 4.7: Financial flexibility: Dividends 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.592 0.668 -0.041 
 (1.17) (0.83) (-0.04) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.643 *** 0.567 *** 0.589 *** 
 
(11.58) (21.94) (20.60) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.793 *** 0.603 *** 0.673 *** 
 (1.30) (0.25) (0.59) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.206 *** 0.218 *** 0.279 *** 
 (2.98) (2.96) (10.30) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.112 **,
+
 0.131 ** 0.168 ***,
+++
 
 (-1.84) (-1.55) (-3.13) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.194 *** 0.182 *** 0.273 *** 
 (3.30) (2.86) (75.16) 
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.013 
+++ 
0.006 
+++ 
0.085 **,
+++
 
 (-2.67) (-2.40) (-5.07) 
m1     -2.99 
m2     -0.41 
Hansen (d.f)     337.28 
   (315) 
Observations 3,581 3,581 3,581 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.577  0.503  0.679  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.541  0.330  0.514  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.543  0.420  0.664  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.063  0.015  0.260  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.357  0.433  0.411  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.207  0.397  0.327  
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year, PermPi,t represents the three year moving average of after-
tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. TransPi,t is equal to the difference between after tax 
earnings per share and PermPi,t. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value 
of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We 
introduce a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the 
coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift 
term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically 
different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; 
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-
statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic 
is negative). The superscripts +, +++ denote significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics 
m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k 
degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a 
change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-
1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the 
respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
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By definition, our measure of the transitory component of earnings can be negative. The 
flexibility hypothesis, however, implies that only positive deviations in earnings (i.e. 
positive transitory earnings) result in (temporary) payouts. We therefore run additional 
regressions in which only positive transitory earnings are considered to explain changes in 
special dividends and repurchases.  
Table 4.8 contains the results of this specification (model (4.7)). As expected, we find the 
speed of adjustment to be very high. This lends further support to the notion that special 
dividends and repurchases are used as very flexible means of payouts. In fact, the estimated 
speed of adjustment further increases with the introduction of stock repurchases. 
Surprisingly, the permanent earnings component has a significant and positive impact on 
special dividends before 1998. The coefficient for positive transitory earnings is also 
positive (and partly significant), but consistently lower in magnitude. This implies that 
special dividends were partly used to pay out permanent earnings. For the second half of 
the sample period, though, special dividends and stock repurchases are not influenced by 
the permanent component of earnings. Accordingly, the estimated target payout ratio of 
permanent earnings falls to almost zero (for GMM (SYS)). On the other hand, the target 
payout ratio for the (positive) transitory component of earnings increases strongly and 
significantly (at the 10% level), from 0.09 to 0.61 (GMM (SYS)). This can again be 
interpreted as evidence in favor of the flexibility hypothesis. 
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                Table 4.8: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.350 ** -2.605 ** 2.740 
 (-2.43) (-2.36) (0.52) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.167 ** 0.074 0.157 
 (2.43) (0.66) (2.11) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.034 
+++ 
-0.083 -0.038 
+++ 
 (-3.12) (-1.47) (-2.61) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.140 *** 0.195 *** 0.142 *** 
 (4.40) (3.87) (5.36) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.124 0.143 0.009 
 (-0.18) (-0.58) (-0.12) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.060 ** 0.060 0.073 *** 
 (2.21) (1.33) (7.54) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.407 0.444 0.634 *,
+
 
 (1.18) (1.21) (1.71) 
m1     -1.37 
m2     -1.63 
Hansen (d.f)     296.22 
   (177) 
Observations 3,353 3,353 3,553 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.168  0.211  0.168  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.120  0.132  0.009  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.072  0.065  0.087  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.394  0.410  0.611  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.833  0.926  0.843  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.034  1.083  1.038  
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermPi,t represents the three year 
moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. Positive TransPi,t is equal to 
the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and zero. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, +++ denote significance 
at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment 
is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) 
equals the coefficient for PermPi,,t (Positive TransPi,,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of 
adjustment in the respective period. 
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4.6  Conclusion 
The Lintner (1956) model, the workhorse of empirical research on corporate payout policy, 
is usually applied to dividend payouts. Against the background of the strong increase in 
repurchases this is not necessarily appropriate, though. We argue that a comparison of 
Lintner models of dividend payout and total payout can yield insights into the drivers of the 
payout decision. In particular it allows us to discriminate among alternative theories of 
corporate payout, namely, the substitutes hypothesis, tax-based explanations, and the 
flexibility hypothesis. These theories make specific predictions about the target payout 
ratios and speed of adjustment coefficients in Lintner models of dividend payout and total 
payout. 
A distinguishing feature of our dataset is that it spans the introduction of stock repurchases 
in Germany in 1998 as well as a tax reform in 2001. This allows us to analyze how these 
events affected payout policy. We find that the introduction of repurchases in 1998 has 
materially affected the payout policy of German firms. In particular, both dividend and total 
target payout ratios decrease. The speed of adjustment for dividend payout decreases while 
the speed of adjustment for total payout increases. This is inconsistent with the substitutes 
hypothesis which predicts that the introduction of repurchases should not alter total 
payouts. Interestingly, special designated dividends do not lose importance after the 
introduction of repurchases.  
We find no evidence that German firms have changed their payout policy in response to the 
2001 tax reform. This finding, although surprising at first sight, is consistent with previous 
evidence. Andres et al. (2012) document that the tax preferences of the largest shareholder 
have no impact on the dividend payout ratios of German firms.  
Our results provide clear support for Jagannathan et al.'s (2000) financial flexibility 
hypothesis. We find that dividends are more rigid than total payouts. This is consistent with 
the prediction of the flexibility hypothesis that dividends are predominantly paid out of 
permanent earnings. We further document that, after the introduction of repurchases, the 
responsiveness of dividends to changes in transitory earnings is reduced substantially. This 
finding is also supportive of the flexibility hypothesis. 
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C  Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table C.1: Classical Lintner model & total payout model – exclusion of years with a 
change in the accounting standards 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 
(or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of 
adjustment.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.195 1.738 ** 0.886 2.967 *** 2.017 8.480 
 (1.06) (1.88) (0.85) (2.57) (1.06) (1.59) 
Di,t-1 0.789 *** 0.663 *** 0.678 ***       
 (7.09) (6.07) (6.49)       
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1       0.247  0.136  0.149  
    (1.32)  (0.95)  (1.19)  
Pi,t 0.081 *** 0.076 ** 0.129 ** 0.339 *** 0.319 ** 0.412 *** 
 (2.10) (2.07) (2.22) (2.65) (2.38) (3.87) 
m1     -2.39      -1.88 
m2     -0.84     -1.32 
Hansen (d.f)     340.77      341.01  
   (314)   (314) 
Observations 3,757 3,757 3,757 3,706 3,706 3,706 
Target ratio 0.384 0.226 0.401 0.450 0.369 0.484 
Speed of adjustment 0.211 0.337 0.322 0.753 0.864 0.851 
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Table C.2: Total payout model – allocation of repurchases to the earnings of the year in 
which the repurchase occurs 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with total payout as the dependent variable. In contrast to the baseline specification, repurchases are linked to 
the earnings of the year in which the repurchase occurs. The first column shows the independent variables. 
Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per 
share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as 
obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The 
superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and 
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees 
of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change 
in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of 
adjustment.  
 Total payout model 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.887 * 1.174  9.273 
 (1.86) (0.75)  (1.39) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 0.446 *** 0.346 *** 0.525 *** 
 (3.27) (2.78)  (6.44) 
Pi,t 0.315 ** 0.317 ** 0.237 *** 
 (2.36) (2.08) (3.48) 
m1     -3.04 
m2     -0.09 
Hansen (d.f)     334.40 
   (294) 
Observations 3,548 3,548 3,548 
Target ratio 0.569 0.485 0.499 
Speed of adjustment 0.554 0.654 0.475 
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Table C.3: Classical Lintner model & total payout model – inclusion of earnings with lag 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. Pi,t-1 corresponds 
to after-tax earnings per share in the previous year. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is 
the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and 
t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null 
of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies 
and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one 
minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t 
divided by the speed of adjustment.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.638 0.926 0.019 2.938 *** 1.946 7.332 
 (1.21) (1.49) (0.03) (2.58) (1.05)  (1.57) 
Di,t-1 0.826 *** 0.687 *** 0.726 ***       
 (6.65) (6.52) (6.02)       
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1       0.215 0.098 0.175 
    (1.26) (0.74) (1.30) 
Pi,t 0.058 ** 0.055 ** 0.113 *** 0.329 ** 0.313 **  0.426 *** 
 (2.11) (2.13) (2.60) (2.50) (2.32) (3.81) 
Pi,t-1 0.006 0.010 -0.003 0.440 0.053 * 0.012 
 (0.58) (1.08) (-0.32) (1.04) (1.85) (0.32) 
m1     -2.42     -2.01 
m2     -0.85     -1.36 
Hansen (d.f)     337.72     339.49 
   (313)   (312) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 3,953 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio 0.333 0.176 0.412 0.419 0.347 0.516 
Speed of adjustment 0.174 0.313 0.274 0.785 0.902 0.817 
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Table C.4: Classical Lintner model & total payout model – exclusion of year dummies 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target ratio equals the 
coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.852 * 1.942 *** 0.737 3.233 *** 4.452 *** 3.262 *** 
 (1.73) (2.78) (1.51) (3.51) (3.12)  (2.65) 
Di,t-1 0.799 *** 0.665 *** 0.717 ***       
 (6.87) (6.03) (5.81)       
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1       0.254 0.147  0.184 
    (1.35) (1.02)  (1.33) 
Pi,t 0.084 ** 0.080 ** 0.134 ** 0.341 *** 0.325 ** 0.432 *** 
 (2.17) (2.18) (2.38) (2.69) (2.43) (4.07) 
m1     -2.58     -2.01 
m2     -1.03     -1.30 
Hansen (d.f)     338.28     333.83 
   (313)   (313) 
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio 0.201 0.239 0.283 0.457 0.381 0.529 
Speed of adjustment 0.418 0.335 0.473 0.746 0.853 0.816 
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Table C.5: Classical Lintner model & total payout model – exclusion of repurchases as 
acquisition currency 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). Observations in which a firm announces that it 
repurchases shares in order to use the shares as a means of payment in future acquisitions ("acquisition 
currency") are not included. The number of observations is slightly lower for models 4-6 because in some 
cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The 
first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special dividends per share paid 
out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous 
year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the 
average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-
value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, 
with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy 
indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the 
coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively). The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by 
the speed of adjustment.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.133 1.713 * 0.392 2.963 ** 2.003 8.227 
 (1.44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r 
(1.89) (0.38) (2.58) (1.08) (1.51) 
Di,t-1 0.798 *** 0.663 *** 0.716 ***       
 (6.88) (6.17) (5.80)    
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1       0.249 0.139 0.167 
    (1.33) (0.96) (1.27) 
Pi,t 0.083 ** 0.078 ** 0.132 ** 0.338 *** 0.320 ** 0.413 *** 
 (2.14) (2.11) (2.34) (2.68) (2.40) (4.14) 
m1     -2.58     -1.92 
m2     -1.11     -1.42 
Hansen (d.f)     339.45     341.25 
   (313)   (313) 
Observations 3,913 3,913 3,913 3,862 3,862 3,862 
Target ratio 0.411 0.231 0.465 0.450 0.372 0.496 
Speed of adjustment 0.202 0.337 0.284 0.751 0.861 0.833 
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Table C.6: The introduction of stock repurchases – exclusion of years with a change in the 
accounting standards 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance 
at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-
1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in the respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by 
the speed of adjustment in the respective period.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.101 1.132 1.392 1.276 0.029 10.827 ** 
 (1.50) (1.02) (1.24) (1.25) (0.01) (2.23) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.669 *** 0.608 *** 0.608 ***       
 (16.76)  (25.85)  (47.64)        
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.868 ***,
++
 0.735 *** 0.712 ***       
 (2.12) (0.93) (0.69)     
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97)       0.578 *** 0.470 *** 0.496 *** 
         (15.05)    (4.27)    (9.00)  
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08)       0.173 
++ 
0.077 
++ 
0.069 
+++ 
       (-2.41) (-2.18) (-4.49) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.187 *** 0.275 *** 0.284 *** 0.273 *** 0.396 *** 
   (3.23)  (2.90)    (25.73)    (3.54) (3.01) (45.94) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.052 **, 
+++ 
0.049 **, 
++ 
0.109 **,
 +++ 
0.346 ** 0.330 ** 0.396 *** 
 (-2.58) (-2.27) (-3.76) (0.37) (0.33) (0.00) 
m1     -2.66     -1.82 
m2     -0.13       -1.22 
Hansen (d.f)       341.01     340.60 
     (314)      (314)  
Observations 3,757  3,757  3,757 3,706 3,706 3,706 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.592  0.477  0.702  0.673  0.515  0.786  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.394  0.185  0.378  0.418  0.358  0.425  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.331  0.392  0.392  0.422  0.530  0.504  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.132  0.265  0.288  0.827  0.923  0.931  
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Table C.7: The introduction of stock repurchases – allocation of repurchases to the earnings 
of the year in which the repurchase occurs 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with total payout as the dependent variable. In contrast to the baseline specification, repurchases are linked to 
the earnings of the year in which the repurchase occurs. The first column shows the independent variables. 
Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per 
share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as 
obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The 
superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a 
structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the 
period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. 
We test if the sum of the pre-break period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We 
also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the 
coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift 
parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The 
superscript ++ denote significance at the 5% level. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of 
adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in the 
respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the 
respective period.  
 Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.266 0.043 9.919 * 
 (1.23) (0.03) (1.72) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.578 *** 0.513 *** 0.518 *** 
  (14.52)  (7.01)  (11.65)  
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) 0.325 
 
0.201 
 
0.438 *** 
 (-1.19) (-1.63) (-0.53) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.285 *** 0.282 *** 0.392 *** 
 (3.55) (3.24) (37.68) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.336 * 0.340 0.228 ***,
++
 
 (0.26) (0.33) (-2.26) 
m1                     -3.35 
m2                     -0.33 
Hansen (d.f)                     337.78 
     (294) 
Observations 3,548 3,548 3,548 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.675  0.579  0.813  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.498  0.426  0.406  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.422  0.487  0.482  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.675  0.799  0.562  
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Table C.8: The introduction of stock repurchases – inclusion of earnings with lag 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with dividends 
per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with total payout as the dependent 
variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower for models 4-6 because in some cases we were 
unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the 
independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. 
Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. Pi,t-1 
corresponds to after-tax earnings per share in the previous year. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is 
the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a 
structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 
1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-
break period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift 
parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift 
parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-
statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in the respective period. The target ratio 
equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.218 1.189 0.336 1.269 -0.021 8.806 ** 
 (1.51) (1.02) (0.34) (1.21) (-0.01) (2.15) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.689 *** 0.627 *** 0.658 ***       
 (37.81) (11.67) (18.28)       
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.858 *** 0.696 *** 0.754 ***       
 (1.30) (0.40) (0.59)     
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97)       0.581 *** 0.466 *** 0.516 *** 
    (10.80)  (3.16) (6.70) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08)       0.152 
+++ 
0.050 
++ 
0.119 
+++ 
    (-2.87) (-2.21) (-3.21) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.198 *** 0.190 *** 0.283 *** 0.284 *** 0.273 *** 0.398 *** 
 (3.04) (2.75) (20.46) (3.43) (3.01) (45.82) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.051 **,
++
 0.050 **,
++
 0.105 **
,+++
 0.338 ** 0.323 ** 0.421 *** 
 (-2.42) (-2.14) (-4.44) (0.31) (0.28) (0.18) 
Pi,t-1 (88-97) -0.013 -0.007 -0.035 * -0.002 0.027 -0.019 
 (-0.50) (-0.26) (-1.66) (-0.06) (0.82) (-0.98) 
Pi,t-1 (98-08) 0.018 0.024 0.010 
+ 
0.037 0.041 -0.004 
 (0.84) (0.79) (1.65) (0.57) (0.26) (0.28) 
m1     -2.74                     -1.97 
m2     -0.31                     -1.26 
Hansen (d.f)     330.98                     338.12 
   (305)     (305) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 3,953 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.637  0.509  0.827  0.678  0.493  0.822  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.359  0.164  0.427  0.339  0.340  0.478  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.311  0.373  0.342  0.419  0.554  0.484  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.142  0.304  0.246  0.848  0.950  0.811  
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Table C.9: The introduction of stock repurchases – exclusion of year dummies 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The number of observations is slightly lower 
for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in 
addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are 
dividends and special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the 
repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in the respective period. The 
target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.761 *** 1.628 *** 0.284 2.508 *** 3.626 ** 2.347 ** 
 (2.80) (2.94) (0.62) (3.60) (2.38) (2.54) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.672 *** 0.605 *** 0.612 ***       
 (14.52) (21.75) (42.73)       
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.880 ***,
++
 0.740 *** 0.758 ***       
 (2.37) (1.15) (1.09)     
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97)       0.556 *** 0.442 *** 0.476 *** 
      (14.30)  (3.72) (7.35) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08)       0.188 
++ 
0.097 
+ 
0.123 
+++ 
    (-2.12) (-1.83) (-2.71) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.195 *** 0.185 *** 0.272 *** 0.279 *** 0.265 *** 0.387 *** 
 (3.21) (2.89) (19.98) (3.44) (2.88) (28.70) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.055 **,
++
 0.054 **,
++
 0.113 **,
+++
 0.350 ** 0.339 ** 0.438 *** 
 (-2.52) (-2.20) (-3.83) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) 
m1     -2.75                     -1.99 
m2     -0.41                     -1.24 
Hansen (d.f)     328.43                     332.56 
   (313)     (313) 
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,909 3,909 3,909 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.595  0.468  0.701  0.628  0.475  0.739  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.458  0.208  0.467  0.431  0.375  0.499  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.328  0.395  0.388  0.444  0.558  0.524  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.120  0.260  0.242  0.812  0.903  0.877  
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Table C.10: The introduction of stock repurchases – exclusion of repurchases as acquisition 
currency 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition we report the results with 
total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). Observations in which a firm announces that it 
repurchases shares in order to use the shares as a means of payment in future acquisitions ("acquisition 
currency") are not included. The number of observations is slightly lower for models 4-6 because in some 
cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The 
first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 and Si,t-1 are dividends and special dividends per share paid 
out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous 
year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the 
average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-
value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We 
introduce a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the 
coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter 
and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period parameter and the shift term is statistically 
different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; 
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-
statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic 
is negative). The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics 
m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k 
degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a 
change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-
1 (or Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1, respectively) in the respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t 
divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period.  
 Regular dividends Total payout 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.103 1.060 0.656 1.276 -0.039 10.040 ** 
 (1.50) (0.98) (0.55) (1.25) (-0.02) (2.00) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.669 *** 0.614 *** 0.607 ***       
 (16.77) (27.37) (47.77)    
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.871 ***,
++
 0.730 *** 0.750 ***  
 
    
 (2.17) (0.87) (0.98)       
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97)       0.578 *** 0.477 *** 0.496 *** 
    (15.12) (4.54) (9.32) 
Di,t-1+Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08)       0.175 
++ 
0.079 
++ 
0.095 
+++ 
    (-2.37) (-2.28) (-3.69) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.189 *** 0.274 *** 0.284 *** 0.274 *** 0.396 *** 
 (3.23) (2.93) (25.56) (3.54) (3.06) (45.85) 
Pi,t (98-08) 0.054 **,
++
 0.052 **,
++
 0.108 **,
+++
 0.344 ** 0.328 ** 0.407 *** 
 (-2.55) (-2.26) (-3.98) (0.37) (0.32) (0.10) 
m1     -2.75      -1.89  
m2     -0.42      -1.35  
Hansen (d.f)     333.19      340.96  
   (313)   (313) 
Observations 3,913 3,913 3,913 3,862 3,862 3,862 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.592  0.490  0.697  0.673  0.524  0.786  
Target ratio (98-08) 0.419  0.193  0.432  0.417  0.356  0.450  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.331  0.386  0.393  0.422  0.523  0.504  
Speed of adj. (98-08) 0.129  0.270  0.250  0.825  0.921  0.905  
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Table C.11: The tax reform – exclusion of years with a change in the accounting standards 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 
represents dividends per share paid out in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the 
fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account 
for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the 
period from 1998 to 2001 and the period from 2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-
1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the 
shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the 
t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift 
parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is 
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null 
of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year 
dummies. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. 
The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.091 1.217 -0.183 0.183 4.232 
 (1.49) (1.09) (-0.20) (0.30) (1.06) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.671 *** 0.573 *** 0.584 *** 0.537 ***   
 (16.52) (26.57) (44.27) (30.54)  
Di,t-1 (98-01) 0.475 *** 0.296 **, 
+
 0.253 *, 
++
     
 (-1.39) (-1.83) (-2.47)   
Di,t-1 (02-08) 0.990 ***, 
+++
 0.868 ***, 
+++
 0.860 ***, 
++
   0.848 *** 
 (3.53) (3.07) (2.13)  (6.88) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.180 *** 0.280 *** 0.289 ***   
 (3.23) (2.84) (31.33) (41.27)   
Pi,t (98-01) 0.040 
++ 
0.034 
++ 
0.248 ***     
 (-2.51) (-2.31) (-0.58)    
Pi,t (02-08) 0.046 **, 
++
 0.042 **, 
++
 0.081 **,
+++
   0.074 ** 
 (-2.39) (-2.05) (-5.39)  (2.12) 
m1     -2.68 -1.67 -1.81 
m2     -0.73 -1.06 -0.59 
Hansen (d.f)     324.69 100.06 99.50 
   (232) (81) (82) 
Observations 3,757 3,757 3,757 1,648 1,334 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.596 0.422 0.673 0.624   
Target ratio (98-01) 0.076 0.048 0.332     
Target ratio (02-08) 4.600 0.318 0.579   0.487  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.329 0.427 0.416 0.463   
Speed of adj. (98-01) 0.525 0.704 0.747     
Speed of adj. (02-08) 0.010 0.132 0.140   0.152  
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Table C.12: The tax reform – exclusion of year dummies 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 
represents dividends per share paid out in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the 
fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** 
denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for 
the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the 
period from 1998 to 2001 and the period from 2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-
1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the 
shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the 
t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift 
parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is 
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null 
of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include a dummy 
indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the 
coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed 
of adjustment in the respective period.  
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.152 *** 2.230 *** 0.328 0.643 *** -0.332 
 (5.41) (5.13) (0.89) (2.89) (-0.30) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.666 *** 0.562 *** 0.578 *** 0.537 ***   
 (15.77) (22.24) (39.43) (31.42)    
Di,t-1 (98-01) 0.523 *** 0.357 *** 0.331 ***,
+ 
    
 (-1.14) (-1.45) (-1.80)     
Di,t-1 (02-08) 0.998 ***,
+++
 0.860 ***,
+++
 0.931 **,
+++ 
  0.870 *** 
 (3.80) (3.33) (3.41)       (7.61)  
Pi,t (88-97) 0.194 *** 0.177 *** 0.279 *** 0.288 ***   
 (3.18) (2.77) (25.05) (36.10)   
Pi,t (98-01) 0.047 ***,
++ 
0.043 **,
++ 
0.277 ***  
 
 
 
 (-2.32) (-2.12) (-0.03)     
Pi,t (02-08) 0.047 ***,
++ 
0.045 **,
+
 0.078 ***,
+++ 
  0.092 ** 
 (-2.33) (-1.95) (-6.02)   (2.39) 
m1     -2.78 -1.67  -1.91  
m2     -1.03 -1.06  -1.28  
Hansen (d.f)     262.89 92.96  101.37  
     (232) (90)  (88)  
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 1,648 1,494 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.581  0.404  0.661  0.622    
Target ratio (98-01) 0.099  0.067  0.414      
Target ratio (02-08) 23.500  0.329  1.130    0.708  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.334  0.438  0.422  0.463    
Speed of adj. (98-01) 0.477  0.643  0.669      
Speed of adj. (02-08) 0.002  0.140  0.069    0.130  
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Table C.13: The tax reform – inclusion of earnings with lag 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with dividends 
per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 represents dividends per share paid 
out in the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. Pi,t-1 corresponds to after-tax earnings per share in the 
previous year. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained 
from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for the introduction of 
stock repurchases in 1998 and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 to 2001 and the 
period from 2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We 
test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the 
standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-
break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the 
parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of 
freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting 
standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target 
ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.202 1.295 -0.424 0.083 0.884 *** 
 (1.49) (1.12) (0.86) (0.14) (7.44) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.692 *** 0.589 *** 0.636 *** 0.572 ***   
 (37.11) (12.01) (18.69) (15.99)   
Di,t-1 (98-01) 0.282 *,
++
 0.118 
+++ 
0.264 **,
++ 
    
 (-2.46) (-2.79) (-2.53)    
Di,t-1 (02-08) 1.021 ***,
+++
 0.872 ***,
++
 0.957 ***,
+++ 
  0.884 *** 
 (3.37) (2.34) (2.75)   (7.44) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.197 *** 0.182 *** 0.288 *** 0.294 ***   
 (3.03) (2.72) (25.28) (35.77)   
Pi,t (98-01) 0.031 
++ 
0.028 
++ 
0.237 ***     
 (-2.60) (-2.39) (0.87)    
Pi,t (02-08) 0.046 **,
++ 
0.045 **,
+ 
0.079 
+++ 
  0.084 ** 
 (-2.24) (-1.94) (-6.06)  (2.31) 
Pi,t-1 (88-97) -0.013  -0.005  -0.035 ** -0.024 *   
 (-0.49) (0.18) (-1.97) (-1.82)   
Pi,t-1 (98-01) 0.159 ***,
+++
 0.149 ***,
++
 0.054 ***,
+++
     
 (2.77) (2.54) (2.80)    
Pi,t-1 (02-08) -0.005 0.000 -0.009   0.000 
 (0.79) (0.18) (1.21)  (0.03) 
m1     -2.75 -1.66 -1.98 
m2     -1.07 -1.04 -1.59 
Hansen (d.f)     310.96 96.94 100.02 
   (229) (80) (80) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 3,953 1,641 1,494 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.640  0.433  0.791  0.687   
Target ratio (98-01) 0.043  0.032  0.322      
Target ratio (02-08) -2.190  0.352  1.837    0.724 
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.308  0.411  0.364  0.428   
Speed of adj. (98-01) 0.718  0.882  0.736      
Speed of adj. (02-08) -0.021  0.128  0.043    0.116 
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Table C.14: The tax reform – exclusion of repurchases as acquisition currency 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. Observations in which a firm announces that it repurchases 
shares in order to use the shares as a means of payment in future acquisitions ("acquisition currency") are not 
included. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 represents dividends per share paid out in 
the previous year. Pi,t represents after-tax earnings per share. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for 
constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated 
coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 
and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 to 2001 and the period from 
2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. 
We test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. 
We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the 
coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift 
parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The 
superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and 
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees 
of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change 
in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the 
respective period. The target ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the speed of adjustment in the 
respective period.  
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.092 1.149 -0.400 0.221 -0.146 
 (1.49) (1.04) (-0.39) (0.55) (-0.12) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.671 *** 0.581 *** 0.583 *** 0.538 ***   
 (16.52) (29.03) (43.61) (30.20)   
Di,t-1 (98-01) 0.483 *** 0.299 ***,
+
 0.322 ***,
+
     
 (-1.36) (-1.91) (-1.81)     
Di,t-1 (02-08) 1.004 ***,
+++
 0.857 ***,
+++
 0.923 **,
+++
   0.862 *** 
 (3.60) (2.81) (3.06)   (7.31) 
Pi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.181 *** 0.280 *** 0.288 ***   
 (3.23) (2.86) (31.60) (44.30)   
Pi,t (98-01) 0.040 ***,
++ 
0.034 ***,
++ 
0.258 ***  
 
  
 (-2.49)  (-2.34) (-0.38)      
Pi,t (02-08) 0.048 ***,
++ 
0.045 **,
++ 
0.076 ***,
+++ 
 
 
0.091 ** 
 (-2.35) (-2.01) (-5.96)   (2.36) 
m1     -2.79  -1.67  -1.91  
m2     -1.01  -1.14  -1.22  
Hansen (d.f)     297.15  105.87  132.96  
     (232) (90) (88) 
Observations 3,913 3,913 3,913 1,648 1,460 
Target ratio (88-97) 0.596  0.432  0.671  0.623    
Target ratio (98-01) 0.077  0.049  0.381      
Target ratio (02-08) -12.000  0.315  0.987    0.659  
Speed of adj. (88-97) 0.329  0.419  0.417  0.462    
Speed of adj. (98-01) 0.517  0.701  0.678      
Speed of adj. (02-08) -0.004  0.143  0.077    0.138  
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Table C.15: Financial flexibility: Dividends – exclusion of years with a change in the 
accounting standards 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year, PermPit represents the three year moving average of after-
tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. TransPit is equal to the difference between after tax 
earnings per share and PermPit. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value 
of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce 
a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for 
the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift term. We test if 
the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. 
We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the 
coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift 
parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The 
superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and 
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees 
of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies. The speed of adjustment is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals 
the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the 
respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.603  0.778  0.370  
 (1.20)  (0.94)  (0.34)  
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.640 *** 0.561 *** 0.575 *** 
 (11.32) (21.92) (20.40) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.763 *** 0.599 *** 0.551 *** 
 (1.10) (0.25) (-0.15) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.208 *** 0.218 *** 0.286 *** 
 (2.97) (2.92) (10.68) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.118 **,
+
 0.134 *** 0.205 ***,
++
 
 (-0.02) (-1.48) (-2.12) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.194 *** 0.181 *** 0.273 *** 
 (3.31) (2.83) (107.56) 
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.008 
+++ 
0.002 
++ 
0.110 ***, 
+++
 
 (-2.74) (-2.42) (-3.98) 
m1   -2.97 
m2   -0.15 
Hansen (d.f)   264.57 
   (178) 
Observations 3,381 3,381 3,381 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.578  0.497  0.673  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.498  0.334  0.457  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.539  0.412  0.642  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.034  0.005  0.245  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.360  0.439  0.425  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.237  0.401  0.449  
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Table C.16: Financial flexibility: Dividends – inclusion of earnings with lag 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with dividends 
per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are dividends per share paid out in 
the previous year, PermPi,t (PermPi,t-1) represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the 
years t, t-1 and t-2 (t-1, t-2, t-3). TransPi,t (TransPi,t-1) is equal to the difference between after tax earnings per share (in the 
previous year) and PermPi,t (PermPi,t-1). For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the 
fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The 
superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for 
the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum 
of the pre-break period parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the 
shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in 
parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic 
is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The 
superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for 
the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year 
dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus 
the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in 
the respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.512 0.130 1.091 
 (0.56) (0.08) (1.21) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.559 *** 0.498 *** 0.511 *** 
 (5.89) (9.29) (11.46) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.835 ***,
++
 0.608 *** 0.667 *** 
 (2.11) (0.81) (0.99) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.176 ** 0.172 *** 0.323 *** 
 (2.51) (4.75) (3.04) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.176 ** 0.154 ** 0.238 **,
+
 
 (0.00) (-0.27) (-1.88) 
PermPi,t-1 (88-97) 0.109 0.148 0.055 
 (1.33) (1.45) (0.90) 
PermPi,t-1 (98-08) -0.088 
+++ 
-0.026 
+++ 
-0.092 
+++ 
 (-2.82) (-2.21) (-2.71) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.227 *** 0.231 *** 0.302 *** 
 (4.94) (4.10) (11.84) 
TransPi,t (98-08) -0.017 
+++ 
-0.004 
+++ 
0.038 
+++ 
 (-3.44) (-2.98) (-6.29) 
TransPi,t-1 (88-97) -0.029 -0.024 -0.075 
 (-0.68) (-0.60) (-1.49) 
TransPi,t-1 (98-08) -0.039 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.021 
 (-0.25) (-0.28) (0.57) 
m1     -3.10 
m2     1.77 
Hansen (d.f)     317.40 
     (254) 
Observations 3,224 3,224 3,224 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.385  0.342  0.659  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 1.067  0.391  0.714  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.514  0.461  0.617  
Target ratio trans (98-08) -0.101  -0.010  0.113  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.441  0.502  0.489  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.165  0.392  0.333  
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Table C.17: Financial flexibility: Dividends – exclusion of year dummies 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year, PermPi,t represents the three year moving average of after-
tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. TransPi,t is equal to the difference between after tax 
earnings per share and PermPi,t. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value 
of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We 
introduce a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the 
coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift 
term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically 
different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; 
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-
statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic 
is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k 
degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include a dummy indicating a change in the 
accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the 
respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the respective 
period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.771 *** 1.667 *** 0.282 
 (2.59) (2.92) (0.53) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.652 *** 0.565 *** 0.597 *** 
 (10.53) (17.71) (18.46) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.784 *** 0.602 *** 0.661 *** 
 (1.23) (0.27) (0.47) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.201 *** 0.211 *** 0.273 *** 
 (2.90) (2.84) (9.44) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.115 **,
+
 0.136 ** 0.171 ***,
+++
 
 (-1.69) (-1.34) (-2.89) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.196 *** 0.182 *** 0.273 *** 
 (3.32) (2.87) (46.87) 
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.014 
+++ 
0.007 
++ 
0.087 **,
+++
 
 (-2.68) (-2.40) (-4.99) 
m1     -3.01 
m2     -0.37 
Hansen (d.f)     320.82 
     (315) 
Observations 3,581 3,581 3,581 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.578  0.485  0.677  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.532  0.342  0.504  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.563  0.418  0.677  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.065  0.018  0.260  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.348  0.435  0.403  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.216  0.398  0.257  
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Table C.18: Financial flexibility: Dividends – calculation of permanent earnings based on a 
five year moving average 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year, PermPi,t represents the five year moving average of after-tax 
earnings per share based on the years t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. TransPi,t is equal to the difference between after 
tax earnings per share and PermPi,t. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average 
value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce 
a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for 
the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift term. We test if 
the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. 
We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the 
coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift 
parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The 
superscripts +++ denote significance at the 1% level. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of 
adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm 
(trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of 
adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.161 -0.253 0.633 
 (0.19) (-0.16) (0.61) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.660 *** 0.594 *** 0.612 *** 
 (8.33) (14.16) (10.21) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.789 *** 0.486 *** 0.513 ***,
+++
 
 (1.04) (-0.78) (-2.57) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.257 ** 0.311 *** 0.353 *** 
 (2.19) (2.29) (4.37) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.153 ** 0.205 ** 0.171 ***,
+++
 
 (1.04) (-0.90) (-2.57) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.218 *** 0.209 *** 0.266 *** 
 (3.12) (2.77) (17.51) 
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.014 
+++ 
-0.002 
+++ 
0.058 *,
+++
 
 (-2.78) (-2.58) (-6.74) 
m1     -2.79 
m2     -0.90 
Hansen (d.f)     325.27 
     (297) 
Observations 2,871 2,871 2,871 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.756  0.776  0.910  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.725   0.399  0.725  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.641  0.515  0.686  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.066  -0.004  0.119  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.340  0.406  0.388  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.211  0.514  0.487  
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Table C.19: Financial flexibility: Dividends – calculation of permanent earnings based on 
an AR (1) – model 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are 
dividends per share paid out in the previous year. Permanent and transitory earnings are calculated based on 
an AR(1)-model for each firm. The predicted values of this model are then defined as PermPi,t while the 
residual corresponds to TransPi,t. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value 
of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We 
introduce a structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the 
coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift 
term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically 
different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; 
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-
statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic 
is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k 
degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a 
change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-
1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the 
respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.177 * 0.357 0.692 
 (1.69) (0.36) (0.71) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.641 *** 0.564 *** 0.627 *** 
 (23.24) (13.58) (24.13) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.708 *** 0.520 *** 0.653 *** 
 (0.50) (-0.26) (0.16) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.216 *** 0.302 *** 0.245 *** 
 (4.78) (5.45) (10.39) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.147 ***,
+
 0.195 ***,
+++
 0.168 ***,
+
 
 (-1.66) (-2.68) (-1.66) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.193 *** 0.184 *** 0.269 *** 
 (3.00) (2.67) (11.50) 
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.024 **,
+++ 
0.027 **,
++ 
0.022 
+++
 
 (-2.73) (-2.33) (-10.78) 
m1     -2.73 
m2     -0.32 
Hansen (d.f)     338.16 
     (326) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 3,953 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.602  0.692  0.657  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.503  0.406  0.484  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.538  0.422  0.721  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.082  0.056  0.063  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.359  0.436  0.373  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.292  0.480  0.347  
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Table C.20: Financial flexibility: Dividends – exclusion of repurchases as acquisition 
currency 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with dividends per share as dependent variable. Observations in which a firm announces that it repurchases 
shares in order to use the shares as a means of payment in future acquisitions ("acquisition currency") are not 
included. The first column shows the independent variables. Di,t-1 are dividends per share paid out in the 
previous year, PermPi,t represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the 
years t, t-1 and t-2. TransPi,t is equal to the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermP i,t. For 
the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** 
denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period 
(1988-1997) parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test 
for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-
break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of 
adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm 
(trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of 
adjustment in the respective period. 
 Regular dividends 
  OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.594 0.686 0.178 
 (1.18) (0.86) (0.17) 
Di,t-1 (88-97) 0.642 *** 0.566 *** 0.587 *** 
 (11.56) (21.87) (20.70) 
Di,t-1 (98-08) 0.785 *** 0.596 *** 0.650 *** 
 (1.22) (0.21) (0.42) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.206 *** 0.218 *** 0.279 *** 
 (2.98) (2.97) (10.33) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.113 **,
+
 0.131 ** 0.169 ***,
+++
 
 (-1.82) (-1.54) (-3.10) 
TransPi,t (88-97) 0.194 *** 0.182 *** 0.272 *** 
 (3.30)  (2.86)  (75.75)  
TransPi,t (98-08) 0.013 
+++ 
0.006 
++ 
0.082 **,
++ 
 (-2.68) (-2.40) (-5.27) 
m1     -2.99  
m2     -0.41  
Hansen (d.f)     328.27  
     (315) 
Observations 3,539 3,539 3,539 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.575  0.502  0.676  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.526  0.324  0.483  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.542  0.419  0.659  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.060  0.015  0.234  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.358  0.434  0.413  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.215  0.404  0.350  
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Table C.21: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – exclusion of years with 
a change in the accounting standards 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermPi,t represents the three year 
moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. Positive TransPi,t is equal to 
the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and zero. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, +++ denote significance 
at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the 
respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (TransPi,t) in the respective 
period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.351 ** -2.645 ** 2.371 
 (-2.43)  (-2.29) (0.43) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.167 ** 0.072 0.156 ** 
 (2.42) (0.63) (2.08) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.035 
+++ 
-0.087 *** -0.042 
+++ 
 (-3.13) (-1.46) (-2.61) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.140 *** 0.198 *** 0.143 *** 
 (4.40) (3.75) (5.46) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.127 0.150 0.122 
 (-0.15) (0.15) (-0.16) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.060 ** 0.062 0.073 *** 
 (2.21) (1.32) (7.44) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.418 0.444 0.666 **,
+
 
 (1.17) (1.20) (1.79) 
m1     -1.35 
m2     -1.66 
Hansen (d.f)     305.43 
     (178) 
Observations 3,353 3,353 3,353 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.168 0.213 0.169 
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.123 0.138 0.117 
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.072 0.067 0.086 
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.404 0.048 0.639 
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.833 0.928 0.844 
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.035 1.087 1.042 
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Table C.22: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – allocation of repurchases to 
the earnings of the year in which the repurchase occurs 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with the 
sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. In contrast to the baseline 
specification, repurchases are linked to the earnings of the year in which the repurchase occurs. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 corresponds to 
the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermPi,t represents the three year moving average of after-tax 
earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. Positive TransPi,t is equal to the maximum of the difference 
between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and zero. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is 
the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value 
(in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a 
structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period 
from 1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the 
sum of the pre-break period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the 
standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the 
pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, +++ denote significance at the 
10% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen 
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid 
instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy 
indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for 
Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in the 
respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.376 ** -2.403 *** 9.852 
 (-2.46) (-2.64) (1.45) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.164 ** 0.105 0.169 ** 
 (2.39) (1.13) (2.41) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.075 
+++ 
-0.082 **,
+
 -0.028 
+++ 
 (-2.68) (-1.85) (-2.80) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.143 *** 0.211 *** 0.142 *** 
 (4.48) (3.66) (5.33) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.118 0.141 0.085 
+ 
 (-0.25) (-0.66) (-1.06) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.060 ** 0.074 0.077 *** 
 (2.20) (1.64) (8.07) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.533 0.704 0.025 
 (1.04) (1.19) (-0.61) 
m1     -2.22 
m2     -1.56 
Hansen (d.f)     273.59 
     (167) 
Observations 3,207 3,207 3,207 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.171  0.236  0.171  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.083  0.130  0.110  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.093  0.084  0.072  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.024  0.651  0.496  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.831  0.895  0.836  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.075  1.082  1.028  
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Table C.23: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – inclusion of earnings with lag 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with the sum of 
special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent variables. 
Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the 
previous year. PermPi,t (PermPi,t-1) represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years 
t, t-1 and t-2 (t-1, t-2, t-3). Positive TransPi,t (TransPi,t-1) is equal to the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings 
per share (in the previous year) and PermPi,t (PermPi,t-1) and zero. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is 
the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in 
parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a 
structural break to account for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 
1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-
break period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift 
parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift 
parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-
statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++ denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and 
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as 
one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in 
the respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.779 -0.139 4.300 
 (0.53) (-0.08) (0.84) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.163 *** 0.050 0.148 ** 
 (2.59) (-0.47) (2.27) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) 0.035 
 
-0.020 0.086 ** 
 (-1.54) (-0.62) (-0.66) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.292 *** 0.360 *** 0.370 *** 
 (3.57) (4.43) (5.54) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.207 * 0.255 ** 0.312 ** 
 (-0.88) (-1.06) (-0.66) 
PermPi,t-1 (88-97) -0.158 *** -0.172 *** -0.227 *** 
 (-2.92) (-5.22) (-4.11) 
PermPi,t-1 (98-08) -0.070 -0.065 ** -0.183 ** 
 (1.09) (1.50) (0.61) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.020 -0.001 0.015 
 (0.62) (-0.01) (0.81) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.446 0.436 0.648 **,
++ 
 (1.30) (1.34) (2.26) 
Positive TransPi,t-1 (88-97) -0.300 -0.051 * -0.058 *** 
 (-1.17) (-1.87) (-3.20) 
Positive TransPi,t-1 (98-08) -0.201 -0.213 **,
+ 
-0.345 **,
+ 
 (1.32) (-1.75) (-1.75) 
m1     -1.48 
m2     -1.71 
Hansen (d.f)     283.86 (170) 
Observations 3,198 3,198 3,198 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.349  0.379  0.434  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.215  0.250  0.312  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.024  -0.001  0.018  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.462  0.427  0.709  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.837  0.950  0.852  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 0.965  1.020  0.914  
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Table C.24: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – exclusion of year 
dummies 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermPi,t represents the three year 
moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. Positive TransPi,t is equal to 
the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and zero. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, ++, +++ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals 
the coefficient for PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of adjustment in 
the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.190 -1.732 -0.724 
 (-1.04) (-0.82) (-0.55) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.157 ** 0.066 0.140 * 
 (2.21) (0.59) (1.79) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.032 **,
+++ 
-0.081 -0.038 **,
++ 
 (-2.90) (-1.36) (-2.37) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.147 *** 0.210 *** 0.152 *** 
 (4.48) (3.38) (5.53) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.128 0.150 0.131 
 (-0.25) (-0.64) (-0.21) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.058 ** 0.058 0.070 *** 
 (2.31) (1.29) (6.19) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.406 0.442 0.637 **,
+
 
 (1.19) (1.22) (1.76) 
m1     -1.53 
m2     -1.59 
Hansen (d.f)     250.82 
     (177) 
Observations 3,353 3,353 3,353 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.174  0.225  0.177  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.124  0.139  0.126  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.069  0.062  0.081  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.393  0.409  0.614  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.843  0.934  0.860  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.032  1.081  1.038  
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Table C.25: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – calculation of 
permanent earnings based on a five year moving average 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermPi,t represents the five year moving 
average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. Positive TransPi,t is equal to 
the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and zero. For the fixed-
effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. 
Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts **, *** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment 
is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) 
equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of 
adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.848 1.048 3.235 
 (1.63) (0.75) (0.66) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.378 ** 0.310 0.463 *** 
 (2.49) (1.52) (3.27) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.035 
+++ 
-0.091 
++ 
-0.036 
+++ 
 (-2.79) (-2.05) (-3.54) 
PermPi,t (88-97) -0.037 0.001 -0.135 
 (-0.36) (0.01) (-1.21) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.118 0.157 0.090 
 (1.36) (1.32) (1.64) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.027 0.024 0.045 
 (0.83) (0.77) (1.31) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.459 0.480 0.663 **,
++ 
 (1.42) (1.39) (2.19) 
m1     -1.45 
m2     -1.49 
Hansen (d.f)     291.78 
     (183) 
Observations 3,353 3,353 3,553 
Target ratio perm (88-97) -0.037  0.001  -0.251  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.114  0.144  0.087  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.043  0.035  0.084  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.443  0.440  0.640  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.622  0.690  0.537  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.035  1.091  1.036  
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Table C.26: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – calculation of 
permanent earnings based on an AR (1) – model 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions 
with the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first column 
shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 
corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. Permanent and transitory earnings are 
calculated based on an AR(1)-model for each firm. The predicted values of this model are then defined as 
PermPi,t while Positive TransPi,t corresponds to the maximum of the residual and zero. For the fixed-effects 
models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each 
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which 
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break 
period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for 
the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break 
coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases 
where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts ++, +++ denote significance 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The speed of adjustment 
is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective period. The target ratio perm (trans) 
equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the speed of 
adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.436 ** -1.359 9.528 * 
 (-2.50) (-0.78) (1.79) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.275 *** 0.270 * 0.253 *** 
 (3.06) (1.85) (2.66) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.003 
+++ 
-0.054 **,
++ 
-0.008 
+++ 
 (-3.17) (-2.31) (-2.85) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.094 *** -0.028 0.114 *** 
 (3.30) (-0.23) (4.49) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.014 0.023 0.025 
 (-1.36) (-0.05) (-1.57) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.089 *** 0.096 *** 0.076 *** 
 (3.40) (2.83) (7.36) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.461 0.506 0.313 
 (1.17) (1.20) (0.74) 
m1     -1.26 
m2     -1.38 
Hansen (d.f)     308.39 
     (179) 
Observations 3,553 3,553 3,553 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.130  -0.038  0.153  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.140  0.022  0.025  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.123  0.032  0.102  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.460  0.480  0.311  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.725  0.730  0.747  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.003  1.054  1.008  
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Table C.27: Financial flexibility: Special dividends & repurchases – exclusion of repurchases as 
acquisition currency 
This table shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-systems (GMM (SYS)) regressions with the 
sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. Observations in which a firm 
announces that it repurchases shares in order to use the shares as a means of payment in future acquisitions 
("acquisition currency") are not included. The first column shows the independent variables. Si,t-1 are special dividends 
per share paid out in the previous year, Ri,t-1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. 
PermPi,t represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1 and t-2. 
Positive TransPi,t is equal to the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per share and PermPi,t and 
zero. For the fixed-effects models the coefficient for constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from 
Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account for the 
introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 onwards which is the 
sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We test if the sum of the pre-break period 
parameter and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift 
parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and 
the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is 
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts +, +++ denote significance at the 10% and 1% level, 
respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of 
the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees 
of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the 
accounting standards. The speed of adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t-1 in the respective 
period. The target ratio perm (trans) equals the coefficient for PermPi,t (Positive TransPi,t) in the respective period 
divided by the speed of adjustment in the respective period. 
 Special dividends + repurchases 
 OLS WG GMM (SYS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.350 ** -2.637 ** 2.542 
 (-2.43) (-2.34) (0.48) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (88-97) 0.167 ** 0.073 0.157 ** 
 (2.44) (0.64) (2.11) 
Si,t-1+Ri,t-1 (98-08) -0.034 
+++ 
-0.084 -0.038 
+++ 
 (-3.12) (-1.45) (-2.63) 
PermPi,t (88-97) 0.140 *** 0.195 *** 0.142 *** 
 (4.40) (3.86) (5.36) 
PermPi,t (98-08) 0.124 0.145 0.124 
 (-0.19) (-0.56) (-0.15) 
Positive TransPi,t (88-97) 0.060 ** 0.060 0.073 *** 
 (2.21) (1.33) (7.53) 
Positive TransPi,t (98-08) 0.407 0.443 0.632 *,
+
 
 (1.18) (1.21) (1.68) 
m1     -1.36  
m2     -1.71  
Hansen (d.f)     292.69  
     (177) 
Observations 3,511 3,511 3,511 
Target ratio perm (88-97) 0.168  0.210  0.168  
Target ratio perm (98-08) 0.120  0.134  0.119  
Target ratio trans (88-97) 0.072  0.065  0.087  
Target ratio trans (98-08) 0.394  0.409  0.609  
Speed of adjustment (88-97) 0.833  0.927  0.843  
Speed of adjustment (98-08) 1.034  1.084  1.038  
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